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SUMMARY
A sheer number of US patents have been transferred through market transactions and
that the size of the market for patents has grown.
In this dissertation, I conduct three complementary studies to examine how the mar-
ket for patents shapes technological innovation. Drawing on the broad discussion of the
benefits and costs of patent ownership transfer for invention, I develop three research ques-
tions, and in three essays I address each of them through building theoretical models and
conducting empirical analysis.
In the first study, I examine a firm’s economic incentive for purchasing patents to gain
strategic benefit over market rivals and how the firm’s patents purchase results in the market
rival’s innovative activities. In the second study, I investigate the antitrust issue of patent
consolidation caused by the purchase of multiple patents by a small number of firms and
the impact of a governmental authorities’ regulation of the generated patent monopolies
by patent consolidation on the development of follow-on innovations. In the last study,
I analyze the impact of granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions
through patents transfer on the follow-on innovative activities.
Altogether, this dissertation contributes to advancing our understanding of the distinc-
tive nature of the market for patents from the market for technology, and it extends the




1.1 Presence and Growth of the Market for Patents
A patent codifies a novel, useful, and non-obvious (35 U.S.C. 101) idea into a legal docu-
ment and confers a temporal exclusive right to use it, becoming transferable property (35
U.S.C. 261). In other words, one can sell or purchase ownership of a patent.
Patent transfer through market transaction forms the market for patents. Because patent-
associated transactions are often subject to substantial transaction costs (Gambardella,
2005; Lemley and Myhrvold, 2007; Troy and Werle, 2008; Benassi and Di Minin, 2009),
one might expect the market for patents to be an inefficient market. Unlike products in typ-
ical markets, each patent is unique, and thus there is usually a limited number of potential
buyers for each patent seller. Also, because one cannot know the actual value of a patent
(Lemley and Myhrvold, 2007), not only because of the difficulty in evaluating the quality of
patent itself but also because of the challenges in estimating the economic contribution of
the patented technology as it used to be the “input” for other innovation (Griliches, 1990).
This uncertainty creates information asymmetry between the buyer and seller of a patent.
Often, this information asymmetry makes the patent market inefficient. Accordingly, one
may assume the market for patents is not that active nor sizable.
Surprisingly, a series of recent studies find that the patent market is active. Serrano
(2010) found that the ownership of 13.5% of US patents has changed at least once during
the patent life. Serrano and Ziedonis (2018) revealed that about 70% of the patents owned
by failed startups are redeployed through patent ownership transfer. Meanwhile, about
one out of three European Patent Office (EPO) patents have been transferred at some time
(Ciaramella et al., 2017).
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Figure 1.1: Number of Transferred US Patents by Year
Aside from the presence of a active market for patents, my calculation of the number of
US patents that were transferred through market transaction1 using the USPTO patent as-
signment databases (Graham et al., 2018) shows extensive growth of the market for patents
in the US. As shown in Figure 1.1, the number of traded patents grew from 112,326 in 1990
to 442,002 in 2015.2
One may explain the growth of the market for patents as the result of business activities
that often accompany patents transfer, such as mergers and acquisition (M&A). However,
the trends of the M&A transaction volume and value both at the worldwide (Figure 1.3)
1 Excluding patent transfer before the patent application exists, cases in which the patent owner’s name
changed, correction for the reason of patents reassignment, secularization of patents by patents
collateral, and patents transfer between corporate-hired inventors and employers.
2 The pattern of decrease in the number of transferred patents seen in 2014 is due to the delay between
patent application and publication as well as the delay in indexing patent transfer records in the
database. The substantial drop actually occurred around 2008, probably because of the global financial
crisis and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
2
Figure 1.2: M&A Transaction by Year (World Wide)
and national scales (Figure 1.2) seem not to correlate with the pattern of ever-increasing
numbers of transferred US patents.
It can also be argued that the increase seen in the last three decades is simply due to
increasingly accumulated patents available for transfer. However, my estimation of the
patent transfer propensity3 presented in Figure 1.4 still shows a growing pattern over the
period from 1990 to 2015.
1.2 Market for Patents and Innovation
The presence of a sizable market for patents draws the attention of innovation manage-
ment scholars and policymakers regarding how the market for patent transfer shapes tech-
nological innovation (hereafter, Innovation). Given that the patent is one of the primary
institutional devices for incentivizing innovation yet can cause undesirable consequences
for innovation, patent transfer can have both beneficial and costly effects on innovation as
3 The denominator is the number of active US patents available for transfer in the year observed.
3
Figure 1.3: M&A Transaction by Year (in U.S.)
Figure 1.4: Propensity of patent Transfer by Year
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well. Indeed, there is an on-going relevant discussion of the conflicting consequences of
patents transfer on innovation.
On the one hand, an active patent market can promote innovation. First, the patent
market provides more opportunities for inventors to reap economic benefits from their in-
novative activities (Arora, 1997; Gambardella, 2005; Galasso et al., 2013; Odasso et al.,
2014; Spulber, 2015). The more active the market for patents, the greater the chance of
selling a patent and the greater the inventor’s expected revenues from that invention, which
creates economic incentive for future innovative activities (Kremer, 1998). This benefit
may be particularly prominent for individuals or start-ups that are financially constrained in
conducting R&D (Hall, 2002) and commercializing their innovations (Ferrill, 2004; Gam-
bardella et al., 2007). Given that directly profiting from invention through commercializa-
tion of patent is risky and costly, transferring patents could be a more convenient and less
risky way for inventors to benefit financially from their inventions.
Second, as the patent system is a crucial institution that enhances technology transaction
efficiency (Shane, 2002; Gans et al., 2008; Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Cockburn et al.,
2010; Gans and Stern, 2010; Spulber, 2015) and transferring patent ownership can be an
alternative way of transferring technology (Jeong et al., 2013), encouraging patent transfer
is one way of promoting technology transfer and, therefore, improving the efficiency of the
innovation process through invigorating the division of innovative labor, as the literature
on the market for technology explains (Arora, 1997; Arora et al., 2004, 2013). Several
empirical studies support this idea.
Burhop (2010) shows that the patent market facilitates technology transfer and promote
knowledge spillover. By analyzing the characteristics of patents that were traded in the late
19th to early 20th century in Germany, this study suggests that the active patent market
in 19th century Germany contributed to the country’s industrialization. A study by Tsai
and Wang (2008) shows that firms’ inward patent licensing and patent purchasing activities
have positive relationships with its performance if the firm has sufficient absorptive capac-
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ity. The study concludes that externally acquired patents can complement firms’ internal
R&D capabilities. Akcigit et al. (2016) show that patent transactions not only help to cor-
rect the misallocation of ideas across firms ex-post facto but also influence firms’ growth
while encouraging their R&D. The authors argue that the patents market allows firms to re-
organize their patent portfolio, which enables them to manage their IPR assets better and to
make a more efficient R&D investments, thereof. In their study, Jeong et al. (2013) show
that patent trading may be complementary to patent licensing, which supports the idea that
patent ownership transfer can be another channel for technology transactions.
Third, patent transfer reallocates existing patents so that these patents can be used more
effectively. For example, the market for patents can reduce the cost incurred by patent
infringement disputes by reallocating the patents to those who are better equipped to en-
force patents right. Galasso et al. (2013) and Haus and Juranek (2018) provide evidence
supporting this idea by showing that the transfer of patents to those who have stronger
capabilities in patents enforcement than the original patentee reduces the delay in settling
patent infringement disputes. This finding implies that patents transfer could encourage the
division of labor between developing and protecting the invention, which would contribute
to improving the overall efficiency of the innovation process. Patents transfer, in this case,
is expected to improve patents’ enforceability as well as inventors’ appropriability.
On the other hand, patent transfer can deter innovation. The fact that patents are used for
strategic purposes through patents enforcement (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Ziedonis, 2004;
Motohashi, 2008; Graham et al., 2009) or that firms have incentive to preempt patents to
maintain stronger downstream market power (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Gilbert, 1987)
is at the center of this thought: some firms purchase patents solely in order to exploit the
patent exclusion rights to gain strategic benefits over their market competitors. A study of
Kelley (2011) suggests that growth of patent transfers are probably driven by entities that
seek benefits from the strategic use of patents. Based on the interviews with patent inter-
mediaries and technology firms in Silicon Valley, this study concludes that patent transfer
6
could be trading of intellectual weapons between firms. The patents transfer for strategic
use can impose the following undesirable effects.
First, it can aggravate the ex-post patent holdup issue or promote frivolous patents in-
fringement disputes, which drives up the cost of innovation. For example, firms may pur-
chase patents to build barriers preventing the entry of potential market competitors or to
impose greater operating costs on present market competitors (Hahn, 1984; Morton and
Shapiro, 2013) to have a strategic advantage in downstream market competition. As a re-
sult, a downstream innovator could be faced with a greater cost to innovate, which would
divert resources from efficient R&D investments. Because patents can also be used as bar-
gaining chips for settling patents infringement disputes (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis,
2004; Thumm, 2004), firms could be motivated to purchase others’ patents for pure defen-
sive purpose rather than to commercialize the underlying inventions. Such patent aggre-
gation for pure strategic benefit could prevent the genuine technology transfer that might
otherwise happen (e.g., Kwon and Motohashi, 2014).
This concern becomes even more salient with the emergence of Patent Assertion Enti-
ties (PAEs), which are defined as business entities that purchase patents for the sole purpose
of leveraging the risk of firms that are under litigation for patent infringement. Some argue
that PAEs may promote innovation by stimulating the market for technology and brokering
patents transfer (McDonough III, 2006; Shrestha, 2010). However, because these entities
typically seek to extract excessive fees from operating firms through ex-post patent asser-
tion, other scholars argue that PAEs do not contribute to the market for technology but
generate unnecessary social cost (Fischer and Henkel, 2012; Kwon and Motohashi, 2014;
Caviggioli and Ughetto, 2016).
A patent transaction that could increase the ex-post patent holdup risk has recently
become one of the stated concern of innovation policymakers (FTC, 2011). According to
policy discourse, ex-post patent transactions do not contribute to innovation because they
increase product prices while failing to improve consumer welfare.
7
Second, patent transfer practices can raise antitrust issues. The patent market enables
consolidation of existing patents by a few firms, which could discourage downstream mar-
ket competition by effectively forming a monopoly on upstream technology as well as the
relevant downstream markets. For example, if a firm purchases all the existing patents on
a particular technology that is essential for making a product, the patent-acquiring firm
can effectively secure excessive market power allowing it to monopolize the correspond-
ing downstream product market (See Hahn, 1984). Regarding this concern, a study by
Figueroa and Serrano (2013) shows that there is no evidence of a concentration of patents
to few firms when it comes to patent trading between small and large firms. Yet, the aggre-
gation of patents by few firms remains one of the antitrust regulatory authority’s concerns
in the U.S. Indeed, patent transactions that result in the creation of a monopoly has been the
subject of regulatory review (Brown and Zun, 2011; Gotts and Sher, 2012) by the antitrust
division of the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
A few firms’ monopolization of upstream technology through patents consolidations
could discourage innovation in the sectors where cumulative innovation is pervasive and
critical. If a firm monopolizes ownership of existing patents, other firms’ access to the nec-
essary technology for developing the follow-on innovation could be substantially restricted.
Third, patent transfer can deter scientific progress and follow-on research. This is of
particular concern in relation to the transfer of universities’ patented inventions in scientific
commons to private firms. Universities often use public research funds to conduct basic
scientific research, which can be the foundation for technological innovation. When the
resulting inventions on outcomes of such scientific research are privatized through transfer
of the patents to firms, access to the underlying scientific knowledge could be excessively
restricted, as demonstrated by the story of the exclusive licensing of the OncoMouse patents
to DuPont by the University of California (Murray, 2006). The restricted accessibility to
the scientific commons can impede and delay follow-on scientific research as well as the
follow-on innovation (Partha and David, 1994; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998; Heller and
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Eisenberg, 1998; Nelson, 2004; Walsh et al., 2007).
1.3 Research Questions & Overview
Motivated by the discussion summarized above, the aim of this dissertation is to elucidate
the nature of the market for patents through exploration of how patent transfer shapes inno-
vation by examining the effect of patent transfer on development of relevant inventions to
the transferred patent. I conduct three complementary studies to explore how patent trans-
fers that the three key actors in the system of innovation involves in affect the development
of relevant inventions: firms (Essay 1), governments (Essay 2), and universities (Essay 3).
Essay 1. Impact of Patent Ownership Transfer on Patent Holdup Risk and Innovation
of Firms
In the first essay, I examine whether firms have economic incentive to purchase others’
patents to use those patents for strategic benefits over market rivals. To this end, I start
by constructing an analytical model to investigate whether the exploitation of a rival firm’s
patent holdup risk is an incentivizing benefit for a firm to purchase a patent. The model
demonstrates that a firm has a strong economic incentive to purchase the patent that is
crucial for the rival firm’s market operation because doing so allows the patent-purchasing
firm to leverage the rival’s patent holdup risk, thus benefiting in market competition.
The extended model that incorporates the firm’s production function and patented tech-
nology as an input for the production derives a hypothesis stating that a firm’s patent pur-
chase will make the rival firm less active in developing technologies relevant to the pur-
chased patent if the patent is critical to the rival firm’s operations. I empirically test this
hypothesis by analyzing the case of the Nortel patent auction in the US in 2011.
Essay 2. How Does Antitrust Regulation of Patents Consolidation Affect Follow-on
Innovation?
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In the second essay, I examine how governmental regulation of formation of patent mo-
nopolies through the prevention of patent consolidation by a firm affects the development
of follow-on innovation.
I start by building a three-firm model to explore how a firm’s patents consolidation con-
figures the market competition and development of follow-on innovation. The model pre-
dicts that a firm’s consolidation of existing patents on substitutes for the patented upstream
technology that it already owns deters follow-on innovation of its market competitors while
not creating incentive for the patent consolidating firm to develop additional follow-on in-
vention. In this case, antitrust regulation of the firm’s patents consolidation is expected
to mitigate its negative effect on the market competitors’ follow-on innovation. I test this
prediction by using the case of the US Department of Justice’s (DoJ) partial regulation of
patents transfer from Novell to Microsoft, Oracle, EMC, and Apple in 2011.
Essay 3. Granting a Firm the Exclusive Access to a University’s Inventions and Its
Effect on Follow-on Innovation
The third essay examines the impact of conferring exclusive access to a university’s
inventions to outside firms on the rate of follow-on invention. This study focuses on exam-
ining how granting a firm the exclusive right to use a university’s inventions distinctively
affects the follow-on innovative activities by entities (i.e., recipients vs. non-recipients of
the exclusive access) and the nature of patented idea (scientific commons vs. those that are
not).
As an empirical strategy, I consider patent ownership transfer from a university to a firm
as a way of conferring an exclusive right to use the university’s invention, while defining the
scientific commons as an invention created based on federal research funding or a patent
that has a tight link to the scientific knowledge originated from federally sponsored re-
search. My data consists of US patents that were transferred by 107 US research-intensive
universities to various firms from 2000 to 2013.
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1.4 Structure of this Dissertation
This dissertation is structured as follow. Essays 1, 2 and 3 are presented in Chapters 2, 3,
and 4, respectively. Each chapter consists of an introduction, theoretical model or literature
review, empirical setting, results, and conclusions. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation




IMPACT OF PATENT OWNERSHIP TRANSFER ON PATENT HOLDUP RISK
AND INNOVATION OF FIRMS
The growth of the market for patents has drawn the attention of innovation management
scholars and policymakers to the impact this market may have on innovation. One of
their prominent questions is whether firms exploit the market for patents to obtain strategic
benefits over their market rivals, which may aggravate ex-post patent holdup and increase
the cost of innovation.
In this study, I examine how a firm’s patent purchase affects its rival’s innovative activity
when the patent can be strategically utilized by the patent purchasing firm against its rival.
I investigate whether there is an economic incentive for the firm to purchase a patent to
strategically utilize the patent against the market rival. Then, I derive a hypothesis stating
that the firm’s patent purchase deters the rival firm’s development of relevant technologies
to that patent if the patent covers crucial technological input for the rival’s market operation,
by imposing a greater patent holdup risk to the rival firm.
My analysis using Nortel’s patent auction case in 2011 finds supportive evidence for the
short term effect. Finally, I discuss the different nature of the market for patents from the
market for technology and how we must understand these differences to formulate better
innovation policies.
2.1 Introduction
Although a great number of patents have been transferred through market transactions, and
studies have repeatedly shown the presence of a sizable market for patents in the United
States, how patent ownership transfer may affect innovation has been less explored. On the
one hand, when patent ownership is transferred to those who can enforce the patents better
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than the original patent owner, the patent transfer reduces unnecessary patent infringement
lawsuits and associated costs (Galasso et al., 2013) while it compensates inventors for un-
derutilized inventions (Kremer, 1998; Ferrill, 2004).
Transacting title to a patent is a way of transferring technology (Arora, 1997; Arora and
Fosfuri, 2003; Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Jeong et al., 2013). The technology market
enhances the efficiency of the innovation process by promoting the division of innovative
labor and diffusion of technology (Arora, 1997; Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora et al., 2004,
2013).
On the other hand, firms may trade patents for the strategic exploitation of the patent
exclusion right without having the intention to market the patented technology. As many
studies show, firms use patents as a defensive bargaining chip for settling patent infringe-
ment disputes (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Thumm, 2004; Ziedonis, 2004) or for deterring
a competitor’s market entry (Cohen et al., 2000; Motohashi, 2008; Graham et al., 2009).
Hence, patent ownership transfer is not necessarily a result of technology transactions (See,
Monk, 2009; Kelley, 2011; Figueroa and Serrano, 2013; Galasso et al., 2013; Morton and
Shapiro, 2014) but may, instead, be part of a firm’s intellectual property strategy.
So, how does a patent transfer for the strategic use of patent exclusion rights affect
a firm’s innovative activity? The literature on patent holdup and firms’ defensive use of
patents both hint at the answer: It depends on which firm acquires a patent and whether
the firm is at risk of a patent holdup with regard to the patent of interest. When patents
are acquired by a rival firm that has stakes in the opportunistic use of patents against the
focal firm, the focal firm is likely to suffer from an increased patent holdup risk. The
patent holdup hypothesis asserts that once a firm is exposed to a greater level of patent
holdup risk, the firm will produce less and make inefficient R&D investments (Lemley
and Shapiro, 2006; Galetovic et al., 2015). On the other hand, a firm’s preemptive patent
purchase immunizes the firm to the probable patent holdup that would occur if the patent
was purchased by another firm. Such defensive patent purchase strategies are a foundation
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of the business of defensive patent aggregators (Hagiu and Yoffie, 2013; Cosandier et al.,
2014; Morton and Shapiro, 2014; Kwon and Drev, 2017).
Although the reasoning outlined above appears to offer a straightforward understanding
of the patent market and how it relates to firms’ innovative activities, there are surprisingly
few studies in this regard. The literature on the strategic use of patents has focused on
theorizing how firms leverage the patent holdup risk of their rivals, while some empiri-
cal studies have found evidence of the detrimental impact to innovation of opportunistic
exploitation of patent holdup risk (Walsh et al., 2003; Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2009; El-
hauge, 2008; Galetovic et al., 2015). Meanwhile, a study on the patent market by Graham
et al. (2018) examined the development of the market in the United States, and Ciaramella
et al. (2017) examined its development in Europe. Serrano (2005, 2010) analyzed firms’
patent trading patterns in the United States, and Galasso et al. (2013) investigated how
patent transfer improves patent enforcement efficiency. Figueroa and Serrano (2013) stud-
ied the patent transaction flow between small and large firms. Kelley (2011) and Morton
and Shapiro (2014) analyzed various drivers of patent transfers, and Serrano and Ziedo-
nis (2018) examined the redeployment of the patent assets of failed start-ups. The lack
of studies becomes particularly salient when considering the recent policy discourse on
the necessity of legislative regulation of entities that purchase patents for the opportunistic
use of patent exclusion rights against manufacturers (i.e., patent assertion entities) (FTC,
2011).
What is the nature of the strategic benefits that a firm can gain over its rival from
the acquisition of external patents? How does a firm’s patent purchase affect the
innovative activities of its rivals?
This study explores the theoretical and empirical answers to these questions. First,
by constructing a simple analytical model, I show that there is an economic incentive for
a firm to purchase patents that could be critical for a rival firm’s market operations in
order to strategically exploit the patent holdup risk the rival firm would face. Second, by
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elaborating on the patent holdup theory, I expand the analytical model to illustrate how a
firm’s purchase of such patents may impact a rival firm’s innovative activity. The model
predicts that a firm’s patent purchase can make the rival deter developing technologies
related to the patent if the patent is crucial for the rival’s market operations.
I empirically tested the derived hypothesis using the case of Nortel’s patent auction (a
bankrupted Canadian telecommunications equipment company).
There are three findings in this paper. First, this study showed that, theoretically, a firm
can significantly enhance its profits when it leverages the patent’s holdup risk for its market
competitors. This benefit becomes an economic incentive for the focal firm to purchase
patents that could be crucial for a rival firm’s market operations.
Second, if a firm’s patent purchase imposes a greater patent holdup risk on its rival,
the rival becomes less active in developing technologies relevant to the patent. The patent
holdup theory explains this finding.
Third, the observed impact on the rival firm, however, disappears over time. I explain
this finding with the strategic actions taken by firms to mitigate (future) patent holdup risk,
which was conceptualized as the “working solution” by Walsh et al. (2003).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I review the patent
holdup literature, focusing on how it increases the cost of innovation. In Section 3, by
constructing an analytical model that captures the relationship between patent transfer and
a firm’s market competition, I explain how the benefits from strategic exploitation of a
patent’s holdup risk to a rival firm can incentivize a firm’s patent purchase. By incorpo-
rating the patent holdup theory into the model, I rationalize how a firm’s patent purchase
increases the patent holdup risk of its rival and influences the rival’s innovative activity
thereafter. In Section 4, I describe the data and my empirical research design. Section 5
presents the findings, and in Section 6, I discuss their implications. Section 7 concludes by
suggesting avenues for future research in this area.
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2.2 Patent Holdup and Innovation
A patent holdup is likely to occur when the following three elements are intertwined: an
essential input to a firm’s production is owned by other firms; the focal firm has an asset-
specific investment in that input; and the input’s owner behaves opportunistically.
For example, suppose that firm A makes a product, and firm B owns an input for firm A’s
production. Firm A may have contracted with firm B for the use of the input in production.
Firm A makes the input-specific investment, which becomes a sunk cost if firm B no longer
supplies the input. By leveraging this risk, firm B may initiate an ex-post negotiation after
firm A makes the input-specific investment and product, which forces firm A to pay firm B
rent that is higher than the ex-ante rent to continue using the input. Expecting this situation,
firm A becomes reluctant to invest in acquiring assets that have specificity to the input. In
an extreme case, firm A’s production can break down.
This holdup situation can happen through ex-post patent enforcement. Because a patent
grants the owner the legal right to exclude others from using the patented invention, the
owner can leverage the patent holdup risk to extract an excessive rent from firms that use
the patented technology for their production. These firms become more vulnerable to an
ex-post patent holdup if they have invested in assets that have specificity to that patent
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2010).
The leveraging of this ex-post patent holdup risk has been blamed for discouraging in-
novation because firms that are exposed to the holdup will be reluctant to make optimal
R&D investments (Bessen, 2004). Even more seriously, given the cumulative nature of
modern innovation (Scotchmer, 2004), patent holdups can limit innovators’ access to essen-
tial technologies for creating follow-on innovation. This undesirable consequence could be
particularly acute in complex technology fields (Shapiro, 2010) or where standard-essential
patents (SEPs) are crucial inputs for production (Farrell et al., 2007; Miller, 2007; Galetovic
et al., 2015). Other theoretical studies raise similar concerns using different terms to refer
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to patent holdup, such as the tragedy of the anticommons and the patent thicket, which em-
phasize the detrimental impact of patent ownership fragmentation and the accompanying
excessive cost of using patented technologies for innovation.
According to Heller and Eisenberg (1998), the tragedy of the anticommons can emerge
when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and
no one has an effective privilege of use (p. 698). In this situation, the cost of acquiring
the necessary patented technology for production can easily exceed the genuine value of
the product while also increasing incidents of patent infringement. A similar concern was
raised by Shapiro (2010) with the concept of the patent thicket, which is defined as a dense
web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through
to commercialize new technology (p. 120). As the patent thicket that a company faces
becomes denser, the cost to clear the patent thicket increases, which restricts follow-on
innovation.
Interestingly, empirical studies report mixed findings on the detrimental effects to in-
novation of patent holdup. Walsh et al. (2003) investigated whether patent holdups hamper
R&D in the biomedical industry. Surprisingly, the study did not find evidence in support
of the tragedy of the anticommons hypothesis. Instead, it suggested that firms equip them-
selves to cope with patent holdups. A study by Galetovic et al. (2015) examined whether
R&D activities in sectors where SEPs are crucial are negatively impacted by patent holdups.
Their study showed no empirical evidence that SEP holdup negatively impacted overall
R&D activity.
In contrast, a study by Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) found empirical evidence
showing that patent thickets impose difficulties on start-up operations. Their analysis
demonstrated that start-ups in sectors where dense patent thickets exist experience a greater
delay in acquiring venture capital funding than firms in sectors with less dense patent thick-
ets. Their study also showed that start-ups in sectors with a dense patent thicket are less
likely to have initial public offerings than those in sectors without patent thickets.
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A subsequent study by Cockburn et al. (2010) that used survey data regarding the inno-
vative activities of German firms showed that the relationship between a firm’s innovation
performance and the patent thicket depends on the firm’s patent licensing activity. Specif-
ically, they found that the innovation performance of firms was negatively correlated with
the denseness of the patent thicket when firms were engaging in in-licensing activity. How-
ever, the relationship was positive for firms that did not practice in-licensing.
The mixed findings summarized above are partly explained by the ways firms cope with
patent thickets or patent holdups. As Walsh et al. (2003) explained, when entities develop
strategies to cope with probable patent holdup problems, they can, to some extent, mitigate
the detrimental impact on their innovative activities. Shapiro (2000) and Bessen (2003)
suggested similar ideas. They argued that patent-oriented strategic instruments, such as
patent pooling or cross-licensing, can resolve the problems associated with patent thickets.
Likewise, Cockburn et al. (2010) showed that the impact of the patent thicket on a firm’s
innovative activity is dependent on the firm’s patent licensing activity, which implies that
patent holdup risk can be managed strategically.
2.3 Model
What is the nature of the strategic benefits that a firm can gain over its market competitor
when it exploits the patent holdup risk of the rival firm? How, if at all, does such a benefit
incentivize the focal firm’s external patents acquisition?
Suppose that there are three firms. Firm 1 and firm 2 are symmetric and in down-
stream market competition. They produce imperfectly substitutable products. The product
substitutability is parameterized into θ ∈ [0, 1]. Firm 1 faces the inverse demand curve
p1 = a − b(q1 + θq2) while firm 2 faces p2 = a − b(q2 + θq1) where a and b are positive
numbers (Bowley, 1924). When θ is 0, each firm faces its market demand whereas they
engage in duopolistic market competition with a perfectly substitutable product if θ = 1.
For simplicity, I assume that firm 1 and firm 2 both have the constant marginal production
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cost, c. Firm 3 owns a patent for an essential technological input for the two other firms’
production. It is assumed that cost for inventing around this patent is substantial while firm
3 competes with neither of them in the downstream market. The product substitutability,
the inverse demand curves, and the marginal production cost are common information.
2.3.1 When firm 3 keeps the patents
Given the technological importance of the patent for the production of firms 1 and 2, these
two firms receive licenses to the patents owned by firm 3. In return, firm 3 earns a certain
fraction (i.e., royalty rate r) of firm 1 and firm 2’s market revenues as the licensing fee.
Given r, firm 1 and firm 2 maximize their profits as follows;
max
qi
qi{(1− r)(a− bqi − bθqj)− c}, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j (2.1)
In quantity competition, firm 1 and 2 produce q̃i =
a(1−r)−c
b(2+θ)(1−r) . Given the two firms’
best responses, firm 3 decides r to maximize its profit as follow:
max
r
π3 := π0 + rq̃1(a− bq̃1 − bθq̃2) + rq̃2(a− bq̃2 − bθq̃1) (2.2)
where π0 is the market profit of firm 3, which is independent from firm 1 and firm 2’s
market operation. Firm 3 charges r such that ∂π3
∂r
= 0.
2.3.2 When the patent is transferred to firm 1(or 2)
Consider that firm 3 sells patents to either firm 1 or firm 2. For simplicity, suppose that
firm 1 becomes the new owner of the patent. With r now given by firm 1, firm 1 and





q1(a− bq1 − bθq2 − c) + rq2(a− bq2 − bθq1)
Firm2 : max
q2
q2{(1− r)(a− bq2 − bθq1)− c}
(2.3)






Firm 1 decides r to maximize its profit, given q̃1 and q̃2.
This model accommodates the concepts of revenue effect and rent dissipation effect of
patent licensing (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora et al., 2004, 2013; Motohashi, 2008; Arora
and Gambardella, 2010; Kani and Motohashi, 2012). Revenue effect refers to the royalty
revenue that the patent owner can obtain by licensing owning patent to other firms. Rent
dissipation effect refers to the patent holder’s profit loss due to the licensee’s market oper-
ation with the licensed patent by the patent holder. The rent dissipation effect increases in
the intensity of downstream market competition between the patent holder and the licensee.
In the firm 1’s profit function, −bθq2 captures the rent dissipation effect because it
corresponds to the loss of market revenue of firm 1 by the rival’s market operation with
the licensed patent. rq2(a − bq2 − bθq1) captures the revenue effect because it is the rent
revenue that firm 1 obtains from firm 2 as a result of licensing.
2.3.3 Comparative Analysis
For non-linearity of the system equations, I find numerical solutions, setting a = 5, b = 1,
and c = 1 with variation in θ from 0 to 1.
Royalty rate. The first panel (Northwest) of Figure 2.1 profiles the optimal level of r
that the patent holder will charge to licensees before (black solid) and after (blue solid) the
patent transfer. First, in both cases, r increases in θ. This indicates that the greater intensity
of market competition between firm 1 and firm 2, the larger that the royalty fee charged



































































































































































































































































































































is sufficiently large, the royalty rate that firm 1 will charge firm 2 becomes substantially
greater than what was charged by firm 3. This indicates that if firm 1 and firm 2 are
close enough in the downstream market space, firm 1’s patent purchase and the probable
re-negotiation for licensing will impose a greater royalty cost per revenue on firm 2.
Profit. The second panel (Northeast) of Figure 2.1 plots firm 1 and firm 2’s maximized
level of profits by θ when firm 2 continues to receive the license at the given royalty rate
r. After firm 1 purchases the patent, it earns more profit (blue solid) than firm 2 (red solid)
when 0 < θ < 1. If the patent on the technology does not exist (green dashed), firm 1’s
profit when it purchases the patent from firm 3 is greater than that when the two firms are in
typical duopolistic market competition. Firm 1’s profit if it owns the patent also exceeds its
monopolistic market profit (gray solid). These findings indicate that firm 1 has an economic
incentive to purchase the patent as long as firm 1 can compel firm 2 to pay to license the
patent at the desired royalty rate.
The improvement of firm 1’s profit originates from the fact that firm 1 becomes capable
of internalizing the externality of its rival’s market operation through enforcement of the
patent license. In doing so, firm 1 can manipulate firm 2’s production level while gaining
rent revenue. In contrast, firm 3 has no stakes in increasing the royalty rate as high as firm
1 will, because imposing excessive rent reduces the market revenue of the licensees and
it curtails the royalty revenue for firm 3 accordingly while doing so gives no benefits in
downstream market competition.
Firm 3’s incentive for patent sale. Does firm 3 have an economic incentive to sell
the patent to firm 1 (or firm 2) in the first place? I examine whether firm 3 can enhance
its profit by selling the patent to firm 1, compared to the profit that firm 3 earns when it
keeps the patent. Firm 1’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to purchase firm 3’s patent
is firm 1’s expected incremental profit from this patent acquisition. The third panel on the
southwest of Figure 2.1 profiles firm 1’s maximum WTP for the patent-purchase and firm
3’ profit before the patent-transfer. Firm 1’s calculated incremental profit from the patent
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acquisition (Black solid line) exceeds firm 3’s when firm 3 keeps the patent (Blue solid
line), which indicates that the patent ownership transfer from firm 3 to firm 1 enhances
both firms’ profits.1
Patents selection for purchase. The comparative statistics reveal that there is an eco-
nomic incentive for a firm to purchase patent if this firm can compel rival firms to pay to
license these patents at the desired royalty rate. Thus, the focal firm has an incentive for
purchasing patents that are critical to its rivals’ market operation.
2.3.4 Impact of patent ownership transfer on rival’s innovative activity
How does a firm’s patent purchase affect the rival’s innovative activity if the patent is crit-
ical to the rival’s market operation and, thus the patent purchase imposes a greater risk of
patent holdup on the rival?
Consider that firm 1 and 2 make products by combining two technological elements,
E1 and E2. E1 is the group of technologies that are replaceable for or have technological
dependency on the patent that is purchased by firm 1. The patent of interest cover h-
technologies for E1. E2 is for technologies that are not relevant to the patents. The number
of technologies that the firm obtains for E1 and E2 for production is x and y, respectively.
I model a firm’s production function into a Cobb-Douglas function of x and y, (i.e.,
q(x, y) = A0x
αyβ). I assume that other inputs for production such as labor or capital are
independent of the patents transfer. The firm pays Px and Py for developing one addi-
tional unit of technology of E1 and E2 in the initial setting (i.e., firm 3 owns the patent),
respectively. For comparative statistics, I set Py = 1.
Before the patent transfer. Firm 1 and firm 2 were presumed to receive licenses on the
patent from firm 3 before the patent transfer. Firm 1 and firm 2’s optimal production levels
1 The fact that the calculated maximum WTP of firm 1 decreases as θ increases, should not be
interpreted as the greater the market competition intensity between firms 1 and 2, the lower firm 1’s
incentive to purchase the patents. This is because the small value of θ means that firm 1 and firm 2 are
in a different market. If firm 1 compels firm 2 that is in a different market to receive the license on firm
1’s patent, firm 1 effectively earns the market profit from own market operation and firm 2’s market
operation, which double the profit size.
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are determined by the result of market competition between them with the given royalty
rate r∗0 by firm 3. For firm 2, this rate of royalty determines the desired level of x and y by





0(a− bq∗20 − bθq∗10) + Pxx+ y, s.t.q∗20 = A0(x+ h)αyβ (2.4)
where q∗10 and q
∗
20 are firm 1 and firm 2’s optimal production level before the patent owner-



























After the patent-transfer. After the patent is transferred to firm 1, firm 2 expects that
its optimal production level will decrease if it continues to pay to license to the patent (see
Figure 2.1).
Assuming that the firm 1 takes the take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) strategy, if the patented
technology is replaceable by other patented technologies of E1, firm 2 considers two op-
tions: keep paying to license the patent from firm 1 at the increased rate of royalty or
inventing around the patent.
When firm 2 chooses to pay for the license, firm 2 continues to use h-technologies for
E1. In return, the firm pays royalties at the given rate r∗L to firm 1 while the production level
changes to q∗2L. Then, firm 2 decides x and y by solving the cost minimization problem
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α+β . Because q∗2L < q
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If firm 2 chooses to invent-around, the firm develops all the necessary technologies for
E1 and E2 through internal R&D. Doing so frees firm 2 from a license contract with firm
1, but making firm 2 face the greater internal R&D cost for E1 (Pz) due to the probable
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0 if Pz > P̃x





α+β ]−1 > Px while λ∗D ≥ λ∗0, otherwise. This indicates
that if the increased R&D cost of inventing around the patent is large enough (i.e., exceeds
the cutoff P̃x), firm 2’s relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2 decreases as a result of the
patents transfer to firm 1. It can be expected that λ∗D increases due to the patents transfer
if the cost of inventing around the patent is not that large. This case does not fall into the
situation where patent holdup is likely to occur.
This consequence is caused by the fact that firm 1’s patents purchase increases the
marginal production cost of firm 2. When firm 2 continues to license the patents from firm
1, it faces increased royalty rates while having a greater R&D cost if firm 2 invents around
firm 1’s patent. Therefore, as long as firm 1 can compel firm 2 to continue paying to license
the patents because the cost for replacing the patented technology is excessively high, firm
1’s patent purchase negatively impacts firm 2’s relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2.
What if the patent of interest is essential and not replaceable by other technologies
of E1? The patent holdup theory asserts that if a patent that covers essential input for
production is owned by other entity who may exploit the patent holdup risk of the rival
firm, this rival firm becomes reluctant to acquire the technologies that depend on the patent
at holdup risk.
As shown in section 3.3, firm 1 has the incentive to purchase patents if it can compel
firm 2 to pay for the license on the patent at an increased royalty rate by leveraging firm 2’s
patent holdup risk. Doing so allows firm 1 to maneuver firm 2’s market operation, which
enhances firm 1’s market profit in return. Then, firm 2 will be reluctant to engage in the
R&D activity for obtaining technologies dependent on firm 1-purchased patent, expecting
holdup. Accordingly, firm 2’s relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2 decreases.
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The constructed model above draws the same conclusion. If the patent covers essential
technology for firm 2’s production, the cost of inventing around the patent will likely be
excessively high (i.e., Pz >> P̃x). Hence, firm 2’s relative R&D outcome for E1 over E2
decreases.
To summarize, firm 1’s patent purchase can impose a greater level of ex-post patent
holdup risk to firm 2, making firm 2 relative less active in developing the relevant tech-
nologies to the firm1-purchased patent. More formally: If a firm purchases a patent that
covers crucial technical input for rival firm’s market operation, the rival becomes rel-
atively less active in developing the relevant technologies to the patent the focal firm
purchased.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Nortel’s Patent Auction in 2011
The empirical work of this study was based on the case of Nortel’s patent auction. Nortel,
which was a Canadian telecommunications equipment company, tried to liquidate their
patents (largely on telecommunications technology) as part of bankruptcy, and they opened
a patents auction on June 27, 2011.
Five parties participated: Apple, the Ericsson Consortium (a consortium of Ericsson,
Research in Motion [RIM], Microsoft [MS], Sony, and EMC), Google, Intel, and Norpax
Inc. Intel made an initial bid of over $900 million, after which Nortel raised the threshold
for bidding increments to $100 million. As a result, Norpax Inc. decided to stop further
bidding. The Ericsson Consortium gave up further bidding after three more rounds. In-
terestingly, Apple and the Ericsson Consortium made a partnership and continued bidding
together under the name of Rockstar Bidco (hereafter “Rockstar”). As a result, Rockstar
came to have greater bidding power than Google and Intel, and after the sixth round of
bidding, Intel decided to exit the auction. Just as Apple and the Ericsson Consortium had
done, Google partnered with Intel, and they bid together as a consortium named Rangers.
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At that point, the auction turned into a competition between two large consortia for the ac-
quisition of the Nortel patents: Rockstar (Apple + MS + RIM + Sony + Ericsson + EMC)
versus Rangers (Google + Intel). Finally, Rockstar won the auction on June 30, 2011, with
a bid to pay $4.5 billion for the Nortel patents.2
In 2012, about half of the Nortel patents were redistributed to the three member-companies
of Rockstar (Apple, MS, and RIM). The remaining patents were transferred to either a
patent assertion entity (i.e., Spherix Inc.) or a defensive patent aggregator (i.e., RPX Corp).
None of the patents were re-transferred to Google or Intel.
This case is useful for testing the present study’s hypothesis for the following reasons.
First, the stakes for the participating firms in acquiring the Nortel patents before their com-
petitors could were high (Nicholson, 2011).3 Nortel owned many high-quality patents in
communications technology, including SEPs that are crucial for making smart devices.
Most of the auction participants owned patent portfolios that were weak in communica-
tions technology and were exposed to increasing patent infringement disputes during the
so-called “era of smartphone patent war” (Lloyd et al., 2011) on communications technol-
ogy patents (Raghu et al., 2008; Chia, 2012; Teece et al., 2014). For this reason, they were
desperate to strengthen their patent portfolios, especially with regard to communications
technology patents. Nortel’s patent auction was a unique opportunity to acquire a large
number of high-quality communications technology patents all at once.
Second, the auction bidders were mutual rivals in the smart device market, whereas
Nortel was not. Hence, from the perspective of Rangers, Rockstar’s winning bid for the
Nortel patents was a patent purchase by a rival; this scenario fits in the setting of the con-
structed model.
Third, the auction result was essentially an external shock to the bidders because the
result of the auction was so difficult to predict. The fact that some firms that had ceased





bidding at an early stage were able to continue bidding later through unexpected partner-
ships with other leading bidders indicates how the auction result was close to an exogenous
event for the auction bidders.
By utilizing these features, I identify the impact of the transfer of the Nortel patents on
the innovative activities of the losing firms. In this respect, I consider the winning group,
Rockstar, to be the comparison group to the losing group, Rangers, because the auction
winners avoided being subject to the Nortel patents’ ex-post patent holdup risk after the
auction.
According to the derived hypothesis, the bid-losing firms would face increased patent
holdup risk due to the auction result, which would make them less active in developing
technologies that are related to the Nortel patents. Because patents filed by a firm can be
used as a proxy for the outcome of the firm’s innovative activities (i.e., Pakes and Griliches,
1984; Griliches, 1990), I tested the hypothesis by examining the post-auction differences in
outcomes of Nortel patent relevant technologies between the auction winners—the Rock-
star firms—and the losing Rangers firms using the difference-in-difference (DiD) approach.
2.4.2 Data
Nortel patents transferred to Rockstar
I began by identifying the US patents that were transferred from Nortel to Rockstar using
the patent assignment database provided by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
(Graham et al., 2018). My initial search found 4,129 patents. While it is known that about
6,000 patents were transferred from Nortel to Rockstar through the auction, the discrepancy
in these numbers is caused by the fact that the database does not contain information about
pending patent applications and patents granted by non-US authorities.
I included grant patents in the sample and excluded patents that were filed after June
30, 2011. These procedures helped identify the patents that were actually subject to the
auction, which resulted in a sample containing 3,574 patents. Out of the total sample,
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there were 971, 218, and 210 patents that were redistributed to Apple, MS, and RIM,
respectively, in 2012. Among the remaining patents, 2,129 were resold to RPX, while
Rockstar (including its subsidiary) retained 41 patents, and Spherix Inc., which was known
to be a patent assertion entity, acquired ownership of five patents (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Redistribution of the Nortel patents after the auction
Patents filed by the auction bidders
Next, I collected information about US grant patents that had been filed by the auction
participants for a time period starting four years before the auction and ending four years
after its end date (i.e., July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2015). I then divided these patents
into two groups. The first group, labeled WIN, comprised the patents that were filed by
the firms that won the auction and were now the new owners of the Nortel patents: Apple,
MS, and RIM. The other group, labeled LOSE, contained the patents that were filed by the
two losing firms, Google and Intel, who continued bidding until the final round but failed
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to acquire the Nortel patents.
To identify the patents that were filed by these firms, I searched for patents where
the owners’ names had been changed from a person’s name to one of the firms’ names
through an employer—inventor type (EIT) transaction. Because patent ownership change
through an EIT is based upon contractual obligations a corporate inventor has to the hiring
firm (Graham et al., 2018), patents transferred in this way can be considered to have been
originally filed by the focal firm.4 Detailed information about the 42,871 US patents was
obtained from patenteview.org, which is serviced by the USPTO.
2.4.3 Variables and the Empirical Model
I employed two dependent variables that operationalize the technological relatedness be-
tween the Nortel patents and patents filed by the auction bidders. The first dependent
variable was a binary variable labeled Comm Tech that took the value of 1 for patents
in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) subcategory of communications
technology; otherwise, it took the value of 0. Most of the Nortel patents were related
to communications technology. Communications technology is often developed cumula-
tively, which implies that a particular technology in this field has greater relatedness or
dependency on other communications technologies than noncommunications technologies
would. Hence, the present study’s hypothesis can be tested by comparing the post-auction
odds of the auction winners and losers filing communications technology patents rather
4 Under US patent law, initial patent ownership is conferred to inventors for patents that were filed
before September 16th, 2012 (pre-America Invents Act [AIA]). For patents filed in the post-AIA
period, the applicant (either the inventor or the employer of the inventor) can be the initial owner.
Hence, patents that were once transferred to firms via employerinventor type transactions can be
considered as “patents” originally filed by the firms if the patents were filed before the AIA. However,
for patents filed after the AIA, it is difficult to identify the initial patent owner in the given database.
This is due to the fact that the patent assignment database provides information about patent ownership
transfer, whereas the official patent search database provided by the USPTO gives information about
the “current” patent owner. Due to this difficulty, I only retrieved patents that were transferred to the
firm of interest through employerinventor transaction types for all patents filed after the AIA as well.
Although this sampling strategy may capture only part of the population of patents filed by the firms of
interest, cross-validation with a patent list obtained from a different data source, the Derwent
Innovation Index, showed that there was no substantial discrepancy in the number of retrieved patents.
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than non-communications technology patents.
A patent citation is made when previously patented inventions limit the legal scope
of the new invention in question (Trajtenberg et al., 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). A
patent citation also indicates that the pair of cited and citing patents are technologically
interrelated (see Jaffe and de Rassenfosse, 2017). Studies have used patent citations as a
proxy for a technological link between the cited and citing patents, considering it a paper
trail of knowledge flow (e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993). Following this line of research, I defined
two patents as having technological overlap, hereafter Tech Overlap, if the two patents
are connected through a patent citation in one of the following ways: (1) when one patent
cites the other (Direct Citation), or (2) when the two patents cite the same third patent(s)
(Shared Reference).
For patents that were filed by firms in the WIN group, Tech Overlap took the value of 1
if the patent cites, or is cited by, or if they share at least one backward citation with a Nortel
patent. For patents filed by firms in the LOSE group, Tech Overlap took the value of 1
if the patent is in a citation relationship with any Nortel patent purchased by WIN group
firms.
Three sets of independent variables were created to employ the DiD approach. First,
I created a set of time dummy variables (T) that regrouped the patents into nine blocks,
each with a duration of one year, based on the patent application date. Because the auction
ended on June 30, 2011, patents filed from July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, became
the reference group (T+0).
Second, I introduced a binary variable that took the value of 1 if the patent of interest
was filed by a firm in the LOSE group (LOSE): this takes into consideration the difference
in the dependent variable at T + 0 between the WIN and LOSE groups.
Third, I generated interaction terms between the time dummy variables and LOSE. The
hypothesis anticipates statistically significant negative coefficients for LOSE×T +n, n >
0.
31
I fit the data to the logit model because the nature of the variable of interest is odds (i.e.,
λ, see the section 3.4). In the regression analysis, I used cluster robust standard errors by
firms to take into account within-group correlation between patents filed by the same firm
because those patents may have a systematic correlation with each other while differing












where pi is the latent variable of the dependent variable for patent i, LOSEi takes the value
of 1 if patent i was filed by a firm in the LOSE-group, Tji takes the value of 1 if patent i
was filed in a jth period counted from the reference period, T is the time dummy variables,
and εi is the error term.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Analysis
The summary statistics in Table 2.1 show that about 86% of the Nortel patents redistributed
to the three member-companies of Rockstar are communications technology patents.
Table 2.2 shows the number of patents filed by each firm during the period of obser-
vation. The decrease in the number of patents filed beginning in the fourth year after the
auction is due to the delay in publishing and indexing patent applications in the patent
assignment database.
Figure 2.3 presents the average share of communications technology patents. The solid
and dashed lines represent the share of communications technology patents filed by, re-
spectively, firms in the WIN group and firms in the LOSE group.
The graphical comparison in Figure 2.3 reveals that firms in the WIN group (solid
black line) and firms in the LOSE group (dashed black line) had similar pre-auction time
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Table 2.1: Technology class profile of the Nortel patents
Tech Field (NBER-Subcategory) Total Redistributed patents Leftover patents Share of redistributed patents
Communications 2546 1190 1356 46.7%
Computer Hardware & Software 537 118 419 22.0%
Optics 131 2 129 1.5%
Electrical Devices 76 50 26 65.8%
Electronic business methods and software 71 10 61 14.1%
Information Storage 55 2 53 3.6%
Miscellaneous 35 8 27 22.9%
Power Systems 32 11 21 34.4%
Semiconductor Devices 25 1 24 4.0%
Computer Peripherals 20 4 16 20.0%
Measuring & Testing 15 1 14 6.7%
Electrical Lighting 11 0 11 0.0%
Metal Working 8 1 7 12.5%
Nuclear & X-rays 7 1 6 14.3%
Heating 2 0 2 0.0%
Apparel & Textile 1 0 1 0.0%
Amusement Devices 1 0 1 0.0%
Transportation 1 0 1 0.0%
Total 3574 1399 2175 39.1%
Table 2.2: Technology class profile of the Nortel patents
Year from the auction APP MS RIM GOOG INTL TOTAL
-4 500 2,045 443 271 1,129 4,388
-3 456 2,008 375 335 966 4,140
-2 710 1,732 451 370 624 3,887
-1 731 1,457 771 456 685 4,100
0 904 1,736 831 962 613 5,046
1 901 1,521 1,014 2,489 589 6,514
2 1,319 1,239 979 2,499 2,196 8,232
3 590 678 330 1,603 1,227 4,428
4 348 332 122 782 552 2,136
Total 6,459 12,748 5,316 9,767 8,581 42,871
trends for their likelihood of filing a communications technology patent. After the auction
(right of the red dashed line), the likelihood of filing a communications technology patent
increased for firms in the WIN group, whereas it decreased substantially for firms in the
LOSE group. Interestingly, the likelihood began increasing for firms in the LOSE group in
the second year after the auction.
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Figure 2.3: Share of communications technology patents
Figure 2.4 depicts the average share of patents that have technological overlap with
Nortel patents. The pre-auction patent filing time trend for the two groups is seemingly
parallel. However, one year after the auction, the patent filing time trend begins differenti-
ating between firms in the WIN group and firms in the LOSE group.
2.5.2 Regression Analysis
Table 2.3 presents the main regression results. The first column reports the estimated logit
coefficients, employing Comm Tech as the dependent variable. The coefficients in the
second column show the estimated average marginal effect (AME).
First, the coefficients of interaction terms between the pre-auction time dummy vari-
ables and LOSE were statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level (LOSE×T −4
to LOSE × T − 1). This observation confirms that firms in the WIN and LOSE groups
had statistically parallel time trends for the log odds of filing communications technol-
ogy patents before the auction, but after the auction, the coefficient of LOSE × T + 1
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Figure 2.4: Share of Tech Overlap Patents
became negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level (0.493). The
AME presented in the second column shows that the LOSE firms’ likelihood of filing com-
munications technology patents decreased by 8.5% points compared to firms in the WIN
group one year after the auction. Interestingly, this impact disappears starting in the sec-
ond year after the auction. The post-auction interaction terms beginning in the second year
(LOSE×T +2 to LOSE×T +4) become statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance
level.
The third and fourth columns report the estimated logit and AME coefficients, employ-
ing Tech Overlap as the dependent variable. The interaction terms from LOSE × T − 4
to LOSE × T − 1 are statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. This result
indicates that the LOSE and WIN groups’ pre-auction time trends for the odds of filing
patents that technologically overlap with Nortel patents were statistically parallel. The co-
efficients of LOSE×T +1 and LOSE×T +3 are negative and statistically significant at
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Table 2.3: Main regression
DV:Comm Tech DV: Tech Overlap
Logit(Comm Tech) AME(Comm Tech) Logit(Tech Over) AME(Tech Over)
LOSEXT-4 0.0412 0.00713 0.0792 0.00635
(0.204) (0.0361) (0.182) (0.0142)
LOSEXT-3 0.220 0.0381 -0.0335 -0.00268
(0.153) (0.0298) (0.241) (0.0195)
LOSEXT-2 0.0911 0.0158 -0.132 -0.0106
(0.148) (0.0285) (0.261) (0.0213)
LOSEXT-1 0.00709 0.00123 -0.0203 -0.00162
(0.0486) (0.00827) (0.114) (0.00907)
LOSEXT+1 -0.493∗∗∗ -0.0855∗∗∗ -0.0953∗ -0.00764∗
(0.0502) (0.00878) (0.0490) (0.00450)
LOSEXT+2 -0.319 -0.0553∗ -0.481∗∗ -0.0386∗
(0.215) (0.0334) (0.241) (0.0201)
LOSEXT+3 -0.127 -0.0220 -0.455∗ -0.0365∗
(0.240) (0.0381) (0.264) (0.0201)
LOSEXT+4 -0.0728 -0.0126 -0.364 -0.0292
(0.335) (0.0563) (0.435) (0.0332)
T-4 -0.0541 -0.00937 0.237 0.0190
(0.165) (0.0302) (0.144) (0.0132)
T-3 -0.205 -0.0356 0.171 0.0137
(0.140) (0.0285) (0.199) (0.0171)
T-2 -0.0504 -0.00874 0.246∗∗ 0.0197∗
(0.139) (0.0255) (0.120) (0.0109)
T-1 0.0889∗ 0.0154 0.414∗∗∗ 0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0104) (0.103) (0.00626)
T+1 0.268∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗
(0.0482) (0.00537) (0.0388) (0.00472)
T+2 0.447∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.210 0.0169
(0.180) (0.0208) (0.234) (0.0191)
T+3 0.553∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.124 0.00998
(0.240) (0.0269) (0.243) (0.0191)
T+4 0.614∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.00882 -0.000707
(0.330) (0.0405) (0.407) (0.0327)
LOSE -0.0278 -0.00482 0.371∗∗ 0.0297∗∗
(0.712) (0.124) (0.173) (0.0119)
Constant -1.355∗∗ -2.600∗∗∗
(0.630) (0.165)
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.006
Observations 42871 42871 42871 42871
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
the 0.1 significance level, while the coefficient of LOSE × T + 2 is negative and statisti-
cally significant at the 0.05 significance level. The estimated AME shows that firms in the
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LOSE group became 0.8%, 3.9%, and 3.7% points less likely to develop inventions with
technological overlap to Nortel patents than in the reference year as compared to firms in
the WIN group.
This observed effect seems to disappear gradually over time after the auction. The size
of the coefficients of the post-auction interaction terms between the time dummy variables
and LOSE in the second through fourth years after the auction (LOSE×T +2 to LOSE×
T+4) decreased, while the coefficients for LOSE×T+4 became statistically insignificant
at the 0.1 significance level.
2.5.3 Robustness Check
Estimation without cluster standard error option
Correcting the standard error (SE) using the typical cluster SE estimation procedure may re-
sult in over-rejection of the null hypothesis when there are few clusters in the data (Cameron
and Miller, 2015). To check the robustness of the findings for this potential problem, I con-
ducted regression analysis without the cluster option.
Table 2.4 reports the results. The first two columns present the estimated logit and AME
coefficients when employing Comm Tech as the dependent variable. The last two columns
report the logit and AME coefficients when employing Tech Overlap as the dependent
variable. The results are largely consistent with the main regression result.
Alternative indicators of technological overlap between patents
Tech Overlap is a composite variable created from two patent citation-based indicators:
Direct Citation and Shared Reference. To check the robustness of the findings, I ran two
separate regressions, one with each of the two binary variables, and the results are shown
in Table 2.5.
The first two columns report the regression results employing Direct Citation as the
dependent variable. In the first column, the estimated logit coefficients of the interaction
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Table 2.4: Estimation without cluster standard error option
DV:Comm Tech DV: Tech Overlap
Logit(Comm tech) AME(Comm tech) Logit(Tech over) AME(Tech over)
LOSEXT-4 0.0412 0.00713 0.0792 0.00635
(0.111) (0.0192) (0.149) (0.0120)
LOSEXT-3 0.220∗ 0.0381∗ -0.0335 -0.00268
(0.114) (0.0197) (0.156) (0.0125)
LOSEXT-2 0.0911 0.0158 -0.132 -0.0106
(0.118) (0.0205) (0.163) (0.0131)
LOSEXT-1 0.00709 0.00123 -0.0203 -0.00162
(0.113) (0.0197) (0.151) (0.0121)
LOSEXT+1 -0.493∗∗∗ -0.0855∗∗∗ -0.0953 -0.00764
(0.0980) (0.0170) (0.137) (0.0110)
LOSEXT+2 -0.319∗∗∗ -0.0553∗∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗ -0.0386∗∗∗
(0.0913) (0.0158) (0.136) (0.0109)
LOSEXT+3 -0.127 -0.0220 -0.455∗∗∗ -0.0365∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.0177) (0.161) (0.0129)
LOSEXT+4 -0.0728 -0.0126 -0.364∗ -0.0292∗
(0.122) (0.0212) (0.207) (0.0166)
T-4 -0.0541 -0.00937 0.237∗∗ 0.0190∗∗
(0.0623) (0.0108) (0.0935) (0.00749)
T-3 -0.205∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗ 0.171∗ 0.0137∗
(0.0650) (0.0113) (0.0960) (0.00769)
T-2 -0.0504 -0.00874 0.246∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗
(0.0629) (0.0109) (0.0940) (0.00754)
T-1 0.0889 0.0154 0.414∗∗∗ 0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0611) (0.0106) (0.0905) (0.00726)
T+1 0.268∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗
(0.0575) (0.00997) (0.0903) (0.00724)
T+2 0.447∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.0169∗∗
(0.0561) (0.00970) (0.0903) (0.00724)
T+3 0.553∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.124 0.00998
(0.0685) (0.0119) (0.115) (0.00922)
T+4 0.614∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.00882 -0.000707
(0.0864) (0.0150) (0.155) (0.0124)
LOSE -0.0278 -0.00482 0.371∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗
(0.0757) (0.0131) (0.108) (0.00868)
Constant -1.355∗∗∗ -2.600∗∗∗
(0.0420) (0.0669)
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.006
Observations 42871 42871 42871 42871
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
terms between the post-auction time dummy variables and LOSE (LOSE × T + 2 and
LOSE×T +3) are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level. The
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Table 2.5: Estimation with two alternative measurements of Tech Overlap
Logit(Direct Cite) AME(Direct Cite) Logit(Same Ref) AME(Same Ref)
LOSEXT-4 0.781∗∗∗ 0.00772∗∗ 0.0759 0.00589
(0.192) (0.00310) (0.200) (0.0152)
LOSEXT-3 -0.413 -0.00409 -0.0153 -0.00118
(0.255) (0.00314) (0.261) (0.0204)
LOSEXT-2 -0.282 -0.00279 -0.144 -0.0111
(0.357) (0.00380) (0.242) (0.0192)
LOSEXT-1 -0.196 -0.00194 0.0359 0.00278
(0.617) (0.00568) (0.0710) (0.00560)
LOSEXT+1 -0.417 -0.00413 -0.117∗∗ -0.00908∗
(0.257) (0.00292) (0.0537) (0.00490)
LOSEXT+2 -0.698∗∗∗ -0.00691∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗ -0.0387∗∗
(0.235) (0.00172) (0.234) (0.0192)
LOSEXT+3 -0.798∗∗∗ -0.00790∗∗∗ -0.492∗ -0.0382∗∗
(0.232) (0.000920) (0.253) (0.0187)
LOSEXT+4 -0.0879 -0.000869 -0.478 -0.0371
(0.712) (0.00685) (0.428) (0.0310)
T-4 -0.188 -0.00186 0.247 0.0192
(0.168) (0.00190) (0.164) (0.0144)
T-3 1.080∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.144 0.0112
(0.165) (0.00401) (0.228) (0.0187)
T-2 0.640∗ 0.00633 0.233∗∗ 0.0181∗
(0.354) (0.00423) (0.115) (0.01000)
T-1 0.705 0.00697 0.358∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗
(0.615) (0.00454) (0.0585) (0.00390)
T+1 0.581∗∗∗ 0.00575∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.00224) (0.0482) (0.00530)
T+2 0.916∗∗∗ 0.00906∗∗∗ 0.198 0.0154
(0.173) (0.000358) (0.228) (0.0181)
T+3 0.682∗∗∗ 0.00674∗∗∗ 0.125 0.00973
(0.214) (0.000748) (0.234) (0.0178)
T+4 0.730 0.00722 0.0276 0.00214
(0.712) (0.00545) (0.399) (0.0308)
LOSE 0.0486 0.000480 0.400∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗
(0.461) (0.00446) (0.163) (0.0105)
Constant -5.102∗∗∗ -2.636∗∗∗
(0.461) (0.156)
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.006
Observations 42871 42871 42871 42871
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
estimated AME reported in the second column indicates that LOSE group firms became
0.8% points less likely to file patents with a direct citation relationship to Nortel patents
after the second and third years following the auction, as compared to the WIN group.
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However, this impact disappeared beginning in the fourth year after the auction.
The last two columns report the regression results employing Shared Reference as the
dependent variable. In the third column, the estimated logit coefficients of the interaction
terms between the post-auction time dummy variables and LOSE (from LOSE × T +1 to
LOSE × T + 3) stayed negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level.
The estimated AME reported in the last column indicates that LOSE group firms became a
maximum of 3.9% points less likely to file patents having technological overlap with Nortel
patents in the second year after the auction, as compared to the WIN group firms. However,
this impact disappeared in the fourth year after the auction.
Placebo test
I examined how specific the findings were in relation to the timing of the auction event
using a placebo test, where I set December 31, 2007, as the date of the placebo auction.
Patents that were filed by the auction bidders in 2007, which were taken from the sample of
patents filed by the bidders between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2010, become the
reference group. The data were fit to the same econometric specifications as in the main
regression.
Table 2.6 presents the test results. The first two columns report the regression results
with Comm Tech as the dependent variable. The interaction terms between the post-auction
time dummy variables and LOSE (from LOSE×T +1 to LOSE×T +3) are statistically
insignificant at the 0.1 significance level.
The last two columns report the placebo test with Tech Overlap as the dependent vari-
able. All the interaction terms between time dummy variables and LOSE are statistically
insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. Thus, there is no evidence for the existence of
substantial changes in the relative likelihood of filing patents that have technological over-
lap with the Nortel patents after the placebo auction.
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Table 2.6: Placebo Test
DV:Comm Tech DV: Tech Overlap
Logit(Comm tech) AME(Comm tech) Log(Tech over) AME(Tech over)
LOSExT-3 0.0167 0.00257 0.228 0.0196
(0.181) (0.0279) (0.175) (0.0170)
LOSExT-2 0.252 0.0388 0.170 0.0146
(0.175) (0.0309) (0.141) (0.0134)
LOSExT-1 0.0894 0.0138 0.182 0.0157
(0.211) (0.0345) (0.144) (0.0138)
LOSExT+1 0.0815 0.0125 -0.0345 -0.00297
(0.126) (0.0200) (0.353) (0.0305)
LOSExT+2 0.0668 0.0103 0.269 0.0231
(0.126) (0.0183) (0.354) (0.0320)
LOSExT+3 0.0322 0.00496 0.0864 0.00742
(0.166) (0.0246) (0.208) (0.0184)
T-3 -0.133∗ -0.0205 -0.137 -0.0118
(0.0701) (0.0148) (0.171) (0.0159)
T-2 -0.284∗∗∗ -0.0437∗ -0.217 -0.0186
(0.105) (0.0248) (0.141) (0.0137)
T-1 -0.0793 -0.0122 -0.0678 -0.00583
(0.171) (0.0290) (0.142) (0.0128)
T+2 -0.126 -0.0194 -0.0803 -0.00690
(0.114) (0.0183) (0.0921) (0.00721)
T+2 0.141 0.0216 -0.0826 -0.00710
(0.0884) (0.0182) (0.251) (0.0223)
T+3 0.0772 0.0119 -0.0884 -0.00760
(0.153) (0.0261) (0.161) (0.0146)
LOSE 0.0655 0.0101 0.262 0.0225
(0.579) (0.0874) (0.339) (0.0272)
Constant -1.437∗∗∗ -2.294∗∗∗
(0.514) (0.306)
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.006
Observations 30177 30177 30177 30177
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
Bootstrap standard error
The data consists of patents filed by five firms, which were regrouped into WIN and LOSE.
Because the number of patents filed was heterogeneous across firms, while data points
were nested at a firm level, estimation without considering this heterogeneity could lead to
a bias toward firms that have filed a larger number of patents than the other firms. If so, the
findings from the baseline regression may only reflect change in the innovative activities of
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specific firms who filed a larger number of patents. One way of resolving this problem is to
use a bootstrap cluster SE estimation method (cluster at firm level) (See Duflo et al., 2011).
To use this method, I reran the regression analysis using a firm-level cluster bootstrap SE
with replacement allowed for 1,000 resampling.
Table 2.7: Estimation with bootstrap cluster standard error
Logit(Comm Tech) AME(Comm Tech) Logit(Tech Overlap) AME(Tech Overlap)
LOSEXT-4 0.0412 0.00713 0.0792 0.00635
(0.271) (0.0475) (0.267) (0.0211)
LOSEXT-3 0.220 0.0381 -0.0335 -0.00268
(0.248) (0.0446) (0.291) (0.0235)
LOSEXT-2 0.0911 0.0158 -0.132 -0.0106
(0.224) (0.0406) (0.300) (0.0245)
LOSEXT-1 0.00709 0.00123 -0.0203 -0.00162
(0.130) (0.0225) (0.110) (0.00877)
LOSEXT+1 -0.493∗∗∗ -0.0855∗∗∗ -0.0953∗∗ -0.00764∗
(0.180) (0.0263) (0.0469) (0.00434)
LOSEXT+2 -0.319 -0.0553∗ -0.481∗ -0.0386∗
(0.207) (0.0329) (0.249) (0.0211)
LOSEXT+3 -0.127 -0.0220 -0.455∗ -0.0365∗
(0.217) (0.0342) (0.267) (0.0207)
LOSEXT+4 -0.0728 -0.0126 -0.364 -0.0292
(0.287) (0.0481) (0.432) (0.0333)
T-4 -0.0541 -0.00937 0.237 0.0190
(0.188) (0.0333) (0.177) (0.0158)
T-3 -0.205 -0.0356 0.171 0.0137
(0.190) (0.0334) (0.237) (0.0201)
T-2 -0.0504 -0.00874 0.246 0.0197
(0.143) (0.0256) (0.154) (0.0135)
T-1 0.0889∗ 0.0154 0.414∗∗∗ 0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0484) (0.0108) (0.0959) (0.00585)
T+1 0.268∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗
(0.0787) (0.0105) (0.0424) (0.00494)
T+2 0.447∗∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗ 0.210 0.0169
(0.165) (0.0180) (0.243) (0.0200)
T+3 0.553∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.124 0.00998
(0.217) (0.0247) (0.243) (0.0192)
T+4 0.614∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.00882 -0.000707
(0.280) (0.0348) (0.401) (0.0322)
LOSE -0.0278 -0.00482 0.371∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗
(0.726) (0.126) (0.165) (0.0114)
Constant -1.355∗∗ -2.600∗∗∗
(0.644) (0.154)
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.006
Observations 42871 42871 42871 42871
Bootstrap cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (Resampling size, N=1000)
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7 presents the estimation results. The coefficients of interaction terms between
the pre-auction time dummy variables and LOSE are statistically insignificant at the 0.1
significance level. This indicates that the assumption of a pre-treatment parallel time trend
of outcome variable for LOSE and WIN empirically holds. The estimated coefficients and
statistical significance of the interaction terms between post-auction time dummy variables
and LOSE indicate that the regression result is largely consistent with the main regression
result.
2.5.4 Exploring Alternative Explanations
Self-selection
One may argue that the LOSE firms bid less for the Nortel patents than the WIN group
because the LOSE group valued the Nortel patents less than the WIN group did in the first
place. This difference could lead to the LOSE group’s less active patenting activities related
to Nortel patent relevant technologies. If so, the present study’s findings would be a mere
consequence of self-selection rather than the result of patent acquisition by the WIN group
firms. However, the data does not support this argument. First, if this alternative argument
was credible, substantially decreased patenting activity by the LOSE group on technologies
relevant to the Nortel patents would be expected to persist over time. My analysis clearly
shows that the LOSE group’s patenting activity bounced back sharply from the second or
third year after the auction, and the recovery seems to continue afterward. Second, the
LOSE group firms do not seem to value the Nortel patents less than the WIN group given
that the LOSE group’s patenting activity on Nortel patent relevant technology was not lower
than that of the WIN group just before the auction. As can be seen in 2.3, the coefficients
of LOSE are either statistically insignificant or even positive. This indicates that the LOSE
group’s patenting activity of Nortel patent relevant technology just before the auction was
not less than or even greater than that of the WIN group.
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An unobserved event may have occurred to LOSE-group firms after the auction
The findings of this study could simply be caused by unobserved events during the post-
auction period that are irrelevant to the Nortel patent auction. If such an event influenced
the LOSE group firms’ patenting activities and R&D outcomes related to communications
technologies in general, the present study’s findings might not represent a causal impact of
the Nortel patent auction.
To rule out this alternative explanation, I designed a crucial test that examined the
specificity of the findings to the Nortel patents as opposed to patents that were filed by
a firm comparable to Nortel. If this competing explanation was credible, similar findings to
those of the main regression results should be observed when examining the LOSE group
firms’ likelihood of filing patents that technologically overlap with patents filed by the
Nortel comparable firm.
For this test, I employed Qualcomm as the alternative to Nortel, with the patents matched
by patent application year and NBER subclass. I chose Qualcomm because, like Nor-
tel, they were not in market competition with the auction participants in the smart device
market while they were intensively developing communications technologies (Kang and
Motohashi, 2015). Indeed, Qualcomm has been a member of various telecommunications
standard-setting organizations, such as ETSI, as was Nortel.5
Using the replacement-allowed and one-to-one matching procedure, 1,366 Qualcomm
patents were selected as the alternative set to Nortel patents. Then, I regenerated the three
variables—Tech Overlap, Direct Citation, and Shared Reference—for each patent that
was filed by the auction bidders, replacing the Nortel patents with the Qualcomm patents.
If the findings obtained from the main regression were not specific to the Nortel patents
but were, instead, the result of an irrelevant and unobserved event, I should have observed
a decrease in the LOSE group firms’ likelihood of filing patents during the post-auction




Table 2.8: Test using the Qualcomm’s patents
DV:Tech Overlap DV: Direct cite DV: Same references
Logit(Tech over) AME(Tech over) Logit(Direct cite) AME(Direct cite) Logit(Same Ref) AME(Same Ref)
LOSExT-4 0.0672 0.00839 1.279∗∗∗ 0.00746∗ 0.0624 0.00770
(0.293) (0.0365) (0.371) (0.00442) (0.299) (0.0369)
LOSExT-3 0.0705 0.00879 -0.240 -0.00140 0.0527 0.00651
(0.266) (0.0331) (0.441) (0.00301) (0.274) (0.0339)
LOSExT-2 -0.0357 -0.00445 0.847 0.00494 -0.0483 -0.00597
(0.0569) (0.00690) (0.517) (0.00407) (0.0437) (0.00549)
LOSExT-1 0.226∗ 0.0282 1.501∗∗∗ 0.00876∗∗∗ 0.218∗ 0.0269
(0.119) (0.0203) (0.285) (0.00234) (0.116) (0.0196)
LOSExT+1 -0.0209 -0.00261 -0.0700 -0.000409 -0.0272 -0.00336
(0.162) (0.0198) (0.540) (0.00311) (0.153) (0.0183)
LOSExT+2 -0.165 -0.0206 0.375 0.00219 -0.185 -0.0229
(0.237) (0.0255) (0.403) (0.00303) (0.226) (0.0233)
LOSExT+3 -0.137 -0.0171 0.279 0.00163 -0.161 -0.0199
(0.336) (0.0384) (0.551) (0.00378) (0.334) (0.0372)
LOSExT+4 -0.449 -0.0560 0.303 0.00177 -0.459 -0.0567
(0.458) (0.0465) (0.947) (0.00604) (0.442) (0.0438)
T-4 0.0930∗ 0.0116 -0.382 -0.00223 0.0850 0.0105
(0.0559) (0.00895) (0.353) (0.00275) (0.0662) (0.00995)
T-3 0.0313 0.00391 0.840∗ 0.00490 0.0343 0.00424
(0.0917) (0.0117) (0.437) (0.00419) (0.0806) (0.0104)
T-2 0.0954∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.396 0.00231 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.000603) (0.487) (0.00270) (0.00658) (0.00184)
T-1 0.144 0.0179∗ -0.478∗∗ -0.00279∗∗∗ 0.152 0.0187∗∗
(0.107) (0.00968) (0.200) (0.000944) (0.104) (0.00905)
T+1 0.144 0.0180 0.174 0.00101 0.149 0.0184
(0.162) (0.0169) (0.211) (0.00130) (0.152) (0.0154)
T+2 -0.0156 -0.00194 -0.214 -0.00125 -0.00397 -0.000491
(0.227) (0.0287) (0.394) (0.00271) (0.215) (0.0266)
T+3 -0.0333 -0.00416 0.342 0.00200 -0.0260 -0.00321
(0.336) (0.0427) (0.525) (0.00244) (0.333) (0.0418)
T+4 -0.0439 -0.00548 0.0183 0.000107 -0.0366 -0.00452
(0.457) (0.0581) (0.785) (0.00456) (0.441) (0.0553)
LOSE 0.599 0.0747 -0.252 -0.00147 0.615 0.0759
(0.650) (0.0659) (0.685) (0.00444) (0.645) (0.0641)
Constant -2.050∗∗∗ -5.314∗∗∗ -2.070∗∗∗
(0.650) (0.662) (0.645)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.014 0.013
Observations 42871 42871 42871 42871 42871 42871
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.8 displays the results. The interaction terms between post-auction time dummy




Firms decide whether or not to file patents on already developed inventions. Thus, the
findings of the present study could be the result of changes in patenting behavior by the
LOSE group firms. More specifically, if, after the auction, the LOSE group decided not to
file patents related to the Nortel patents, even if they had already developed technologies
relevant to the Nortel patents before the auction, the findings of the present research may
not indicate changed innovative activities of the LOSE group firms but, rather, simply show
changed “patenting behavior.”
One possible explanation is that a rival’s acquisition of the Nortel patents might have
marginalized the utility of having a patent for an invention relevant to the Nortel patents
for the LOSE group. For example, the LOSE group firms might have developed inven-
tions related to the Nortel patents well before the auction, so that patenting such inventions
could have been strategically beneficial if the LOSE group could obtain the Nortel patents.
However, because the WIN group acquired the Nortel patents, there might have been less
incentive to file patents on such inventions for the LOSE group.
To test the credibility of this alternative explanation, I conducted a crucial test by uti-
lizing the continuation patent application practice in the US patent system. In the United
States, a patent applicant can amend or add new patent claims to a previous patent by fil-
ing so-called children patent applications as long as the previous patent application is not
abandoned. By doing so, the patentee can extend the scope of protection of the patented
invention ex-post facto. I considered the LOSE group’s patents that were filed before the
auction and categorized as communications or that have technological overlap with the
Nortel patents to be a body of inventions related to the Nortel patents that were developed
before the auction. Then, I examined how many children applications of these patents were
filed each year after the auction. If the suggested alternative explanation was credible, I
would have been likely to observe that the LOSE group firms filed fewer children applica-
tions in the years after the auction than in preceding years.
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First, I selected two groups of patents that were filed by the LOSE group before the
auction. One group comprised patents that were filed between July 1, 2006, and June 30,
2007. Another group comprised patents that were filed between July 1, 2008, and June
30, 2009. For the first group of patents, I supposed that a hypothetical auction occurred
on June 30, 2009. Then, I counted the number of children patent applications filed in the
time period of three years before the hypothetical auction date to two years after it, so from
July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2011. Because the period of observation does not contain the
post-Nortel auction period (beginning June 30, 2011), the first group of patents became the
control group. For the second group of patents, I examined the number of children patent
applications beginning three years before Nortel’s auction and filed every year thereafter
until two years after the auction ended (on June 30, 2011). Because the period of observa-
tion for this group contains the genuine post-auction period, this group of patents became
the treatment group. If this competing explanation is supported, the number of children
patent applications for the treatment group should have dropped after the auction com-
pared to the control group. With this setting, the two-year post-auction period became the
post-treatment period. Figure 2.5 illustrates this crucial test design.
Figure 2.5: Crucial test design with Continuation Patent Application Data
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I retrieved information about continuation patent applications of the Nortel patents (i.e.,
continuation, continuation-in-part, divisional patents) from the USPTO’s Patent Examina-
tion Research Dataset.6 Based on these data, I identified the children patent applications
for the two selected groups of patents. Then, the yearly patent panel data was constructed
with the number of children patent applications associated with a patent in the dataset as
the dependent variable. I utilized the panel data DiD approach for the analysis. The num-
ber of children patent applications for patents that were filed within the year before the
auction became the reference group. To additionally examine the change in the likelihood
of filing the continuation applications, I also regressed the dummy variable that took the
value of 1 if there was any type of children patent application to the patent of interest in the
corresponding time window. Table 2.9 reports the regression results.
The first two columns report the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results using
the number of continuation patent applications as the dependent variable. The interaction
terms between the dummy variable for the treatment group (Treat) and post-auction time
dummy variables (Treat×T +1 and Treat×T +2) is statistically insignificant at the 0.1
significance level. The analysis result using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
there was at least one child patent application to the patent of interest in the corresponding
time window is reported in the third and fourth columns. The coefficients of Treat×T +1
and Treat× T + 2 are statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level.
Winner’s Effect?
In the main regression, I considered the counterfactual of the LOSE group’s post-auction
R&D outcomes as those of the WIN group. However, this research design may not be able
to properly identify the impact of the auction on the LOSE group’s innovative activities be-
cause the auction result could also affect the auction-winning firms’ R&D outcomes. After
the WIN group acquired the Nortel patents, they could have engaged in more development
6 Available at https://bulkdata.uspto.gov/data/patent/pair/economics/2016/
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Table 2.9: Crucial test using continuation patent applications (OLS)
N. of children apps N. of children apps Exist children apps Exist children apps
TreatxT-2 -0.0576∗∗ -0.0348 -0.0478∗ -0.0348
(0.0281) (0.0345) (0.0245) (0.0345)
TreatxT-1 -0.0172 -0.0403 -0.00873 -0.0403
(0.0481) (0.0594) (0.0458) (0.0594)
TreatxT+1 0.0270 0.0788 0.0367 0.0414
(0.0299) (0.0548) (0.0265) (0.0386)
TreatxT+2 0.00321 0.0142 0.0129 0.0215
(0.0328) (0.0517) (0.0296) (0.0446)
T-2 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0722∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0224) (0.0149) (0.0224)
T-1 0.284∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0355) (0.0275) (0.0355)
T+1 0.0216∗∗ 0.0333∗ 0.0216∗∗ 0.0333∗
(0.0101) (0.0175) (0.0101) (0.0175)
T+2 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0328) (0.0157) (0.0251)
Patent FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0174 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0174∗
(0.00878) (0.0107) (0.00748) (0.00999)
R2 0.125 0.085 0.130 0.104
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.079 0.127 0.099
Sample Comm Tech Tech Overlap Comm Tech Tech Overlap
Observations 2420 1435 2420 1435
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
of Nortel patent relevant technologies. As a result, the DiD estimators under the current
research design could indicate that the WIN group firms were encouraged to focus on in-
ventions of technologies relevant to the Nortel patents as opposed to the LOSE group’s
firms being deterred from developing technologies relevant to the Nortel patents.
To check the credibility of this alternative explanation, I analyzed only the likelihood
of the LOSE group firms filing communications patents and patents that have technological
overlap with the Nortel patents. Because the acquisition of the Nortel patents by the WIN
group can be considered an exogenous event from the LOSE group’s perspective, this anal-
ysis can be helpful for isolation of the impact of the patent transfer on the LOSE group’s
innovative activities. Figure 2.6 visualizes the regression results.
The results indicate that, after the auction, the LOSE group’s likelihood of filing com-
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Figure 2.6: Auction-losing firms’ likelihood of filing Comm Tech and Tech Over
munications patents and patents that have technological overlap with the Nortel patents
dropped significantly after one or two year(s) the auction. The result of this analysis im-
plies that the LOSE group’s innovative activities around technologies relevant to the Nortel
patents have decreased since the WIN group’s acquisition of the Nortel patents.
2.5.5 Evidence from Post-auction Events
In 2013, Google and other smartphone manufacturers that employ the Android operating
system were sued by Rockstar for alleged infringement on seven of Nortel’s auctioned
patents. Most of the lawsuits were settled in 2014.
Intel has not been sued for infringement of the Nortel patents after the auction. Instead,
the reported cost for the acquisition of patent licenses given in their 10-K documents, shown
in Figure 2.7, indicate that Intel spent $810 million in 2012, which is an unusual expendi-
ture for the acquisition of patent licenses.7 Even after considering the large-scale license
agreement with Interdigital in 2012, this expenditure is still extraordinarily high.8 Consid-
ering 2012 was one year after the Nortel patent auction and that the average expenditure for
7 Data obtained from http://www.sec.gov.




the acquisition of patents and licenses for Intel had been $81 million per year, this finding
suggests that Intel faced greater costs for the acquisition of patent licenses after the Nortel
patent auction.
Figure 2.7: Intel’s cost for purchase of license and patents reported in 10Ks
Given that an imposed patent holdup risk often results in either patent infringement
disputes or substantially increased costs for patent licensing, the described post-auction
events seem to reasonably explain how the result of the Nortel patent auction imposed a
greater level of patent holdup risk to the LOSE group firms.
2.6 Discussion
This study sheds theoretical and empirical light on how a firm’s acquisition of external
patents affects rival firms’ innovative activities.
The constructed model demonstrated that a firm can earn more market profit by impos-
ing a greater patent holdup risk on rivals through the purchase of a patent that could be
critical for the rival’s market operations. The constructed model rationalized that if a firm’s
patent purchase imposes a greater risk of ex-post patent holdup on its rival, the rival firm
becomes less active in developing technologies related to the patent purchased by the focal
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firm.
I empirically analyzed the case of Nortel’s patent auction in 2011 to test the derived
prediction. According to the hypothesis derived from the constructed model, the auction-
losing firms should have become less active in developing technologies related to the Nortel
patents, and the analysis found empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis.
However, this impact did not persist for long. Although the auction-losing firms were
deterred from developing technologies relevant to the Nortel patents immediately after the
auction, these firms’ development of such technologies recovered a few years later.
I explained my finding by referencing firms’ post-auction efforts to cope with the in-
creased risk of an ex-post patent holdup. Immediately after the Nortel patent auction,
Google announced that it planned to acquire Motorola Mobility.9 Given that Motorola Mo-
bility owned a sizable patent portfolio of communications technology, Google’s acquisition
announcement was believed to be a strategic response to its increased risk of the ex-post
patent holdup created by their rival firms’ acquisition of the Nortel patents. Intel also made
an effort to acquire external patents of communications technologies after the auction. For
instance, in 2014, Intel announced that it would purchase about 1,400 telecommunications
patents from Prowave Inc. These post-auction actions taken by Google and Intel can be
understood to be part of a so-called working solution (Walsh et al., 2003).
The concept of working solutions and the findings of the present paper jointly explain
why there is mixed evidence for detrimental impacts of patent holdup on firms’ innovative
activities. Firms seek ways to cope with the increased risk as time goes by, and in doing so,
the detrimental impact of the patent holdup on the firms’ innovative activities is gradually
mitigated.
Does this finding imply that we do not need to be concerned about the long-term effects
of a firm’s patent purchase on rival firms’ innovative activities because the impact will be
mitigated spontaneously as the affected firms equip themselves with working solutions?
9 Actual patent ownership transfer occurred in 2014, and Google resold Motorola Mobility to Lenovo in
the same year.
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My findings do not allow for drawing this conclusion because not all firms will be capa-
ble of building and executing working solutions. Firms having sufficient resources and the
capability to build working solutions will be able to effectively cope with the effects on
their innovative activities of another firm’s patent purchase. However, if firms are small or
medium-sized enterprises, which often lack resources, they may have difficulties building a
working solution, in which case the impact could be long-lasting and critical for them. Ac-
cordingly, when interested parties, such as innovation/patent policymakers, examine how
a firm’s patent purchase for strategic benefit affects innovation, it is essential to consider
who the rival firms are and whether they are capable of formulating a strategy for coping
with the probable patent holdup resulting from a patent purchase by the focal firm.
Some may argue that LOSE group firms could be protected from the detrimental im-
pacts of auction results under the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) regime,
even if the WIN group tried to utilize the LOSE group’s patent holdup risk. If the FRAND
regime worked, LOSE group firms should not have been affected by the auction result.
However, the FRAND regime is vague to enforce practically (Layne-Farrar et al., 2007;
Craig, 2013; Larouche et al., 2014). In practice, the benchmark royalty that is essential for
determining whether proposed patent licensing terms on the negotiation table are “fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory” is often not observable because there is no incentive
or legal requirement that mandates a firm’s disclosure of their historical licensing terms in
detail. In the absence of such a benchmark, licensing negotiations under FRAND tend to
result in legal disputes. Given this limitation, the utilization of FRAND might not be as
effective as was intended.
2.7 Conclusion
The primary implication of the present study is that the market for patents is of a different
nature than the market for technology. In the market for patents, firms may acquire external
patents so they can strategically exploit their patent exclusion rights over their market com-
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petitors, which may increase ex-post patent holdup risk for these rival firms, consequently
increasing their innovation costs. On the other hand, the subjects of transactions in the
technology market are technological ideas. Technology transactions promote innovative
division of labor and the efficient allocation of technology to those who can do a better job
at commercializing it.
This different natures of the market for patents and the market for technology forces us
to reconsider policies that aim at encouraging patent ownership transactions in the belief
that an active patent market will bring the benefits of the technology market to innovation.
But this assumption needs careful reconsideration. We need to more thoroughly examine
questions such as, when does active patent ownership transfer actually promote innovation?
When does it generate patent holdup and unnecessary cost for innovation?
This study contributes to extending our understanding of the relationship between patents
and innovation. Studies have conventionally discussed whether patents promote or hamper
innovation, focusing on the tension between technological monopoly and incentives for
innovation conferred by the patent system (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Nordhaus, 1969). In trying
to understand how the existence of a patent shapes innovation, the present study untangles
part of the puzzling relationship between patents and innovation by emphasizing the im-
portance of taking into consideration who owns which patents and whether the patentee is
willing to use a patent for strategic purposes.
Firms can also benefit from the present study. The finding that a firm’s patent purchase
affects its rival’s innovative outcomes suggests that firms need to carefully monitor rivals’
patenting activities. But they also need to monitor what patents are purchased by rival
firms and examine whether such patents can impose a holdup risk against their innovative
activities and business operations so they can build a more effective intellectual property
strategy.
The findings in this study by no means imply that patent transfer does not serve as
a channel for technology transactions or that it only impedes innovation. The data and
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findings of this study do not allow such conclusions to be drawn. Whether patent transfer
for strategic exploitation of the patent exclusion right generates more social costs than
benefits and how it affects overall innovation are remaining questions.
Like all research, this study is not without limitations. First, I have measured outcomes
of innovative activities of firms through their patenting activities. However, as many studies
have pointed out, patents are not always a reliable proxy for firms’ innovative activities.
Not all inventions are patented (Cohen et al., 2000; Moser, 2012). Patents used to be filed
for strategic purposes (e.g., Ziedonis, 2004; Motohashi, 2008), and there are many reasons
other than R&D for filing patents (see, Cohen et al., 2000; Graham et al., 2009; Morton and
Shapiro, 2014). Future studies may address this limitation by using alternative measures.
Second, although analyzing the case of Nortel’s patent auction was useful for identify-
ing the impact of patent ownership transfer, the conclusion drawn from this case is subject
to external validity issues because the finding is based on a single case. I hope future studies
can bring more cases and add more insights to the conclusions of the present study.
Finally, the present study did not consider the role of regulatory authorities. When it
comes to Nortel’s patent auction, the redistribution of the patents to the three member-
companies of a consortium was the subject of sanctions by the US Department of Justice
(DoJ) because of the concern that the redistribution of patents might harm market com-
petition. In 2012, the DoJ permitted the acquisition of the patents by the three member-
companies but forced them to not exploit the patents opportunistically.10 While how the
DoJ’s post-auction actions might have influenced the bidding firms’ R&D activities with





HOW DOES ANTITRUST REGULATION OF PATENTS CONSOLIDATION
AFFECT FOLLOW-ON INNOVATION?
One of the prominent questions across the patent and antitrust policy domains is whether
the antitrust intervention into a formation of patent monopoly promotes or discourages
innovation.
This study aims to help answers this question by examining the short-term effect of
antitrust regulation of the creation of the patent monopoly on the rate of follow-on innova-
tion. I identify the formation of the patent monopoly with a firm’s consolidation of existing
patents. By building a simple analytical model, I explore how the creation of a patent
monopoly through a firm’s patents consolidation affects the rate of follow-on innovation.
The model shows that, in a sector where cumulative innovation is crucial, a firm’s consol-
idation of patents on substituting upstream technologies for what it possesses negatively
affects the rate of follow-on innovation of its market competitor. The regulation of patent
consolidation, in this case, is predicted to positively affect competitors’ development of the
follow-on innovation.
I test the derived prediction by using the case of the US Department of Justice’s (DoJ)
partial regulation of Novell’s software patents sales to four large proprietary software com-
panies (Microsoft, Oracle, EMC, and Apple) in 2011, while considering patentable in-
vention as an proxy for technological innovation. My analysis shows that the antitrust
regulation positively affected the development of follow-on inventions by firms that were
in market competition with the patent consolidators. A series of falsification of alternative
explanations indicates that the antitrust regulation mitigated the negative impact of patent
monopoly formation on these firms’ development of follow-on inventions.
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3.1 Introduction
“The aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem [...] wholly at odds. How-
ever, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging
innovation, industry and competition” (Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,
897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Federal Circuit, 1990)).
“Intellectual property rights do not necessarily [...] create monopolies because consumers
may be able to substitute other technologies [...] for the protected technologies. Conse-
quently, antitrust and intellectual property are properly perceived as complementary bodies
of law that work together to bring innovation to consumers” (DoJ and FTC, 2007).
Although both patent and antitrust laws aim to enhance social welfare, their efforts to
do so have been perceived as being in conflict with one another. The patent law allows a
temporal monopoly on technological idea in order to incentivize innovation. In contrast,
antitrust law restricts monopolistic market powers in order to promotes competition. To
this conventional point of view, the modern policy understanding suggests that the two in-
stitutions are not conflicted, but rather compatible. The mere existence of a patent does not
form the monopoly because innovators can access substitutes for the patented technology,
while the patent law protects innovators’ appropriability (DoJ and FTC, 2007). Accord-
ingly, the patent promotes both of market competition and innovation (Gilbert and Shapiro,
1996).
This thought seems to accommodate proponents’ views of patent and antitrust laws.
However, it does not fully address the key question of how the institutional tension be-
tween the two bodies of law shapes innovation (See Oppenheim, 1955). The compatibil-
ity between the two institutions is conditioned on which innovators can access substitutes
for patented technology. What if a firm comes to own most existing patents and, hence,
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effectively form a patent monopoly? Will the antitrust regulation of such patents consol-
idation by a few firms encourage or discourage innovation? Although this inquiry takes
a crucial part in describing how the two institutions interact for innovation and relate to
another long-standing question of whether a stronger (or weaker) patent protection encour-
ages innovation (e.g., Kortum and Lerner, 1998; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001; Hall
and Ziedonis, 2001; Lerner, 2002), relevant studies seem to have limitations in providing
the direct answer.
First, whether innovators’ monopolistic profit drives innovation is inconclusive. Schum-
peter (1942) theorized that market concentration (weak competition) promotes innovation;
subsequent studies found further supportive empirical evidence (e.g., Blundell et al., 1999;
Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006). In contrast, Arrow (1962) claimed that competitive market
environment spurs innovation and empirical research has supported this claim (e.g., Schor,
2004; Correa and Ornaghi, 2014). Aghion and Griffith (2005)’s study is positioned be-
tween the two opposing ends to show that an inverted U-shape relationship exists between
the intensity of market competition and the rate of innovation. This inconclusiveness may
be due to the endogenous relationship between market competition and innovation (Sidak
and Teece, 2009).
Second, the net effect of patent protection on innovation is an ongoing research ques-
tion. Exclusive access to certain knowledge through patenting may deter innovation by
preventing innovators from accessing essential technological inputs for another innovation
(e.g., Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2000; Jaffe and Lerner, 2011). Meanwhile, if
the monopolistic profit of an original innovator is not protected, the incentive for the private
R&D investment is deprived, and less innovation than the socially desirable level can be
created as a result.
Third, how the antitrust authority’s regulation of the formation of patent monopoly
affects innovation has been less examined. The studies on the antitrust authority’s role in
a patent system has focused on shaping the patent system by finding the optimal length or
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breadth of patent right (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990; Denicolo, 1996) and
examining the consequence of restricting the exertion of patent right for market competition
and consumer welfare (e.g., Chang, 1995; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1996; Jaffe, 2000), with
less interest in innovation (Khan, 2016).
How does the antitrust regulation of patent-monopoly formation affect innova-
tion? The present study aims to answer this question in part by examining the short-term
effect of the antitrust regulation of formation of patent monopoly on the rate of follow-on
innovation. The patent monopoly can be created through patents consolidation in two ways.
One is a preemptive patenting by internal Research and Development (R&D). The preemp-
tive patenting helps maintaining monopolistic market power of market dominant players
(Gilbert and Newbery, 1982), yet this does not violate the antitrust law (See Gilbert, 1987).
Another is by aggregating existing patents through patents transfer. The patents consoli-
dation by patents transfer can lead to not only restriction to an upstream technology by
downstream innovators (Hahn, 1984; Figueroa and Serrano, 2013) but also deterring their
market entry (See Ziedonis, 2004; Gotts and Sher, 2012), which may result in antitrust law
violation. The present study focuses on the later case.
I start by building an analytical model that illustrates how the downstream market com-
petition and follow-on innovation are affected by a firm’s aggregation of existing patents.
The model predicts that, in a sector where innovation is created cumulatively, a firm’s
patents consolidation negatively affects the rate of its market competitors’ follow-on inno-
vation, only if the patent-acquiring firm amasses patents on substituting upstream technolo-
gies for what it already owned (i.e., consolidation of patents on substituting technologies).
However, the formation of such a patent monopoly does not affect the rate of the patent con-
solidator’s follow-on innovation activity. In this case, the regulation of patent-monopoly
formation by preventing patent consolidation is predicted to positively affect the rate of
follow-on innovation by the market competitors of the patent-consolidating firm while not
affecting this firm’s development of the follow-on innovation.
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I empirically test this prediction by capitalizing on the case of the US DoJ’s interven-
tion into Novell’s (an open-source software company) sale of Linux-related patents to four
large proprietary software companies (i.e., Microsoft, Oracle, EMC, Apple). In the anal-
ysis, I use a patented invention as the proxy for an innovation. For a antitrust concern,
the US DoJ stepped into this patent transfer deal. The intervention was a partial regula-
tion of the transfer of Novell patents to Microsoft. As a result, only part of the Novell’s
patents could be transferred to the other three software companies. Because the DoJ’s reg-
ulation was triggered by the German Antitrust Authority’s disclosure of information about
the patent buyers, followed by Open Source Software (OSS) advocate’s objection to this
deal, I argue that the DoJ’s intervention was an exogenous event in this case. Using the
patent citation count as a proxy for the number of follow-on inventions, I compare the rate
of follow-on inventions for the transfer-regulated patents and transferred-patents after the
DoJ’s intervention.
My analysis using the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) and synthetic control approach
with a series of falsification of alternative explanations supports the derived prediction. The
antitrust regulation of consolidation of Novell’s patents positively affected the development
of the patent-consolidating firm’s competitors’ follow-on inventions. However, no evidence
indicates that the regulation affected the rate of patent-consolidating firms’ follow-on in-
ventions.
The contribution of the present study is threefold. First, this study advances the broad
policy discussion about the interaction between antitrust and patent laws regarding inno-
vation by examining the impact of antitrust regulations of patent-monopoly on follow-on
innovation. Second, the findings of the present study highlight the importance of govern-
mental attention to patent-only transfer with respect to its impact on innovation. Conven-
tionally, the antitrust authority has focused on regulating business deals such as Mergers
and Acquisition that may harm market competition. This study suggests that antitrust au-
thorities also need to pay closer attention to patents-only transfer deal for innovation. Fi-
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nally, the present study advances the recent policy discourse on how the market for patents
shapes innovation by extending the scope of the discussion from patent transfers for ex-post
patent enforcement (FTC, 2011) to the creation of patent-monopoly.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the background
of this study. Section 3 describes the model that illustrates whether and how patent transfer
creates a patent monopoly and its impact on the rate of follow-on innovation. Section 4
describes the data and method for the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the findings,
and the implications are discussed in Section 6.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Patent Transfer, Antitrust Law, and Innovation
Firms transfer patents for various reasons. Firms sell patents for asset monetization (Kelley,
2011; Orr, 2013; Morton and Shapiro, 2014; Serrano and Ziedonis, 2018) or financing
through patents collateral (Hochberg et al., 2018).
Meanwhile, firms may purchase patents for defensive purposes (Lemley et al., 2016).
A well-organized patent portfolio can be a useful bargaining chip in business negotiations
(Cohen and Lemley, 2001; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). Specifically, when a
firm is sued for patent infringements, the firm can use owning patents to settle the dispute
through cross-licensing. Because this strategy becomes feasible when the firm has a suffi-
ciently strong patent portfolio (Von Graevenitz et al., 2013), the firm has an incentive for
acquiring patents from outside to strengthen their patent portfolios.
Firms also purchase patents to raise their rivals’ operating cost. The first essay of this
dissertation shows that firms have an incentive to purchase patents to leverage market com-
petitor’s ex-post patent holdup risk, and doing so effectively increases the rival’s operating
cost while making the market competitors less active in developing the relevant technolo-
gies to the patents.
Firms’ patents transfer increasingly gains the attention of antitrust and innovation poli-
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cymakers for its associated antitrust issue and less clear consequence for innovation.
On the one hand, the patent transfer may facilitate efficient reallocation of patents to
those who can utilize the patents better (Galasso et al., 2013; Akcigit et al., 2016) while
promoting innovators’ specialization in developing ideas (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999).
For firms, the patent transfer can be a useful instrument in managing their intellectual
property (IP) assets. The flexible IP management enabled by trading patents may help firms
to make more efficient R&D investments. In addition to the firms’ patents transfer activity,
the government can contribute to promoting innovation while encouraging the knowledge
diffusion by purchasing patents from inventors and sharing them in public domain (Kremer,
1998).
On the other hand, the patent transfer can harm market competition by allowing a few
firms to amass patents and thereby effectively monopolize the downstream market (Hahn,
1984; Figueroa and Serrano, 2013). For instance, a patent buyer can enjoy monopolistic
market power by aggregating patents on particular upstream technology and by then re-
stricting downstream innovators’ access to these patents (Ziedonis, 2004; Gotts and Sher,
2012). In addition, the patent transfer can lead to frivolous patents infringement lawsuits by
those who purchase patents to extract excessive rent from operating firms through ex-post
patent enforcement. This can increase the cost of innovation and result in a sub-optimal
R&D investment by those operating firms. For this issue, ex-post patent enforcement has
become one of the agenda in a recent hearing held by FTC (2011).
For the probable antitrust issue, patents transfer can be the subject of authorities’ reg-
ulation. In US, two legislative acts enable the regulation of patent transfer: The Sherman
Act and The Clayton Act. The Sherman Antitrust Act (26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§17) was
enacted in 1890, to regulate unlawful market monopolies. This act enabled the regulation
of business practices that may discourage market competition.
The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 (38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. §§1227, 29 U.S.C.
§§5253) to specify which business practices violate the Sherman Act, elaborating on its
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antitrust enforcement scheme and its legal remedies. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides
the key foundation for the regulation of patent transfer. The section states that business
practices that may harm market competition or lead to the formation of a monopoly can
be regulated by authorities. Based on this section, the patent transfer that can harm market
competition or form a monopoly can be subject to regulation (Klitzke, 1980; Gotts and
Sher, 2012).
Gotts and Sher (2012) detail in what cases the regulation of patents transfer will be in
consideration. In one case, the patent transfer can be regulated when it is likely to result in
the exclusion of the patent buyer’s competitors from the market. In another case, the patent
transfer can also be regulated when it results in increased patent thicket and aggravation of
patent holdup issue. In a third case, the patent transfer can be regulated when the patent
buyer has different incentives in using the patents than the patent seller. For instance, if the
patent buyer has a greater incentive to block market entry of competitors, while the patent
seller had the intention to share the patents at reasonable royalty fee, the patent transaction
can be subject to an antitrust investigation based on the possible violation of section 7 of
The Clayton Act.
3.2.2 Open Source Software and Patents
A computer program (i.e., software) is implemented by writing source code and converting
it into an executable form (i.e., a binary file). The source code is protected by copyright
law.
Accessibility to the source code of the existing software is crucial for developing the
new software because it is often built cumulatively (Cohen and Lemley, 2001; Smith and
Mann, 2004; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Hall and MacGarvie, 2010; Noel and Schanker-
man, 2013).
The software is categorized into two types based on public accessibility to the source
code. One is proprietary software. Proprietary software is built by exclusive profit-seeking
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entities. The source code of the software is not provided to the third party. Instead, the soft-
ware vendor provides a package of binary files which are executable on users’ machines.
Even if one could obtain the software’s source code, one cannot modify the source code
nor distribute the software that was built on it without the permission of the source code’s
original copyright holder.
The second type is OSS. The copyright holder of OSS makes the source code available
to anyone who complies with a designated OSS license term. The recipients of the source
code can freely modify, study, and distribute the implemented software as long as they
comply with the given OSS license terms. GNU Public License (GPL) is one of the popular
OSS license schemes. Linux is the computer operating system that complies with the GPL.
Accordingly, anyone can freely use the GPL-licensed linux source code as long as comply
with the GPL terms.
Free access to the software source code and its distribution made the Linux-based soft-
ware a strong competitor to proprietary computer programs. The competition led major
proprietary software companies to take actions for deterring Linux community’s software
development. Patents infringement disputes raised by Microsoft against Linux vendors
in 20071 and the legal disputes between SCO-group and Linux vendors regarding copy-
right/patents infringement are the examples. Wen et al. (2013) showed that such patents
enforcement against Linux community could deter its further software development activ-
ities indeed.
The series of patent infringement disputes on software patents against the Linux com-
munity motivated some Linux-based software companies and vendors to build a defen-
sive patents pool, namely Open Invention Network (OIN) in 2005.2 The OIN was jointly
founded by Novell, Sony, NEC, IBM, Red Hat, and Philips. It amasses patents that can





to the patents to anyone who wants to use or develop the Linux-based program. In return,
the licensees are required to permit the use of their patents by other licensees of OIN. Under
the OIN program, the OIN licensees can avoid the probable patents infringement disputes
with other licensees of OIN.
OSS appears to have an inherent conflict with the patent law. Patents confer patent
holder the right to exclude others from using the patented invention, whereas OSS allows
anyone to use, modify, and distribute the software which contains patented technology for
free.
However, OSS can be compatible with patent law, at least, under GPL scheme. When
OSS vendors distribute software under the GPL terms, it implies that the vendor automat-
ically licenses the patented technology implemented in the software for free (i.e., implicit
patent licensing, see Section 7 GPL v23). Yet, patents implemented in OSS are not always
necessarily licensed for free. If a patent holder does not distribute its software under the
GPL terms, third parties cannot utilize the patent nor distribute the software that contains
the patented technology if the patent holder does not formally license it. Even if the soft-
ware is licensed under the GPL scheme, the patent is not automatically licensed to the third
parties if the licensees do not comply with GPL terms.
3.3 Model
In this section, I explore how a firm’s consolidation of existing patents and resulting patent
monopoly may affect the follow-on innovation development by using an analytical model.
3.3.1 Setting
Consider that there are three firms and two patented upstream technologies, T1 and T2.
Each of technologies can generate two follow-on innovations, D1 and D2 respectively with
R&D investment S. In this model, I posit that D1 and D2 are horizontally differentiated
3 https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html
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products. For instance, T1 and T2 are patents on digital information searching algorithms.
T1 provides a way of searching a queried information faster but less accurately than T2.
In contrast, T2 is an algorithmic method to search information more accurately but slowly
than T1. Web search engines that implement each of the patented algorithms become D1
and D2.
Firms 1 and 2 have stakes in developing D1 and D2 whereas firm 3 does not. Firm 3
only owns the patent on T2. Initially, firm 1 owns the patent on T1 and firm 2 receives the
license on T2 from firm 3. In this setting, none of the firms consolidate the existing patents.
The number of consumers who may consume D1 or D2 is given as λ.
3.3.2 Hotelling Linear City Model
In the given setting, firms 1 and 2 each creates D1 and D2. The resulting market competi-
tion can be generalized into a duopolistic market competition between the two firms with
two horizontally differentiated products. Hotelling linear city model (Hotelling, 1929) is
useful for formally describing this situation.
λ-consumers are evenly distributed between [0,1] while firms 1 and 2 are located at the
two ends, respectively (i.e., Firm 1 at 0, Firm 2 at 1). Consumers have the homogeneous
indirect utility function U = V0 − pi − τx, i ∈ {1, 2}, where τ is the transportation cost,
x is a consumer’s distance from D1, p1 and p2 are the market prices of D1 and D2, and V0
is a consumer’s default valuation of the follow-on innovations. The indifferent consumer
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Q2 is derived as Q2 = λ(1 − x) = λ2 +
λ(p1−p2)
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. Firms 1 and 2 find the optimal prices by









)− S, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j (3.1)
4 x is the solution of the equation V0 − τx− p1 = V0 − (1− x)τ − p2
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τ − S (3.2)
Meanwhile, if there is only one follow-on innovation created, the firm that developed
the follow-on innovation becomes a monopolist. In this case, consumers with V0 ≥ τx+pi
will consume the follow-on innovation. Hence, the market demand for the follow-on inno-
vation is given as Qi =
λ(V0−pi)
τ
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V 20 − S (3.4)
No Patent Transfer
In this model, it is presumed that τ ≥ 2S
λ
:= τ0 as this condition creates the economic
incentive for firms 1 and 2 to invest in developing the follow-on innovations D1 and D2.
Because firm 2 initially receives the license on T2, it pays the license fee to firm 3. At the
equilibrium, the license fee is firm 2’s payoff from developing D2 (i.e., λ
2
τ − S). Firm 1
does not license the patent on T1 to firm 2 because firm 1’s payoff becomes negative if firm
2 develops D1.5 Because firms 1 and 2 invest in D1 and D2, there are two firms in market
operation, and two follow-on innovations are created.
Patent Consolidation
Consider that firm 1 buys the patent on T2 from firm 3. As a result, firm 1 becomes the sole
owner of the existing patents. This situation refers to the formation of patent-monopoly by
5 Firm 1’s expected payoff of investing in D1 is −S because firm 2’s development of D1 makes τ = 0.
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patent aggregation. Accordingly, firm 2 cannot invest in D1 nor D2 without the permission
of firm 1 (i.e., license).
Firm 1’s Strategy: After firm 1 purchases the patent, it can choose one of the following
follow-on innovation investment strategies: invest in both of D1 and D2 ({ALL}), invest in
follow-on innovation for one upstream technology while giving the license on the other to
firm 2 ({OPEN}), or invest in follow-on innovation of only one upstream technology while
not allowing firm 2’s access to the other ({BLOCK}).
Payoffs: For simplicity, the R&D cost for developing both D1 and D2 is assumed to be
2S. Under this assumption, Firm 1’s payoff of choosing {ALL} is λτ − 2S.6 The payoff
of choosing {OPEN} consists of a direct payoff from firm 1’s follow-on innovation and
the license fee paid by firm 2. The direct payoff from the follow-on innovation is given
as λτ
2
− S. Then, firm 1 charges the exact amount of payoff that firm 2 will earn from
the follow-on innovation as the license fee, which is λτ
2
− S. Hence, the payoff for firm
1 of choosing {OPEN} becomes the same as {ALL}. The payoff of choosing {BLOCK}
is λ
4τ
V 20 − S because firm 1 becomes the monopolist and there will be only one follow-on
innovation created.
Strategy Selection: In strategy selection, firm 1 is assumed to take the take-it-or-leave
strategy. Because {ALL} and {OPEN} are indifferent strategies for firm 1, firm 1 compares
the payoff of these two strategies with the payoff of {BLOCK}.
{ALL} or {OPEN} (hereafter, {A/O}) becomes the dominant strategy when τ is such
that λτ − 2S ≥ λ
4τ
V 20 − S. According to the solution with the constraint τ ≥ 0, firm 1




:= τ1. However, when τ < τ1, firm 1 chooses
{BLOCK}.
Patent Price and Incentive: Why would firm 1 buy the patent on T2? Why wouldn’t
firm 2 purchase the patent on T2? Does firm 3 have an incentive to sell the patent on T2?
When firm 1 chooses {A/O}, it can earn λτ
2
− S additionally by purchasing the patent
6 2× (λτ2 − S)
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on T2. Hence, the maximum price that firm 1 is willing to pay for buying the patent on T2
is λτ
2
− S. Because this price is positive, firm 1 has an incentive to purchase the patent on
T2. Meanwhile, firm 3 earns λτ
2
− S by selling the patent, which is the same as licensing
the patent to firm 2. Hence, firm 3 is indifferent about whether to license the patent to firm
2 or sell it to firm 1.
When firm 1 chooses {BLOCK}(i.e., τ < τ1), the incremental profit for firm 1 from




which is always greater than λτ
2
− S. In this case, firm 3
earns a greater profit by selling the patent on T2 to firm 1 than by licensing T2 to firm 2.
Hence, firm 3 has an incentive to sell the patent to firm 1, while firm 1 still has an incentive
to purchase the patent on T2.7
Firm 2’s payoff of purchasing the patent on T2 is λτ
2
− S, which is the same as the
payoff for receiving the license on T2. Thus, the incremental payoff from purchasing the
patent on T2 is 0, which indicates that firm 2 has no incentive to switch from licensing to
purchasing the patent.
Number of Follow-on Innovations: When firm 1 chooses {ALL}, there will be only
one firm in the market operation while two follow-on innovations created. When firm 1
chooses {OPEN}, the number of created follow-on innovations is two, and there will be
two firms in operations. Firm 1’s choose of {OPEN} does not affect the rate of follow-on
innovation. However, if firm 1 chooses {BLOCK}, it invests in the follow-on innovation
of one upstream technology while firm 2 can develop neither D1 nor D2. Hence, there will
be only one firm in market operation, and one follow-on innovation created.
3.3.3 Comparative Analysis
Figure 3.1 shows the number of follow-on innovation before (INT ) and after the creation
of patent monopoly by patent transfer (IT ) according to the value of τ . The dashed line is
INT . The solid line presents IT .
7 Firm 1 can offer the price of the patent in between the λτ2 − S and
λ(V 20 −2τ
2)
4τ so that firm 1 retains a
positive incremental profit while making firm 3 better off than licensing the patent to firm 2.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Follow-on Innovations
The number of the follow-on innovation does not change when τ is sufficiently large
(i.e., τ ≥ τ1). In contrast, if follow-on innovation for each upstream technology is not
sufficiently differentiated from each other (i.e., τ0 ≤ τ < τ1), the patent consolidation
results in blocking firm 2’s creation of follow-on innovation while firm 1 will invest in
follow-on innovation for only one upstream technology. This is so because developing
marginally different follow-on innovation is not profitable to firm 1. The similar conclusion
has been reached by the study on the effect of horizontal M&A on innovation (Richman
et al., 2016).
The constructed model suggests that the formation of a patent monopoly by patents
consolidation negatively affects the development of follow-on innovation only if the patent
acquirer consolidates the patents on substituting technologies for what it already owned.
The negative effect is primarily attributed to the discouraged development of follow-on
innovation by firm 2 that could be in market competition with firm 1 if there was no patents
consolidation. This observation formulates the following prediction:
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When a firm consolidates patents on substituting technology for what it already owns,
the regulation of such patents consolidation positively affects its market competitors’
follow-on innovation development.
3.4 Empirical Setting
3.4.1 Novell’s Software Patents Transfer
The empirical work of the present study is based on the case of the US DoJ’s intervention
into the Novell’s software patents transfer to CPTN holdings (hereafter, CPTN) in 2011.
Novell’s primary business domain was the Linux-based OSS market. It was also a founder
of the OIN that is the largest non-aggressive defensive patent pool for the Linux community.
By joining the OIN licensing program, firms could freely use the patents that are shared
through OIN. In return, the OIN licensees and member companies (Novell, Red Hat, IBM,
Philips, Sony, and NEC) were required to share their patents with other OIN licensees.
In 2010, Attachmate Inc (Hereafter, Attachmate) announced that it acquires Novell
Inc. Before the acquisition, Novell tried to sell about 800 software patents. Four large
proprietary software companies (MS, Oracle, EMC, and Apple) established a consortium
called CPTN for the acquisition of the Novell patents.8 A two-stage patent acquisition
process was planned. CPTN acquired all the Novell patents first. Then, it redistributed the
patents to its member companies later. For this deal, CPTN paid $450 million in cash.
Before December 2010, it was known that Microsoft and some unknown parties made
the patents transfer deal with Novell.9 In early December 2010, the German Federal Cartel
Office (Bundeskartellamt) fully disclosed who were behind the CPTN holdings (MS, Ora-
cle, Apple, and EMC). After this information disclosure, there was opposition to this deal






thority’s investigation into whether the Novell’s patents transfer deal violated the German
antitrust law. In late December 201010, the OSI and the Free Software Foundation (FSF),
another open software advocate, sent a letter to the US DoJ to express their concern that
the Novell’s patents transfer would destroy the Linux community and consequently deter
its innovation. They argued that:
• Novell was dedicated to promoting the Free/Libre and Open Software (FLOSS),
while using their patents primarily for defensive purpose.
• Linux software is the major competitor against products of CPTN member compa-
nies.
• CPTN member companies already have major market share in the market for operat-
ing systems, virtualization software, and middleware.11
The OSI and FSF were concerned that CPTN members would use Novell patents to
prevent further development of OSS. They feared this because the CPTN members were
not obliged to share their patents with the Linux community while they were in the software
market competition with the OIN members.
The US DoJ responded to this concerns by starting an investigation into whether Nov-
ell’s patent transfer violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. According to the FSF, DoJ
requested detailed information about the patents transfer deal from CPTN in late January
2011.12 The 8-K document filed by Novell reports that there was another round of request
by DoJ for further information about the deal in March 2011.13 On April 20, 2011, DoJ
announced that it intervenes in the deal to address the immediate antitrust concern. The







First, MS was not allowed to acquire any of Novell patents. The patents that could
be acquired by MS were to be transferred to CPTN and then transferred back to Novell
(later held by Attachmate). As a result, neither MS nor the other CPTN members could
acquire titles to these patents. Instead, MS was permitted to receive licenses for the patents
retained by Novell and acquired by the other member companies of CPTN. Second, EMC
agreed not to acquire 33 virtualization software-related patents (i.e., virtual machine (VM)
technology) because EMC was the dominant player in the virtualization software market.14
Third, all the patents retained by Novell became subject to GPLv2 and OIN licensing.
Thus, even though Novell dis-joined the OIN, the patents retained by Novell kept being
shared through the OIN license program.
The DoJ’s partial regulation of Novell’s patent transfer is a useful case to test the de-
rived theoretical prediction. First, the CPTN members were the dominant software market
players who already owned many software patents. Thus, the transfer of the Novell patents
could result in consolidation of patents on substituting software technology for what CPTN
members already owned. Second, the trigger of the DoJ’s intervention was the German
authority’s disclosure of the list of CPTN members. Hence, the US DoJ regulation was
close to an exogenous event to the involved parties in the patent transfer deal. Third, the
DoJ’s intervention was not to regulate the transfer of a specific set of patents that were par-
ticularly important for Linux software development. Instead, DoJ prohibited the transfer of
patents that MS tried to acquire.
3.4.2 Data
I started by identifying the US patents that were transferred from Novell to CPTN, recorded
in the USPTO patent assignment database (Graham et al., 2018). My initial search identi-
fied 866 patents. From these, I included 760 granted patents into the sample.
In the empirical analysis, I used a variable that counts the number of patents-citation
14 According to the data, many of the VM patents (searched by virtual machine) was transferred to Oracle.
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accrued to a patent in question beginning four years before to the DoJ’s intervention date
(i.e., April 20, 2011) as a control variable. To avoid the truncation problem in use of this
variable, I excluded the patents that were filed after April 21, 2007. As a result, 432 patents
retained.
For each patent in the data, I identified which company became the new patent owner
by searching for the patent ownership change history made by CPTN as the patent assignor
after April 2011.15 Among 432 patents, 97 (22.5%) patents were transferred to Oracle
(September 2011), 100 patents (23.2%) were reassigned to Apple (June 2012), and EMC
became the new owner of 109 patents (25.2%) (September 2011). The rest of the patents
(126 patents, 29.2%) were re-transferred to Novell (September 2011). Because DoJ ruled
that the patents that could be transferred to MS must be retained by Novell, the 126 patents
are the transfer-prohibited patents (hereafter, regulated patents). Figure 3.2 depicts the
redistribution of Novell’s patents.
Figure 3.2: Transfer of Novell Patents
I obtained detailed information of each of the patents from patentview.org (serviced by
15 Identified by execution date.
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USPTO). The distribution of NBER subcategories shows that most of the 432 patents were
related to software indeed (181 Computer Hardware & Software, 103 Electronic Business
Method & Software, and 99 information storage).
3.4.3 Variables
Dependent Variables
I define a follow-on innovation as a new technical idea that was built upon a previously
existing inventive idea. Based on this definition, I operationalized the number of follow-
on innovation of a patent by using the patent forward citation that a patent received in a
certain time window (e.g., Galasso and Schankerman, 2014; Gaessler et al., 2017; Drivas
et al., 2017). Note that this empirical strategy has several limitations. Not all patented
inventions are commercialized and, hence, subsequent patent of a focal patent invention
may not be the valid proxy for “innovation.” Also, some innovation may not be the subject
of patenting in the first place. The innovators used not to patent their innovation for various
reasons, or the innovative idea is not the patentable subject matter by law. However, it
is not deniable that the patent citation is one of the most reliable and available sources to
measure technological linkage between the inventive ideas contained in the citing and cited
patents and captures the cumulative nature of inventions in the citing patents (e.g., Jaffe
and Trajtenberg, 2002; Kang and Motohashi, 2014; Jaffe and de Rassenfosse, 2017). This
is because the patent citation is made when the novelty and legal scope of the invention
in question is limited by the cited patents (i.e., prior arts). In addition, due to the fact that
only inventions which are “useful” and “novel” are patentable, the issued patent can be
considered as the legally curated inventive idea that may bring in innovation.
I employ four patent forward citation variables counting from the beginning on the date
of DoJ’s intervention and up until four years later. The first two variables are to test the
derived theoretical predictions, and the last two variables are used to examine the impact
of the regulation in a more comprehensive manner.
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The first dependent variable, PostCiteOIN, accounts for the number of forward cita-
tions originated from the patents belonging to the members of OIN excluding Novell (i.e.,
Sony, NEC, IBM, Red Hat, and Philips). This variable proxies for the number of follow-
on inventions created by the OIN members that competed with the CPTN members in the
software market. The second dependent variable is PostCiteCPTN that accounts for the
number of forward citations made by the CPTN members’ patents. This variable proxies
for the number of follow-on inventions created by the firms that were trying to consolidate
the Novell patents. The third variable, PostCiteRem, accounts for the number of forward
citations from the patents that were owned by those who were not the OIN nor CPTN
members. Finally, to examine how the DoJ’s intervention affected the overall rate of all the
follow-on inventions, I regress PostCiteAll that accounts for the total number of forward
citations that a patent in question received.
Independent Variable
The independent variable is a binary variable labeled to regulated, which takes the value
of 1 for the regulated patents and 0 for the transferred patents, by considering the DoJ’s
intervention as a policy treatment. The regulated patents comprise the treatment group
and the transferred patents belong to the control group. One may argue that the regulated
patents should belong to the control group because the DoJ’s regulation sustains status-quo
of the patents ownership. However, due to the regulation in the context of this study is an
authority’s intervention into the free market transaction of patents, it is more reasonable to
consider it as a manipulative factor (e.g., Choi and Philippatos, 1983; Crandall and Winston,
2003).
Control Variables
First, I control for the number of created follow-on inventions of each patent based on
the number of its forward-citations that the patent of interest received from beginning four
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years before the date of DoJ’s intervention. Because the full list of the CPTN member
companies was disclosed in December 2010, I count the number of forward citations up
to six months before the regulation date. By introducing this variable, I control for the
pre-regulation difference in the number of follow-on inventions between regulated- and
transferred-patents. PreCiteOIN, PreCiteCPTN, PreCiteRem, and PreCiteAll are the
pre-treatment control variables for each of the dependent variables.
Second, I control for the patent’s legal scope using the number of independent patent
claims (nClaim). The broader its legal scope, the greater the probability that the patent lim-
its the legal scope of subsequent patents (Marco et al., 2016) and the greater the probability
of the patent being involved in patent infringement litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman,
1997). Because patents with a broad legal scope could be useful in strategic patent enforce-
ment, MS might be interested in acquiring these, while their transfer could particularly
catch the attention of DoJ.
Third, as DoJ stated, its primary concern was the probable discouragement of further
development of Linux-oriented applications, middleware, virtualization software, and op-
erating system as a result of the patent transfer deal. Thus, the transfer of patents relevant
to these application areas could have become the primary target of the DoJ’s intervention,
since MS targeted these patents for strategic purpose. Meanwhile, because these applica-
tions could be related to the emerging technological opportunity in the software market, the
relevant patents could have received more patent citations than patents for other applica-
tions. To rule out this spurious effect, I introduce a binary variable DoJConcern that takes
the value of 1 if the patent of interest contains at least one of the following keywords in its
abstract16: linux, unix, software, middleware, open source, operating system, and virtual
machine. The search identified 98 patents in the sample.
Fourth, the member companies of OIN had major stakes in the GNU/Linux software
market while the GNU/Linux software was the primary competitor of MS products. Hence,
16 I used the curated abstracts provided by Derwent Innovation Index of Clarivate Analytics.
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MS might had the incentive for preempting patents that closely relate to OIN members’
technologies for the monopolistic market profit (See the “incentive for a firm to preempt
patents for monopolistic market profit”, Chang, 1995). At the same time, patents rele-
vant to the technological domain of the OIN members could have been within a promising
technology area, and thus attract more follow-on inventions than other software patents do.
To rule out this hypothesis, I control for whether the patent of interest has technological
link with the patents owned by the OIN members by using the patent citation information.
CiteOINPat takes the value of 1 if the patent of interest cites patents owned by the OIN
members before the DoJ intervention, and 0 otherwise.
Fifth, the genuine value of a patent is realized as a patent portfolio (Parchomovsky and
Wagner, 2005; Choi and Gerlach, 2017). Firms used to obtain patents to strengthen their
patent portfolio by organizing it as a well-interconnected web of intellectual property rights.
In this regard, MS probably tried to acquire Novell patents that are related to the patents
that MS already owned. Meanwhile, the patents closely related to MS’ patents might be
relevant to a rising technological opportunity in the software market, which attracts more
follow-on inventions than others. To control for this effect, I introduce CiteMSPat as a
control variable which takes the value of 1 if the patent of interest has cited any MS-owned
US patents before the DoJ’s intervention.
Sixth, the Novell’s patents transfer was the subject of the German authority’ investiga-
tion regarding the violation of the German antitrust law. Hence, those patented inventions
that were protected in Germany could have caught the attention of the German authority,
which triggered the intervention of US DoJ in the end. As many studies show, patents with
protections in multiple jurisdictions often contain commercially valuable inventions (e.g.,
Lanjouw et al., 1998; Harhoff et al., 2003). It is also plausible that MS had planned to pur-
chase Novell’s commercially valuable patents in the first place. I control for this effect by
introducing EuroFam that takes the value of 1 for the Novell patents having EPO family
patents. Finally, I control for the patent application year (AppYr) and technology (Tech)
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field fixed effects by using NBER subcategory (Hall et al., 2001).
3.4.4 Descriptive Analysis
Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics for the variables of interest. A simple comparison
of the mean values reveals notable differences between the regulated and transferred patents
in all the four forward citation indicators. On average, the regulated patents received more
citations both before and after the DoJ’s intervention than the transferred patents. This
indicates that, even though the DoJ’s intervention was triggered by a seemingly exogenous
event, the two groups of patents are different in their technological importance.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Regulated (N=126) Transferred (N=306)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ln(PostCiteOIN+1) 0.37 0.64 0.22 0.47
ln(lPostCiteCPTN+1) 0.55 0.84 0.43 0.68
ln(PostCiteRem+1) 1.73 1.25 1.36 1.18
ln(PosteCiteAll+1) 2.01 1.26 1.63 1.15
ln(PreCiteOIN+1) 0.55 0.69 0.40 0.59
ln(PreCiteCPTN+1) 0.57 0.79 0.48 0.68
ln(PreCiteRem+1) 1.67 1.16 1.29 1.12
ln(PreCiteAll+1) 1.96 1.19 1.58 1.15
nClaim 23.04 12.09 22.39 11.23
DoJConcern 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43
CiteOINPat 0.78 0.42 0.77 0.42
CiteMSPat 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.50
EuroFam 0.07 0.26 0.22 0.42
AppYr 1999.71 3.82 2000.57 3.97
Table 3.2 presents the correlations between the key variables. Except for the correla-
tions between the forward citation-based variables, the correlations are below 0.3.
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Table 3.2: Correlation
Variables ln(PreCiteOIN+1) ln(PreCiteCPTN+1) ln(PreCiteRem+1) ln(PreCiteAll+1) Regulated
ln(PreCiteOIN+1) 1.00
ln(PreCiteCPTN+1) 0.34 1.00
ln(PreCiteRem+1) 0.41 0.35 1.00
ln(PreCiteALL+1) 0.57 0.56 0.94 1.00
Regulated 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.15 1.00
nClaim 0.15 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.03
DoJConcern 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.04
CiteOINPat 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01
CiteMSPat -0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04
EuroFam -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 -0.18








CiteOINPat 0.06 0.00 1.00
CiteMSPat -0.06 0.09 0.16 1.00
EuroFam 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Regression Results
I employ the econometric model that was employed by the study of Galasso and Schanker-
man (2014). Because this model controls for the pre-intervention dependent variable, the
specification is cross-sectional DiD model. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator
with robust standard error is used. For the estimation, I take natural logarithms on the four
forward-citation variables added by 1 because these variables have right-skewed distribu-
tions and zero as the minimum value. The econometric model specification is as follow.
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ln(PostCiteV ari + 1) = β0 + β1 × regulatedi + β2 × ln(PreCiteV ari + 1)
+ β3 × nClaimi + β4 ×DoJConcerni + β5 × CiteOINPati
+ β6 × CiteMSPati + β7 × EuroFami + β8 × AppY ri
+ β9 × Techi + εi
(3.5)
where PostCiteV ari ∈ {PostCiteOINi, PostCiteCPTNi, PostCiteRemi, PostCiteAlli}.
My theoretical prediction anticipates a positive and statistically significant β1 for the
ln(PostCiteOINi + 1) while that for ln(PostCiteCPTNi + 1) is not far from 0. Table
3.3 presents the result.
The first column reports the regression result employing ln(PostCiteOIN+1) as the
dependent variable. The regression result shows that the coefficient of regulated is positive
and statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. The rate of follow-on invention
for a regulated patent becomes about 15.6% greater than that for a comparable transferred
patent, after the regulation.
The second column presents the estimation result using ln(PostCiteCPTN+1) as the
dependent variable. The coefficient of the regulated is statistically insignificant at the 0.1
significance level. This indicates that there is no evidence showing the notable difference
between regulated and transferred patents in the rate of CPTN member’s follow-on inven-
tions after DoJ’s intervention.
The third column presents the estimation result using ln(PostCiteRem+1) as the de-
pendent variable. The coefficient of the regulated is statistically insignificant at the 0.1
significance level. There is no evidence showing that the DoJ’s regulation influenced the
rate of follow-on inventions of individuals or organizations that were not involved in the
patent transfer deal.
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Table 3.3: Main Regression Result
ln(PostCiteOIN+1) ln(PostCiteCPTN+1) ln(PostCiteRem+1) ln(PostCiteAll+1)
Regulated 0.156∗∗ 0.0102 0.0664 0.0679









nClaim -0.00115 0.00280 0.00377 0.00312
(0.00190) (0.00293) (0.00310) (0.00301)
DoJConcern 0.0191 -0.126∗∗ 0.0381 -0.0447
(0.0576) (0.0624) (0.0887) (0.0848)
CiteOINPat 0.0956∗ 0.00828 0.0167 0.0326
(0.0543) (0.0684) (0.0918) (0.0898)
CiteMSPat -0.0291 0.0203 0.0162 -0.0196
(0.0531) (0.0588) (0.0761) (0.0734)
EuroFam -0.0297 -0.0300 -0.0641 -0.0871
(0.0692) (0.0708) (0.108) (0.104)
Constant -0.324∗ -0.498∗∗ 0.230 0.000753
(0.183) (0.253) (0.238) (0.277)
R2 0.203 0.420 0.657 0.663
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.375 0.630 0.637
AppYrFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TechFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 432 432 432 432
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The last column reports the estimation result using ln(PostCiteAll+1) as the depen-
dent variable. Although the sign of the coefficient of regulated is positive and size is not
marginal, it is statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level, which indicates that
there is no statistical evidence for rejecting that the transferred and regulated patents are
indifferent in the overall rate of follow-on inventions in the post-regulation period.
All in all, the DoJ’s regulation seems to positively associate with the rate of follow-on
inventions by OIN members that were in market competition with the CPTN members.
Yet, there is no statistical evidence showing that the CPTN members’ (the patent acquirers)
rate of the follow-on inventions was impacted by the DoJ’s regulation. These findings are
consistent with the theoretical prediction and robust to the count-variable regression models
(Negative binomial and Poisson models), a placebo test for the specificity of the finding to
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the timing of regulation, and sub-sample regressions. Appendix A reports the details of the
robustness tests.
3.5.2 Limitations of DiD
Two assumptions must be satisfied to identify the treatment effect of interest when to
employ DiD. The first assumption is that the time trend of outcome variable in the pre-
treatment period between the treatment and control groups should be parallel; this is the
pre-treatment time trend parallel assumption. Another assumption is that the time trend
of the treatment-free outcome variable in the post-treatment period for the treatment and
control groups should parallel.
The first assumption seems to be partly violated according to the empirical data (See
Figure 3.3).17 The second assumption is not testable as the counter-factual of regulated
patents is unobservable.
The violations of these two assumptions make the DiD estimator biased, and thus, the
regression result may not present the causal impact of the DoJ’s regulation.
To mitigate these concerns, I employ the Synthetic Control (SC) approach as a com-
plementary empirical method to the DiD analysis. The SC mechanically forces the pre-
treatment period outcome of the treatment and control group to become comparable. If the
outcome of the treatment and control groups can be predicted by a linear combination of
selected covariates and pre-treatment outcomes, the SC yields an unbiased estimation of
the treatment effect (Kreif et al., 2016). Note that even though the SC has some benefits
over DiD, it also has limitations. The synthesized counterfactual is not real, and there is
a possibility that the outcome variable is not sufficiently predictable by a linear combina-
tion of selected covariates and the pre-treatment outcome. However, the SC method and
DiD approach may jointly identify the treatment effect better than DiD analysis alone if
17 Although I have controlled for the difference in the pre-intervention period forward citation measures
between the two groups of patents in the DiD regression, this empirical strategy is not sufficient to






























































































































































































































































these two methods yield consistent findings as the synthetic control approach can be used
to validate the finding from DiD analysis (Kreif et al., 2016).
3.5.3 Synthetic Control Analysis
The dataset employed in the present study has a multiple number of regulated patents
(treatment units) and transferred patents (control units). Hence, I employ the method for
multiple-treated and control units case as proposed by Kreif et al.(2016). See Appendix B
for the methodological details of the synthetic control approach.
I began with choosing all the control variables that were used for the DiD analysis.
Then, I created the aggregated regulated patent by taking the arithmetic average of the
selected covariates of the 126 regulated patents. Third, I constructed the synthetic control
of the aggregated regulated patent. To this end, I customized the MATLAB script which
was provided by Jens Hainmueller at Stanford University.18 Table 3.4 compares the mean
values of the key variables of regulated patents with those of the synthetic control.
Table 3.4: Means of Key Variables for Regulated, Synthetic-Regulated, and Transferred
Patents
Variables Regulated Synthetic-Regulated Transferred
Mean of PreCiteOIN 0.99 0.96 0.64
Mean of PreCiteCPTN 1.13 1.17 0.88
Mean of PreCiteRemained 5.97 6.03 4.21
Mean of PreCiteAll 8.10 8.15 5.74
PreCiteOIN 1.30 1.30 0.89
PreCiteCPTN 1.66 1.66 1.25
PreCiteRemained 9.30 9.30 6.38
PreCiteAll 12.26 12.26 8.52
nClaim 23.04 23.04 22.39
Application Year 1999.71 1999.71 2000.57
EuroFam 0.07 0.07 0.22
DoJConcern 0.20 0.20 0.24
CiteMSPat 0.38 0.38 0.43
CiteOINPat 0.78 0.78 0.77
18 Downloaded from https://web.stanford.edu/˜jhain/synthpage.html in August
2018.
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The mean values of most of the key variables of the synthetic control are comparable
to those of the regulated patents, which demonstrates that the average characteristics of
constructed synthetic control are sufficiently close to those of the regulated patents.
For statistical inference, I conducted the placebo test as Abadie et al.(2010) and Kreif
et al.(2016) employed. First, 126 patents were randomly selected from the transferred
patents (donor pool). Then, I constructed the placebo-regulated patent by taking the av-
erage of the key variables of interest from the 126 selected patents. Second, by using the
remaining patents in the donor pool (180 patents), I constructed the synthetic control for
the placebo-regulated patent. This procedure is repeated 1000-times. Finally, I profiled the
distribution of the difference between the accumulated forward citations measured at T=4
and T=-1, accrued by the regulated patents and 1,000 placebo-regulated patents, G. Us-
ing this distribution, I calculated the likelihood of obtaining G above the absolute value of
G for the aggregated-regulated patents by chance. This likelihood becomes the empirical
p-value.
Figure 3.4 shows the number of patents forward-citations accrued to a patent by OIN
member companies, according to the SC-analysis. After the DoJ’s intervention, the forward
citations received by regulated patents from OIN member companies becomes greater than
for the synthetic control. The obtained G for regulated patents is at the right tail of the dis-
tribution (empirical p-value=0.02). This result confirms that the DoJ’s regulation positively
affected the follow-on inventions development of OIN members.
Figure 3.5 presents the number of forward citations patents received from CPTN mem-
bers. There is virtually no difference in the number of forward citations accumulated by
the regulated patents and synthetic control after DoJ’s intervention. The empirical p-value
is 0.12, which does not reject the null hypothesis at the 0.1 significance level.
Figure 3.6 shows that there is no notable difference in the number of forward citations
made by those who were not the members of CPTN nor OIN, accrued to the regulated











































































which does not reject the null hypothesis at the 0.1 significance level.
Figure 3.7 compares the total number of forward citations accrued to the regulated
patents and the synthetic control. The obtained empirical p-value is 0.999, which indicates
that there is virtually no difference between the two groups.
All in all, my DiD and the SC analysis conform that the DoJ’s regulation positively
affected the OIN members’ development of follow-on inventions for the Novell’s patents.
I use the DiD as the primary tool for further analysis as I confirmed that the DiD and the
SC method produced consistent findings.
3.5.4 Promotion or Mitigation?
My theoretical model explains that the difference between regulated and transferred patents
in the post-regulation rate of OIN members’ follow-on inventions is due to their decreased
rate of follow-on inventions for the transferred patents—DoJ’s regulation was effective to
mitigate this effect (Mitigation effect). However, it is not the only one that can explain
my empirical finding. The DoJ’s regulation could “promote” follow-on inventions by the
OIN’s members without negative impact of the patent transfer (Promotion effect). The
implication of one is substantially different from another, and yet, my empirical research
design does not allow to distinguish these two scenarios. I address this empirical challenge
by conducting an additional test.
If the mitigation effect worked, the rate of OIN members’ follow-on inventions for the
transferred patents should have been lower than that of comparable patents which were
not involved in the transfer deal (hereafter, the counterpart patents). In contrast, if the
promotion effect worked, the rate of follow-on inventions for the regulated patents created
by OIN members should have been greater than that of the comparable counterpart patents.
These two scenarios are not mutually exclusive. If the two scenarios worked together, the
two aforementioned statements should be jointly supported.











































































as the counterpart patents. Because the CPTN members were in fierce market competition
in software market with the OIN members, while all the CPTN members had great stakes
in acquiring Novell patents, the patents filed by them would be sufficiently close to the
Novell patents in technology space. Thus, the forward citation rate for these patents can be
a reasonable baseline for this test. I chose the US patents that were originally filed by the
four CPTN members between January 1, 1990, and April 20, 2007.
The regression results presented in Table 3.5 show that the rate of OIN members’
follow-on inventions for the transferred patents become about 6.4% lower than that of the
comparable counterpart patents in the post DoJ’s regulation period. Meanwhile, the coef-
ficients of regulated are positive but statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level.
This implies that the CPTN members’ consolidation of the Novell patents imposed a nega-
tive impact on the development of OIN members’ follow-on inventions and thus, the DoJ’s
intervention mitigated this effect. Yet, there is no evidence for the existence of “promotion
effect” by the regulation.
A finer way of building the counterpart patents is to find individual patents that have
close “technical similarity” to the Novell patents. To this end, I benefit from the outcomes
of the two recent studies by Younge and Kuhn (2016) and Kuhn et al. (2017). By analyzing
the full text of the US grant patents, they calculated the pair-wise textual similarity of all the
US patents and their cited patents. The textual similarity takes the value between 0 and 1
(1 for the completely same patents documents). Using the data available in their website19,
I search for patents that cite each of the Novell patents with maximum textual similarity
with the cited patent. From the identified technically similar citing patent, I identify other
patents cited by the selected citing patent with the maximum textual similarity, excluding
the patents that were filed by Novell, OIN members, or CPTN members. Novell patents that
could not find the matched patents in this algorithm were dropped from the sample. This
matching procedure remained 370 Novell’s patents and found 370 matched counterparts
19 https://www.patrf.org/research/
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patents (replacement allowed). If the regulation mitigated the negative impact of the patents
transfer on the OIN member’s follow-on inventions, the OIN member’s rate of follow-
on inventions for the transferred patents should have been lower than that of the textual-
similarity matched patents. In contrast, the post-regulation OIN’s follow-on inventions for
the regulated patents should be indifferent from that of the matched patents. Table 3.6
presents the test result.
The result shows that the rate of the OIN members’ follow-on inventions for the trans-
ferred patents is still far less than that for textual-similarity based matched patents. Indeed,
the coefficients of transferred in the first and third columns takes negative values and they
are statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level. In contrast, there is no evidence
showing a significant difference between the regulated patents and the matched patents
in the rate of OIN members’ follow-on inventions. Regression results presented from the
fourth to sixth columns indicate that there is no evidence showing the difference in the
CPTN members’ rate follow-on inventions for the Novell patents. This additional analysis
confirms that the direction of the impact of the regulation was of “mitigating” the neg-
ative impact of the CPTN’s patents consolidation for the OIN member’s development of
follow-on inventions, as predicted by the theoretical model.
3.5.5 Buyer’s Effect vs. Regulation Effect?
The true counter-factual in the present study’s context is “what if Microsoft could acquire
the regulated patents.” In the main analysis, I used the Novell patents that were transferred
to Oracle, EMC, and Apple as a comparison group. A downside of this empirical strategy
is that it cannot isolate the effect of the antitrust regulation from the probable effect by the
fact that the patents acquirer was not MS. The effect of regulation could be particular for
the patents consolidation by the three firms of the CPTN, not necessary so if MS was the
patents acquirer. If my finding originated from such buyer’s effect, the finding might not
present the causal impact of the regulation.
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To address this concern, I replace the comparison group with the software patents that
were purchased by MS from America Online Inc. (AOL) in June 2012. In 2012, AOL
announced that it sells some of its software patents to MS for patents monetization.20 AOL
also involved in developing open-source software as Novell did and its patent sales timing
was close enough to the Novell’s patents transfer (i.e., 1-year difference). Hence, AOL’s
patents that were sold to MS (hereafter, AOL-MS patents) can be a reasonable alternative
comparison group of the regulated patents. If my finding was not driven by the buyer’s
effect, the similar finding as that of the main regression result likely to be observed. In
contrast, if the patent buyer effect was the prevailing driver of my finding, the rate of follow-
on inventions for the regulated patents and the AOL-MS patents should be indifferent.
I collect information on the US patents that were transferred from AOL to MS in June
201221, which were filed before June 2008 (4-year before the transfer), from the USPTO
patent assignment data. My search identifies 90 patents. Then, I conduct the regression
analysis using the two dependent variables (ln(PostCiteOIN+1), ln(PostCiteCPTN+
1)). Table 3.7 presents the regression result.
The statistical significance of the coefficients of regulated is largely consistent with
those in the main regression result. Meanwhile, the coefficient of transferred is statisti-
cally insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. This result indicates that my finding was
driven by which CPTN’s patents consolidation negatively affected the OIN members’ de-
velopment of the follow-on inventions, rather than the “buyer’s effect.”
3.5.6 Did DoJ Prevent Technology Transfer?
Patents transfer can serve an alternative way of transferring technology (Jeong et al., 2013).





21 Identified by execution date
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of the Novell patents could encourage its future development of follow-on inventions. In
this case, DoJ’s regulation could be of regulating technology transfer from Novell to MS. I
test the credibility of this argument by capitalizing on the MS’ selection of Novell patents
for the acquisition and the fact that DoJ allowed MS to receive licenses of all of the Novell
patents in the end.
MS and other CPTN members selected a set of patents that they will acquire from
Novell. Attachmate (the acquirer of Novell) retained the leftover patents and collateral-
ized them to Suisse Credit for financing in April, 2011.22 This indicates that MS had two
sets of Novell patents in choosing patents for acquisition in the begining: patents that MS
originally wanted to acquire (later, these patents become regulated patents), and patents
that were not chosen by MS for acquisition (later, transferred patents and leftover patents).
Because MS was allowed to receive licenses of all of the Novell patents afterall, it was
able to access the Novell technology eventually. If MS intended to acquire the “Novell’s
technology” by purchasing the patents, then, MS should have developed more follow-on
inventions for the regulated patents than the patents that it did not choose to acquire. That
is, the rate of MS’ follow-on inventions for the regulated patents should be greater than that
of the transferred and the leftover patents.
For the empirical test, I additionally collected the information about the leftover patents
by identifying the patents that were collateralized through Suisse Credit in April 2011.
From these patents, I excluded the patents that were filed after April 20, 2007, for the use
of four-year window forward citation variable as a control variable. Finally, I obtained the
124 “leftover patents.”
The dependent variable is the ln(PostCiteMS+1) that accounts for the number of for-
ward citations made by MS in the post-regulation period. The independent variable is the
regulated.
22 Credit Suisse was one of the financial advisers of Attachmate, and Novell collateralized the leftover




Table 3.8 reports the test result. The first column reports the regression result comparing
the MS’ forward citation for regulated and transferred patents. The coefficient of regulated
remains statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. The second column presents
the regression result comparing the MS’ forward citation for regulated and leftover patents.
The coefficient of regulated is statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. This
result indicates that there is no evidence supporting that the MS intended to acquire the
Novell’s technology.
3.5.7 Patent or Invention? Evidence from Copyright and Trademark Data
In my research design, I used patents as the outcome of the inventive activities of the paten-
tee. Accordingly, my finding may merely indicate decreased software “patenting” activi-
ties of OIN members by the partial transfer of Novell patents to the three CPTN members,
rather than their overall software innovation activities. This alternative explanation is of
particular interest in that the partial transfer of Novell patents could impact the direction of
OIN members software innovation. To address this concern, I conduct a descriptive anal-
ysis of the two alternative measurements of a firm’s software inventive activities: software
copyright and trademark filing.
Software Copyrights
Because copyright is non-patent intellectual property rights that allow a limited monopoly
on technical ideas on software (Graham and Mowery, 2003), examining firms’ software
copyright filing activities can be another measure of their innovative activities for software
development. The fact that the subject of software copyright protection is not a conceptual
or mathematical algorithm, but program source code or the computer file itself makes the
copyright filing a more straightforward measure of firms’ software innovation activities.23
If the partial transfer of Novell patents did not associate with OIN members’ overall
23 See, the Circular 61 of the copyright law
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf
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software innovation activities, their copyright filing intensity on new computer programs
(or source code) is unlikely to have decreased after the partial transfer of the Novell patents.
In contrast, if Novell’s partial transfer of patents to the CPTN members negatively affected
the overall software innovation activities by OIN members, their software copyright filing
intensity should have dropped after the transfer.
To operationalize this test, I collect information about copyrights filed by OIN member
companies from the US copyright office’s database.24 The copyright filing activities by
MS becomes the baseline in this analysis because MS was not in the OIN program and
was prevented from obtaining any of Novell patents by the regulation.25 Then, I categorize
copyright as software-copyright if the subject of the copyright is “computer program.”
Figure 3.8: Analysis of Software-Copyright Filing Activities
The panel on the left of Figure 3.8 compares the Within-Firm share of software copy-
rights (#ofSWcopyrights
#ofAllcopyrights
) for the OIN members and MS each, before and after the partial
transfer of Novell patents.26 The comparison shows that OIN members’ software copyright
filing intensity decreased after the partial transfer of the Novell patents.
24 https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?DB=local&PAGE=First
25 I do not analyze the other CPTN members’ copyright filing activities because the transfer of the
Novell’s patents to them could affect their copyright filing activities. Thus, the three CPTN members’
copyright filing activities are not a proper baseline for the comparison.
26 Note that I take into account 1-year delay between the timing of copyright application and publication
in counting the number of software copyrights as the delay in publishing copyright applications is two
to 22 months (See the official note released by US copyright office in the following link https:
//www.copyright.gov/registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf)
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The panel on right presents the change in Between-Firm share of software copyrights
that the OIN members and MS filed compared to the total number of software copyrights
filed by the Top 100 software companies.27 Similar to the within-firm software copyright
share analysis, the OIN members’ average share of software copyrights substantially re-
duced after the partial transfer of the Novell patents whereas MS did not.
Trademark Filing Activities
Firms’ product or service innovation also can be measured by their trademark filing activ-
ities because trademark law protects products’ brand name. Indeed, studies use trademark
filing activities of firms to capture some aspects of firms’ innovative activities (Mendonça
et al., 2004; Srinivasan et al., 2008; Stoneman, 2010; Flikkema et al., 2014). If Novell’s
partial transfer of its patents to the CPTN members negatively affected OIN members’ soft-
ware innovation activities, their software trademark filing activities should have dropped
after the transfer. I consider MS’ trademark filing activities on software as a baseline in
this analysis, as I did in the copyright filing analysis. I retrieve information of all the trade-
marks that were filed by the OIN members and MS from the USPTO trademark data (Gra-
ham et al., 2013).28 I categorize a trademark as a “trademark on software” if the trademark
document contains the clauses of “software for” or “computer program(s) for” in its goods
and service description while being categorized into international class “009” (“Electrical
and scientific apparatus”).
Figure 3.9 presents the Within-Firm share of software trademarks (left) and Between-
Firm share of software trademarks filed by the OIN members and MS. The data shows that
the OIN members experienced decreased software-trademark filing activities after Novell’s
partial transfer of patents.
27 in order of 2014 software sales revenue
(https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/publications/global-
100-software-leaders/explore-the-data.html
28 Downloaded from https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-
resources/electronic-data-products/trademark-case-files-dataset-0
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Figure 3.9: Analysis of Software-Trademark Filing Activities
In sum, my additional analysis using copyright and trademark data indicates that the
CPTN member’s consolidation of a part of Novell patents negatively affected the OIN
members’ software innovation activities.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, I examined how the antitrust regulation of patent-monopoly formation affects
follow-on innovation. I focused on the the patent monopoly formation by a few firms’
consolidation of existing patents. The constructed model in this study predicts that, in a
sector where cumulative innovation is critical, a firm’s consolidation of patents on substi-
tuting upstream technology for what it already possesses discourages the development of
follow-on innovation by its market competitors. In contrast, it does not affect the patent-
consolidating firm’s development of follow-on innovation. The regulation of such patents
consolidation is expected to positively affect the rate of the follow-on innovation of the
market competitors while not affecting that of the patent consolidating firm.
I empirically tested the derived theoretical prediction by using the case of the US DoJ’s
partial regulation of Novell’s software patents transfer to CPTN holdings in 2011. The
member companies of the CPTN holdings (i.e., MS, Oracle, EMC, and Apple) were in
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intensive market competition with Linux-application vendors in the software market. In
contrast, Novell was a key member of OIN that protects the Linux community from patent
infringement disputes by sharing its software patents with the Linux community for free.
Accordingly, it was believed that, after the patent transfer, the CPTN members may use the
Novell patents to prevent the Linux software development to have a stronger market power
in the software market. This antitrust concern led to the DoJ’s intervention. DoJ restricted
MS’ patent acquisition only. The remaining Novell patents were transferred to the other
CPTN members. By comparing the post-regulation number of follow-on inventions for the
regulated- and transferred-patents, I tested my theoretical prediction.
My empirical analysis showed that the regulation positively affected OIN members’
development of follow-on inventions. My additional analysis indicated that the regulation
had mitigated the negative impact of CPTN members’ consolidation of Novell patents on
OIN members’ follow-on inventions development. The analysis of software copyright and
trademark filing trends found further supportive evidence of this conclusion. Yet, there was
no evidence showing that the regulation affected CPTN members’ follow-on inventions
development. All in all, my study answers the question presented at the beginning of this
paper: In the sector where cumulative innovation is crucial, regulating a firm’s consolida-
tions of patents on substituting upstream technologies for what it owns positively affects
the follow-on innovation of its market competitors in the short-term.
Then, shouldn’t the US DoJ have prohibited the transfer of all of the Novell patents
in the first place? Does my finding imply that the regulation of patents consolidations is
always necessary?
This study does not provide a complete answer. First, the DoJ’s regulations primarily
aim at encouraging “downstream market competition,” rather than innovation. In contrast,
the present study focused on the regulations’ impact on the rate of follow-on innovation,
not market competition. Because innovation and market competition are related but not
the same dimension of social welfare, the overall impact of regulations on social welfare
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should not be dictated by the present study’s findings. A more comprehensive analysis of
how the regulations affected other dimensions of social welfare is necessary for a more
inclusive conclusion.
Second, regulation of patent consolidation can even bring undesirable consequence to
other dimensions of social welfare. In particular, when failing firms try to liquidate their
patents and the only buyer of the patent is the patent consolidating firm, the government’s
restriction of such patent transfer deal may impose implicit exit-cost to the patent selling
firm. The imposed exit-cost can damage the patent owner’s appropriability by discounting
the value of the patent, which also restricts the patent holder’s enforceability. Because the
restricted patent enforceability could attract the entry of less-efficient firms into the market
(Gilbert and Shapiro, 1996), the regulation of the patent transfer deal may even result in
reducing consumer welfare.
Regarding this undesirable effect of the regulation, one may suggest applying for the
compulsory licensing regime as the solution; mandating the patent consolidating firms to li-
cense out the consolidated patents to market competitors. Yet, expecting the enforced com-
pulsory license regime, the patent consolidating firm may not want to acquire the patents
because the compulsory licensing essentially discounts the patent buyer’s economic return
of acquiring the patent. The reduced incentive to purchase the patent will take out the
chance for the patent owner to sell their patents, accordingly.
The governmental acquisition of patents of failing firms can be a solution of this prob-
able dilema (See Kremer, 1998). When a failing firm tries to sell its patents to a patent-
consolidating firm, the government purchases the patents if the patents are critical to other’s
innovative activities. Through the government’s patents acquisition, the patent seller ob-
tains the salvage value of the patents to some extent (i.e., the ex-ante value of patent) while
the government can ensure that the patents are not used to discourage follow-on innovative
activities nor market competition. Later, the government can place on the patents on the
public domain so that anyone can use the patented invention.
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Third, it is necessary to consider whether promoting the development of follow-on in-
novation is always desirable from the social welfare standpoint. In some sectors, follow-on
innovation used to end up with a marginal improvement of existing innovation. The devel-
opment of follow-on innovation could easily result in duplication of R&D, which is socially
sub-optimal (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Wright, 1983) in this case. In this study, I limited
the case to a sector where the cumulative innovation is crucial and pervasive. However,
it is not necessarily true in other sectors. Accordingly, whether antitrust regulations for
promoting follow-on innovation is desirable for social welfare is a question that needs a
careful understanding of the probable sectoral difference.
Finally, the decreased rate of follow-on innovation by the competitors of the patent-
monopolist-to-be does not mean that their overall innovation is discouraged. The patent
monopoly may change the direction of competitors’ innovation. Examining whether and
how regulations affect the direction of competitors’ innovation is necessary for a more
comprehensive understanding in this regard.
There could be some concerns about this study’s empirical design. One issue is that the
DoJ regulated not only the transfer of patents to MS but also EMC’s attempt to acquire VM
software patents. Because EMC’s patent acquisition was partly regulated by the DoJ, one
may argue that the patents ultimately acquired by EMC should be treated distinctively. My
data does not support this argument. Although it is not definitive which patents could (or
could not) be acquired by EMC, my manual investigation of the patent documents indicated
that most VM patents were acquired by Oracle, not transferred back to Novell. Hence, I
argue that the intervention into the transfer of VM patents was only intended to prevent
EMC from acquiring these patents, not to completely prevent the consolidation of these
patents by other CPTN members.
Another concern is that the constructed theoretical model is not comprehensive enough
to capture a more general dynamics of patents transfer and the role of regulation in various
situations. What if patented technologies in transfer are complementary rather than substi-
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tutes for what the patent buyers own? What if a follow-on innovation does not turn into a
new product? How will the dynamics change if the patent buyer is a nonpracticing entity
and, therefore, not in market operation? Although all these questions are relevant and in-
triguing, they are beyond the scope of the present study. I hope the constructed model in
this study can serve as a useful theoretical foundation for future research to address further
questions.
The present study makes two contributions. First, it elaborates on the current under-
standing of the relationship between antitrust and patent laws for innovation by demon-
strating that the two institutions are not always complementary enterprises for innovation.
Indeed, the patents can still create a market monopoly through patents consolidation and
antitrust law works against it. The present study theoretically and empirically show the
channel where antitrust intervention into the creation of a patent monopoly could positively
affect the development of follow-on innovation.
Second, the finding that a firm’s consolidation of existing patents through patents trans-
fer may bring the antitrust issue while affecting innovation emphasizes the role of the an-
titrust authority in the market for patents. This implication also stresses the importance of












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample regulated vs. transferred regulated vs. leftover
R2 0.384 0.543




Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER 4
GRANTING A FIRM EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TO A UNIVERSITY’S INVENTIONS
AND ITS EFFECT ON THE RATE OF FOLLOW-ON INNOVATION
In the research policy domain, a prominent question has been whether granting a firm the
exclusive rights to use a university’s inventions deters innovation by restricting other’s ac-
cess to scientific knowledge or if it encourages innovative activities around the university’s
inventions by prompting the recipient to invest in R&D for follow-on innovation.
The present study explores the answers to this question by examining whether giving
a firm exclusive access to a university’s inventions encourages the recipient’s follow-on
invention, if there is positive externality for non-recipients’ innovative activities, and if its
probable benefits for a follow-on invention are marginalized when a university’s invention
is characterized as a scientific common. I consider patent title transfer from a university to
a firm the enabling of exclusive access to the university’s invention for the patent-acquiring
firm.
After examining US patents that were transferred by 107 research-intensive US univer-
sities to firms between 2000 and 2013, I found no evidence that recipients became more
active in developing follow-on inventions after acquiring the university’s patents. However,
it does promote follow-on inventions by non-recipients. Further analysis found no evidence
showing that enabling exclusive access to a university’s inventions in scientific commons
marginalizes this positive association.
This research contributes to elucidating the consequences of exclusive access to univer-
sity inventions for follow-on invention and to shedding light on the less-recognized role of
the university in the innovation system: supplier for the patent market.
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4.1 Introduction
University research has been one of the prominent subjects of public policy support because
they frequently serve a locus of basic scientific research (National Science Foundation,
2002; National Science Board, 2012) which used to become the key foundation for tech-
nological innovation (Jaffe, 1989; Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Mowery and Sampat, 2005;
Berman, 2011). The use of the OncoMouse, developed by Harvard University researchers,
as an essential tool in cancer treatment research (Stewart et al., 1984; Blaug et al., 2004;
Murray, 2010) is a well-known example of how the university’s inventions stemming from
their scientific research can be crucial technological inputs for further innovation. Because
of such unique positioning of universities in the knowledge-based economy, the govern-
ment provides public research funding and institutional support for university scientific
research.
Yet, utilization of a university’s invention is unlikely to be efficient for two-sided in-
centive problems. First, university inventions are often too embryonic to be utilized as is
(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby et al., 2001); therefore, they require the recipients to
make an extensive additional R&D investment for the commercialization of the invention.
This raises the recipient’s appropriability concerns (Colyvas et al., 2002; Motohashi, 2005)
because if the return on the recipient’s R&D investment is not protected, the incentive for
moving ahead is substantially removed (Arrow, 1962). Second, the engagement of the
university’s researchers is critical for successful commercialization of the university’s in-
vention (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2003; Goldfarb and Henrekson,
2003). However, there is no substantive economic incentive for the academic researchers
to become engaged in such an endeavor because, without proper institutions, the success-
ful commercialization of the university’s inventions does not necessarily provide economic
benefit to the researchers.
This two-sided incentive problem has served as the necessity for and the key foundation
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of the establishment of formal institutions that enable exclusive access by firms to a uni-
versity’s inventions (see Mowery and Sampat, 2005; Thursby and Thursby, 2007; Shapira
and Youtie, 2010). Allowing universities to own intellectual property right on federally
funded research (i.e., Bayh-Dole Act) and the practice of exclusive licensing are examples
(see Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Feldman et al., 2002). Such institutions were expected to
mitigate the recipient’s appropriability concern while creating an economic incentive for
academic researchers to more actively engage in commercializing the research outcomes
by tying their private economic benefit to the results of commercialization of the research
outcomes (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2003).
These institutional benefits were expected to promote, in particular, follow-on innova-
tive activities around the university’s inventions. First, as intended, giving exclusive access
to the university’s inventions can address the recipients’ appropriability concerns, and thus
promote their R&D investment for follow-on invention. Second, doing so can encourage
other’s subsequent inventions by indicating the arriaval of new technological opportunities
(Larsen, 2011; Drivas et al., 2017; Thompson et al., 2018). This anticipated positive exter-
nality can be even further promoted by mutual learning among the innovators from each
other’s innovative activities (Jaffe, 1986; Patel and Pavitt, 1995; Griliches, 1995).
In contrast, enabling exclusive excess to a university’s inventions has been criticized
for its probable consequence of slowing down scientific progress and innovation by gen-
erating the problem of so-called “privatization of scientific commons” (Partha and David,
1994; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998) or aggravating the “tragedy of anti-commons”(Heller
and Eisenberg, 1998; David et al., 2000; David, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Walsh et al., 2007).
A well-known example that illustrates this concern is what happned after the exclusive li-
cense of the OncoMouse patent to DuPont. After DuPont acquired the exclusive right to
use the OncoMouse, it started to restrict the OncoMouse enabled scientific research and
commercial activities (Murray, 2006).
This concern becomes even more salient when considering that a university’s research
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is often publicly funded to promote the creation of scientific knowledge that can bring about
a broad socioeconomic impact. Indeed, the government provides public research funding
to universities to promote their basic scientific research (Shapira and Youtie, 2010), the
outcome of which can become part of the scientific commons. Hence, enabling exclusive
access to a university’s scientific discoveries can significantly impede scientists’ ability to
conduct further research (David, 2004; Andrews et al., 2006), which also results in the
discouragement of subsequent innovative activities (Merges and Nelson, 1990; Scotchmer,
1991; Williams, 2013) or diffusion of knowledge (Sampat, 2004; Murray and Stern, 2007).
The arguments summarized above imply that granting a firm the exclusive right to use
a university’s inventions may have differential impacts on the development of subsequent
inventions by entity and nature of the underlying knowledge. It could promote more the
recipient’s innovative activity around the university’s invention while also encouraging that
of non-recipients for the probable positive externality. However, enabling exclusive access
for one firm to the university’s inventions that are in the scientific commons is expected to
marginalize that positive impact.
The present study aims to empirically explore these probable differential impacts. My
empirical strategy is based on the transfer of ownership of a university’s patents to firms.
After the patent ownership transfer, the recipient becomes to secure the exclusive right to
use the patented invention. In comparison to patent licensing, where the original patent
owner retains ownership of the patent and has discretion in the use of the invention to
some extent, a patent transfer is a more definitive way of conferring exclusive access to the
knowledge in the patent.
By virtue of the fact that scientific commons have been largely the product of publicly
funded research (Nelson, 2004), and universities often conduct basic scientific research
using public funding, I consider a university’s inventions based on the outcomes of federally
sponsored research to be containers of the scientific commons.
My data consists of US patents granted to 107 research-intensive US universities who
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then transfer those patents to outside firms between 2000 and 2013. My analysis finds no
evidence showing that the recipient of university’s patents become more likely to engage
in the development of follow-on inventions. However, the patent transfer does positively
affect the development of subsequent inventions by the non-recipients of the university’s
patents. Interestingly, there is no evidence showing that conferring a firm exclusive access
to a university’s invention that is characterized as the scientific common marginalizes this
positive association.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, my research advances the recent schol-
arly efforts toward empirically examining the impact of enabling exclusive access to uni-
versities’ knowledge on innovation. The contribution lies in the fact that this study directly
examines the impact of privatization of universities’ inventions that are featured as scientific
commons and investigates its impact on the rate of follow-on innovation more comprehen-
sively than use of a few universities’ practice of exclusive patent licensing (e.g., Sampat
and Ziedonis, 2004; Murray and Stern, 2007; Drivas et al., 2017; Thompson et al., 2018).
Second, this study also extends the conventional understanding of a university’s role in
the National Innovation System (NIS) (Edquist, 2013, 2010; Lundvall, 2010; Mowery and
Sampat, 2005; Youtie and Shapira, 2008) by shedding light on the relatively less-explored
role of universities as suppliers to the patent market. In doing so, this study contributes
to the recently growing literature on the market for patents and how it shapes innovation
(Ciaramella et al., 2017; Hochberg et al., 2018; Serrano and Ziedonis, 2018; Kwon, 2018).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I provide my review
of prior studies on the impact of granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inven-
tions, focusing on the literature about the tragedy of the anti-commons as well as the issue
of the privatization of the scientific commons. From this review, I derived my three main
hypotheses. In Section 3, I describe the empirical strategy and data used for testing the
hypotheses. Section 4 presents the findings, and their implications are discussed in Section
5. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of the present study’s limitations and
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future research opportunities.
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses
It has been argued that granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions is
essential for the efficient technology transfer and its commercialization.
First, the exclusive right to use a university’s inventions is necessary to incentivize
commercialization of universities’ knowledge (see Mowery and Sampat, 2005; Thursby
and Thursby, 2007; Shapira and Youtie, 2010). For successful utilization of a university’s
invention, the involvement of the university’s researchers in the commercialization process
is crucial (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2003; Goldfarb and Henrek-
son, 2003). Allowing the researchers to own the patents, and therefore have the ability to
license the use of the invention, is one way of incentivizing researchers to participate in the
commercialization effort because the revenue generated from successful commercializa-
tion benefits the academic researchers. Indeed, a study by Friedman and Silberman (2003)
found that rewarding university researchers in such a manner helps expedite the transfer of
the university’s technologies.
Second, granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s invention mitigates the
recipient’s appropriability concerns. A case study by Colyvas et al. (2002) elaborated on
the importance of concerns about appropriability with regard to transferring a university’s
inventions. The study showed that if the invention in question is too embryonic, the re-
cipients of rights to use the invention should invest extensively in additional R&D for
commercialization. If the invention is not exclusively accessible, the return on such pri-
vate R&D investment can be easily stipulated by a competitor’s probable imitation. Hence,
these firms prefer to receive exclusive rights to use the invention. Given that a university’s
inventions are often too embryonic to be commercialized as they are (Jensen and Thursby,
2001; Thursby et al., 2001), the appropriability concern of a potential recipient of the uni-
versity’s inventions could be particularly salient. A study by Bercovitz and Feldman (2007)
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empirically confirmed that when a university’s research can be fully appropriated, the re-
cipient firms consider the university to be a partner. By using MIT’s patent license data,
Shane (2002) showed that university patents are more likely to be licensed when patent
protection is effective. In addition, the licensing revenue is positively associated with the
degree of effectiveness of patent protection. These findings indicate that exclusivity in the
use of a university’s inventions matters to firms.
To summarize, granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions miti-
gates the appropriability concerns of the recipient, which in turn, encourages the recipi-
ent’s innovative activity around the university’s inventions. This forms the basis of my first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s invention encourages
the recipient to develop subsequent inventions.
Enabling exclusive access to a university’s invention may impose positive externality.
When a university confers exclusive right to use an invention to an outside firm, it can
signal an emerging technological opportunity to the rest of the stakeholders in that field of
endeavor (Drivas et al., 2017; Thompson et al., 2018), which may encourage innovative
activities around the university’s inventions overall. Because innovators learn from each
other’s work (see, Jaffe, 1986; Patel and Pavitt, 1995; Griliches, 1995), the invigorated
innovative activities and the outcomes could come to serve as intellectual inputs for fur-
ther innovative activities around the university’s inventions. The probable presence of the
positive externality is formulated into the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions encour-
ages the development of follow-on inventions by non-recipients.
Granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions may, however, discour-
age open science and slow down scientific progress. This is particularly pertinent given
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the fact that universities often conduct basic scientific research using public money. Exclu-
sive access for a firm to the inventions that are the outcome of publicly funded scientific
research may restrict the broad utilization of the inventions by others. The body of litera-
ture regarding the tragedy of the anti-commons hints that exclusive access to a university’s
scientific commons inventions can hold up future research by restricting the flow of knowl-
edge that would lead to the next steps in research and innovation (Heller and Eisenberg,
1998; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998; David et al., 2005). Indeed, Walsh et al. (2007) and
Thompson et al. (2018) find empirical evidence that denial of access to inputs for scientific
research significantly delays future scientific work.
This concern has also been expressed with regard to the practice of exclusive licensing
of a university’s inventions (Nelson, 2004). When a university exclusively licenses its
inventions to a firm, it can be particularly detrimental to the development of follow-on
innovations by non-licensees if the invention is the outcome of scientific research that was
publicly funded. Given that among the stated missions of public research funding are
the promotion of basic science, diffusion of knowledge, and encouragement to utilize the
outcomes for innovation, granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions
that are characterized as the part of the scientific commons can be seen as misaligned with
the stated goal of the research policy.
A series of studies support this claim. Feldman et al. (2007) stated that one of the fac-
tors leading to the successful utilization of the Cohen-Boyer DNA splicing technology was
the practical, flexible, and less restrictive licensing program used by Stanford University
and the University of California. Studies by Sampat (2004) and Murray and Stern (2007)
contended that exclusive access to scientific knowledge through patenting does, indeed,
squelch follow-on scientific research. They backed up their contention with the finding
that citations to scientific publications were significantly reduced after the granting of the
corresponding patents. By analyzing the case of patents licensed by the University of Cal-
ifornia, Thompson et al. (2018) also made the case that licensing of a university’s patented
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research tool restricts follow-on scientific research.
Given that the government provides public money to universities to support their scien-
tific research, the university’s granting of exclusive access to inventions that are the result
of publicly funded research can generate the so-called privatization of the scientific com-
mons (Nelson, 2004), which may deprive the benefits of enabling exclusive access in the
development of follow-on inventions.
Yet, this argument could be challenged because privatization of a university’s scientific
knowledge occurs when the university patents on it. By the Bayh-Dole act, the university
becomes to own the “exclusive right to use” its invention even if it was developed using the
public money once the university patent on the invention. Accordingly, granting a firm the
exclusive access to the university’s inventions originated from the public research funding
may not generate nor aggravate the “privatization of scientific common” effect as long as
the invention has been patented. This discussion is distilled into the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions that are
in the scientific commons may (or may not) marginalize its positive effect on the devel-
opment of follow-on inventions.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the three hypotheses. In the next section, I describe the empirical




4.3.1 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The empirical work of the present study is based on the transfer of patent titles from
research-intensive universities to outside firms. By transferring ownership of the patent,
the recipient comes to have exclusive right to use the university’s patented invention.
My data consists of US patents granted to research-intensive US universities who then
transfer the patents ownership to outside firms (hereafter univ-transferred patents). To iden-
tify research-intensive universities, I first pull a list of R1 and R2 universities from the
Carnegie Classification Data Collection.1 Multiple campuses that are part of a larger uni-
versity umbrella system using the same base university name are merged into one.2
Next, by using the USPTO’s patent assignment database (Graham et al., 2018), I obtain
a list of US patents of which those universities transferred to an outside firm between 2000
and 2013.3 Then, I search for detailed information on these patents using the data provided
by patentsview.org.4 To screen out patents that were transferred by ex-ante contract (i.e., a
patent that was transferred before the patent existed), all patents that were transferred to an
outside firm before or on the patent application date were excluded from the sample (see
Serrano and Ziedonis, 2018).
According to the collected data, 107 research-intensive US universities have transferred
at least one US patent to outside firms, with a total of 913 univ-transferred patents. The Uni-
versity of California took first place for the number of patents transferred (102), followed
1 I used 2015 data because it was the most up-to-date available at the time I conducted this research. The
full list of universities is available at
http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/downloads/CCIHE2015-
PublicDataFile.xlsx.
2 For example, University of California campuses in Berkeley, Irvine, Davis, and Los Angeles were
combined into “University of California.” This merging process was necessary due to intellectual
property assets of multi-campus universities being managed by the same TLO or advisory board.
3 I use the patent forward citation as the key dependent variable in the regression analysis. To have at
least five years of forward citation observation point following a patent transfer (the latest year for
patent forward citations in the data set was 2017), I limit the patents to those transferred before 2014.
4 Publicly provided by USPTO.
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by the University of Texas (68 patents). Figure 4.2 displays the number of univ-transferred
patents by the top 20 universities.
Figure 4.2: Top 20 universities (Number of transferred patents to firms)
To operationalize the definition of an invention as part of the scientific commons, I cap-
italize on the fact that the university’s scientific researches with extensive public value are
often awarded governmental research funding. That is, I consider a patent on the outcome
of federally funded research to be a proxy for the invention being in the scientific commons.
To identify such patents, I make use of federal regulations that universities must state the
federal funding agency for their patent if the patent originated from the federal funding
(“statement of government interest”; Section 202(c) of the Bayh-Dole Act covering univer-
sity ownership of a patent resulting from federally funded research). Accordingly, I code
patents as inventions in the scientific commons if they contain the statement of govern-
ment interest (hereafter FEDs; non-FEDs for patents that had no statement of government
interest). Out of the 913 patents in the sample, 214 (23.4%) were FEDs.5
5 One may argue that this operationalization may not be an accurate way of identifying the patents on
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Figure 4.3 profiles the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) categories (Hall
et al., 2001) for the univ-transferred patents. Drugs & Medical is the most populated tech-
nology field for both FEDs (28%) and non-FEDs (38.5%). Chemical and Electric are the
second most populated fields for, respectively, FEDs (21%) and non-FEDs (21%).
Figure 4.3: Technology Class Distribution
I explore how likely it was for FEDs to be transferred to an outside firm as compared to
non-FEDs, by using the information about patents owned by 107 universities where owner-
ship had not changed between 2000 and 2013. The overall proportion of FEDs transferred
to outside firms is lower than non-FEDs, on average. Among FEDs (22,196), only 214
patents (0.96%) were transferred to outside firms, whereas about 2.64% of non-FEDs were
transferred to outside firms. This difference consistently holds over the different periods,
outcomes of “publicly funded” research because there are many more ways that public funding is
provided to universities than just the federal government’s research program. However, given that
federal research funding is the primary source in many cases and it is the best available way of
identifying the origin of governmental support at the patent level, this operationalization can be still
useful.
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as shown in Figure 4.4.
Error bars present 95% confidence intervals obtained from the t-tests
Figure 4.4: Share of Univ-Transferred Patents by Application Year
This finding indicates that FEDs might have been systematically less targeted for ac-
quisition by firms, or universities might be less willing to transfer them than non-FEDs.
To explore whether there is a distinctive difference in the timing of a transfer between
FEDs and non-FEDs, I visually compare the distribution of the time to transfer by year
between FEDs and non-FEDs, as shown in Figure 4.5.
The average time to transfer for FEDs is 4 years while for non-FEDs, it is 6 years. The
distribution patterns for both FEDs and non-FEDs display decreasing frequency with the
age of a patent (counted in the number of years between the transfer date and the application
date).
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Time to Transfer (by Year)
4.3.2 Econometric Model
My identification strategy is based on the variation in the timing of patent transfer using
the same method that Drivas et al. (2017) employed to analyze the impact of universities’
exclusive licensing on the rate of follow-on inventions.
I employ the number of citations that a patent received from consecutive patents (i.e.,
forward citation) as a proxy for the number of follow-on inventions of the focal patent (Jaffe
et al., 1993; Galasso and Schankerman, 2014; Gaessler et al., 2017; Drivas et al., 2017). The
more the forward citations a patent received, the greater the extent of subsequent inventive
activities around the focal patented invention. The natural log value of the forward citations
that an univ-transferred patent received in period s counted at the calendar year t plus 1 was
the dependent variable. Suppose that patent i filed in 2011 received 10 patent citations in
2015. Then, the dependent variable takes the value of ln(FWDi,4,2015 + 1) = ln11 for
this data point. For each patent, I count the forward citations for each year up to either
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December 31, 20176 or its statutory expiration date (i.e., 20 years from its application
date).7
For the purpose of the present research, I use the three forward citation indicators as the
dependent variables: total number of forward citations (FWDAll, proxy for the total num-
ber of follow-on inventions), forward citations made by the patent recipient (FWDInt,
proxy for the number of follow-on inventions developed by the recipient of the university’s
patent), and forward citations made by non-recipients of the patent (FWDExt, proxy for
the number of follow-on inventions developed by those who had no access to the focal
invention).
The independent variable is PostTransferi,s, which takes the value of 1 if the patent
of interest was transferred to a firm in period s, and 0 otherwise. If a patent filed in 2000
was transferred to a firm in 2010, PostTransferi,s took the value of 1 for all s ≥ 11.
In this research design, the counterfactual is how many patent citations an univ-transferred
patent might have received if the patent had not been transferred to a firm. Because this
is not observable, I utilize the variation in timing of the patent’s transfer as Drivas et al.
(2017) employed. Suppose there are two patents. One was filed in 2000 and transferred to
a firm in 2005. The other was filed in 2000 and transferred to a firm in 2010. I used the
forward citations that the later transferred patent received from 2005 to 2010 as the proxy
for the counterfactual of the forward citations that the early transferred patent might have
received from 2005 to 2010.
To take into account variations in the dependent variable by time-invariant character-
istics of the patent, I use a patent-level fixed effect (FE) estimator.8 I also control for the
FE of the calendar year when the forward citations were made (i.e., dummy variables for
that year) to account for the probable effect of secular time events on the rate of follow-on
6 The patent citation data covers patents filed up to December 31, 2017.
7 The analysis using the actual expiry date is reported in the robustness check section.
8 In the robustness check section, I discuss whether the FE estimator is appropriate to use by reporting
the Hausman test result.
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inventions.9 I use the cluster-robust standard error, by university, to take into account intra-
school correlation in the error terms. To test Hypothesis 1 and 2, I regress my data on the
following econometric model specification:
ln(FWDYi,s,t + 1) = β0 + β1 × PostTransi,s + Patenti + Periods + Y eart + εi,s,t
(4.1)
whereFWDYi,s,t is {FWDAll, FWDInt, FWDExt}, Patenti is the patent FE, Periods
captures period FE, Y eart captures the calendar year FE, s is the number of years since the
patent application date (s ∈ [1,max(20, Y earMax)]), Y earMax is the number of years
between the patent application date and December 31, 2017, and εi,s,t is error term.
Hypothesis 1 expects β1 to take a positive and statistically significant value when
ln(FWDInt+1) is the dependent variable. When the dependent variable is ln(FWDExt+
1), β1 takes a positive and statistically significant value if Hypothesis 2 is supported. If
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are both supported, β1 is expected to take a positive and statistically
significant value if ln(FWDAll + 1) is the dependent variable.
To test Hypothesis 3, I introduce the interaction term between FEDi (which was 1 for
FEDs) and PostTransferi,s. The following is the econometric model specification:
ln(FWDYi,s,t + 1) = β0 + β1 × PostTransferi,s + β2 × FEDi × PostTransferi,s
+Patenti + Periods + Y eart + εi,s,t
(4.2)
Hypothesis 3 expects a negative and statistically significant value of β2 if ln(FWDExt+
1) is the dependent variable. The counterargument expects to fail to reject the null hypoth-
esis.
9 For example, rapid emergence of a new technological opportunity by an exogenous event in a particular




Table 4.1 reports the main regression results, where the first three columns use ln(FWDAll+
1), ln(FWDInt + 1), and ln(FWDExt + 1) as the respective dependent variables. The
independent variable is PostTransfer.
Table 4.1: OLS regression with Patent Fixed Effect
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipients
PostTransfer 0.133∗∗∗ -0.0179 0.146∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ -0.0196 0.147∗∗∗
(0.0416) (0.0174) (0.0377) (0.0452) (0.0188) (0.0403)
FEDxPostTransfer -0.00542 0.00817 -0.00504
(0.0515) (0.0194) (0.0502)
Constant -0.524∗∗∗ 0.0273 -0.546∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.0268 0.553∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.0176) (0.109) (0.110) (0.0175) (0.107)
R2 0.118 0.021 0.109 0.118 0.021 0.109
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.019 0.107 0.116 0.019 0.106
Observations 14054 14054 14054 14054 14054 14054
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the first column, we see that the coefficient PostTansfer is positive and statis-
tically significant at the 0.01 significance level (0.133). This indicates that, on average,
the total number of follow-on inventions of the univ-transferred patent increases by 13.3%
after the university transfers the patent. The second column shows that the coefficient
PostTransfer is not statistically significant at the 0.1 significance level. There is no ev-
idence indicating that a patent recipient’s inventive activity around a university’s patent is
affected by the patent transfer.
The coefficient PostTransfer in the third column is positive and statistically signif-
icant at the 0.01 significance level (0.146). On average, the number of non-recipients’
follow-on inventions of a university’s patent increases by 14.6% after the patent is trans-
ferred. This supports Hypothesis 2.
Columns 4 through 6 report the regression results with the interaction term between
FEDi and PostTransferi,s. In the fourth column, the coefficient FED×PostTransfer
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is statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. There is no evidence showing that
granting a firm exclusive right to use a university’s invention in a part of scientific commons
marginalizes its positive effect on the development of follow-on inventions.
The fifth column reports the regression result using ln(FWDInt+1) as the dependent
variable. Both the coefficients PostTransfer and FED×PostTransfer are statistically
insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. In the sixth column, the coefficient FED ×
PostTransfer is statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level. The regression
results indicate that there is no evidence supporting Hypothesis 3.
All in all, my regression analysis does not find evidence for Hypothesis 1 and 3. How-
ever, there is evidence showing that granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s
inventions through patent transfers encourages non-recipients to develop follow-on inven-
tions (Hypothesis 2 is supported).
4.4.2 Robustness Check
Use of random effect (RE) estimator
I use the hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to determine if the FE estimator is an appropri-
ate primary estimator. If both the FE and RE estimators are mutually consistent, the RE
estimator is preferred because it is more efficient. Otherwise, the FE estimator is used.
Table 4.2 presents the RE regression and Hausman test results. Overall, the statistical
significance and sign of the coefficients of the independent variables are consistent with
those of the FE model regression. The calculated p-values with χ2 from the Hausman
test when ln(FWDAll + 1) and ln(FWDExt + 1) are the dependent variables is less
than 0.05, and it is insignificant at the 0.1 significance level, when the dependent variable
is ln(FWDInt + 1). This indicates that the FE estimator is appropriate for regressing
ln(FWDAll+1) and ln(FWDExt+1) whereas the RE was proper to use when regress-
ing ln(FWDInt + 1). Overall, the selection of the estimator does not change the main
findings.
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Table 4.2: OLS panel regression with Random Effect and Hausman-Test result
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipients
PostTransfer 0.135∗∗∗ -0.0268 0.153∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ -0.0265 0.168∗∗∗
(0.0427) (0.0197) (0.0385) (0.0472) (0.0204) (0.0423)
FEDxPostTransfer -0.0702 -0.00156 -0.0661
(0.0505) (0.0179) (0.0484)
Constant -0.0759 0.0248 -0.0904∗∗ -0.0737 0.0248 -0.0886∗∗
(0.0464) (0.0203) (0.0413) (0.0461) (0.0202) (0.0411)
χ2 51.50 26.81 131.63 101.41 28.57 175.23
p > χ2 0.0357 0.8381 0.0000 0.0000 0.8062 0.0000
Observations 14054 14054 14054 14054 14054 14054
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Use of a count-variable regression model
To check the sensitivity of the findings to the regression model, I fit the data to a patent-
level FE Poisson panel regression model using the same econometric model specifications
for the forward citation count without log transformation: FWDAlli,s,t, FWDInti,s,t,
and FWDExti,s,t as the dependent variables. Table 4.3 reports the Poisson FE regression
result. Because the Poisson model drops the patents that have serial 0s in the forward
citation count, the number of observations reduces from 14,054 to 12,972. The signs and
statistical significance of the coefficients of the independent variables are consistent with
those of the main regression results in Table 4.1.
Table 4.3: Poisson regression
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipient
PostTransfer 0.205∗∗∗ 0.157 0.200∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.119 0.200∗∗∗
(0.0561) (0.214) (0.0552) (0.0599) (0.213) (0.0590)
FEDxPostTransfer 0.0217 0.305 -0.00342
(0.179) (0.452) (0.172)
Observations 12972 3341 12748 12972 3341 12748
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As an alternative econometric model, one may want to use the conditional FE negative
binomial regression model (CFNB). This model is known to fit the data better than the
Poisson model when using data that has an over-dispersion problem. However, according
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to a simulation study by Guimaraes (2008), fitting the data to the CFNB with a T of less
than 20 inflates the Type I error in testing a null hypothesis (i.e., over-rejection of the null
hypothesis). Because my sample contained a maximum of 20 data points for each patent
(many patents had less than 20 data points), fitting the data to CNFB ran the risk of inflating
the Type I error. Due to this econometric issue, CFNB was not used for hypotheses testing.
Use of pooled DiD estimator for testing Hypothesis3
As an alternative method for testing Hypothesis 3, I use DiD estimation by reformatting the
panel data into patent-level cross sectional data as employed by Galasso and Schankerman
(2014). I count the number of forward citations that the patent received after its transfer
until December 31, 2017, and then divide it by the number of years from the patent transfer
year to 2017 to take into account the patent-level difference in the time window in counting
forward citations. As with the panel regression analysis, I create three forward citation
variables, FWDPost (the normalized total number of forward citations that the patent
received during the post-patent transfer period), FWDPostInt(the normalized number
of forward citations made by the patent recipient during the post-patent transfer period),
and FWDPostExt (the normalized number of forward citations made by non-recipients
during the post-patent transfer period). Then, I add 1s to them and take the natural log-
transformation. The independent variable is FED.
I introduce a set of control variables to take into account the probable confounding ef-
fect of the patent-level heterogeneity. The control variables are the natural log-transformed
per year number of citations that the patent received before the transfer, adding the value of
1s (ln(PreFWD)+1); the number of independent claims(nClaim); the natural log-transformed
size of the patent family(ln(Family)); the natural log-transformed number of backward ci-
tations (ln(BWD+1)); whether the patent had been licensed before the patent transfer (Li-
censed)10, and a set of dummy variables for the patent application year and the NBER
10 One can identify universities’ licensed patents by investigating patent renewal history. Under 37 CFR
1.27, a university can take the status of small entity as long as it has “not assigned, granted, conveyed,
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category. Following formula describes the econometric model specification.





where PostFWDY is {FWDPost, FWDPostInt, FWDPostExt}, γk is the coeffi-
cient of the kth control variable, and Xk is the kth control variable. Table 4.4 presents the
regression results.
In the first through third columns, the coefficients of the FED were statistically in-
significant at the 0.1 significance level. Overall, the DiD analysis with the pooled data
found no evidence supporting Hypothesis 3.
Exclusion of the most active university in patent transfers
In my data, the University of California transferred the largest volume of patents to out-
side firms during the period of observation. To check whether my finding was driven by
any peculiarities in the University of California’s patent transfer activities, I exclude the
university from the sample and reanalyze the data.
Table 4.5 displays the regression results. Overall, the statistical significance and signs of
the coefficients of the variables of interest are consistent with those of the main regression.
As a variation, I exclude the patents transferred by the University of Texas as it had the
second highest number of transferred patents. Table 4.6 reports the regression result. The
findings do not change substantially.
Finally, I exclude patents that were transferred either the University of California or the
or licensed, and is under no obligation under contract or law to assign, grant, convey, or license, any
rights in the invention to any person, concern, or organization which would not qualify as a person,
small business concern, or a nonprofit organization.” Given that those with a small entity status pay
discounted patent renewal fees, universities’ patents that were licensed to non-small entities before the
transfer must be renewed without the small-entity discount. Therefore, the patents that were renewed
without the small-entity discount before the transfer can be considered as licensed patents. I also added
patents that appeared in the patent assignment database as licensed patents, excluding confirmatory
licenses.
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Table 4.4: Pooled DiD: Testing Hypothesis 3
Total Recipient NonRecipients








ln(nClaim) 0.0836∗ -0.0169∗ 0.0970∗
(0.0497) (0.00938) (0.0497)
ln(FamilySize) 0.0672∗ 0.000482 0.0622∗
(0.0354) (0.0102) (0.0353)
ln(BWD+1) 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0196∗∗ 0.0455∗∗
(0.0195) (0.00818) (0.0186)
Licensed -0.229∗∗∗ -0.00827 -0.225∗∗∗
(0.0780) (0.0160) (0.0740)
Chemical 0.00536 0.0189 -0.0105
(0.0844) (0.0228) (0.0807)
Cmp&Cmm 0.112 -0.0194 0.109
(0.117) (0.0257) (0.113)
Drgs&Med 0.176 0.0176 0.172
(0.122) (0.0223) (0.118)
Elec 0.0803 0.0627 0.0209
(0.0988) (0.0476) (0.0841)
Mech 0.221∗∗ 0.0660∗ 0.158
(0.110) (0.0395) (0.0998)
Constant -0.754∗∗∗ 0.00393 -0.758∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.0480) (0.227)
R2 0.464 0.483 0.476
Adjusted R2 0.440 0.460 0.453
Observations 913 913 913
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
University of Texas, then re-run the regression. The results presented in Table 4.7 show
consistent findings with the main regression results.
Exclusion of patent co-assignment
There could be cases where universities become the initial assignee of a patent, and the
patent is later co-assigned to the university and an outside firm by legal contract. These
patent co-assignments and shared ownership between universities and firms do not tech-
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Table 4.5: Panel Regression excluding University of California patents
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipients
PostTransfer 0.135∗∗∗ -0.0181 0.147∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ -0.0186 0.142∗∗∗
(0.0483) (0.0200) (0.0442) (0.0512) (0.0210) (0.0460)
FEDxPostTransfer 0.0299 0.00335 0.0354
(0.0570) (0.0262) (0.0537)
Constant 0.610∗∗∗ 0.0356∗ 0.582∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ 0.0355∗ -0.517∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.0183) (0.113) (0.115) (0.0183) (0.112)
R2 0.118 0.024 0.107 0.118 0.024 0.107
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.021 0.104 0.115 0.021 0.104
Observations 12301 12301 12301 12301 12301 12301
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.6: Panel Regression excluding University of Texas patents
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipients
PostTransfer 0.150∗∗∗ -0.0166 0.163∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ -0.0182 0.164∗∗∗
(0.0402) (0.0182) (0.0355) (0.0440) (0.0198) (0.0384)
FEDxPostTransfer -0.00689 0.00800 -0.00418
(0.0566) (0.0213) (0.0560)
Constant -0.496∗∗∗ 0.0452∗∗∗ -0.534∗∗∗ -0.496∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.0117) (0.119) (0.119) (0.0117) (0.117)
R2 0.120 0.022 0.110 0.120 0.022 0.110
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.019 0.108 0.117 0.019 0.108
Observations 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071 13071
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.7: Panel Regression excluding University of California and University of Texas
patents
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipients
PostTransfer 0.155∗∗∗ -0.0167 0.168∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ -0.0168 0.161∗∗∗
(0.0464) (0.0210) (0.0412) (0.0500) (0.0220) (0.0442)
FEDxPostTransfer 0.0374 0.000513 0.0488
(0.0642) (0.0297) (0.0596)
Constant -0.457∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.0123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.0123) (0.122)
R2 0.120 0.025 0.108 0.120 0.025 0.109
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.022 0.106 0.117 0.022 0.106
Observations 11318 11318 11318 11318 11318 11318
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
nically fall into the practice of granting the firm the exclusive access to the university’s
inventions because the university still retains part of the title to the patent. To deal with
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these cases, I exclude patent co-assignment cases before reanalyzing the data. As a result,
39 patents (4.3%) out of the original 913 patents are dropped. The regression results with
the remaining 874 patents are presented in Table 4.8. The signs and statistical significance
of the coefficients of the key variables remain consistent as those in the main regression.
Table 4.8: Exclusion of Patents co-assignments
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipients
PostTransfer 0.137∗∗∗ -0.0192 0.150∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ -0.0210 0.149∗∗∗
(0.0430) (0.0179) (0.0389) (0.0466) (0.0194) (0.0415)
FEDxPostTransfer 0.00320 0.00840 0.00342
(0.0523) (0.0200) (0.0509)
Constant 0.585∗∗∗ 0.0288 0.561∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗ 0.0283 -0.538∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.0177) (0.108) (0.110) (0.0177) (0.107)
R2 0.120 0.022 0.110 0.120 0.022 0.110
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.020 0.108 0.118 0.020 0.108
Observations 13558 13558 13558 13558 13558 13558
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Taking into account the patent expiry
In the main analysis, I set the maximum period of observation to the statutory expiration
date (i.e., 20 years from the patent application date). However, not all patents are fully
renewed, and hence, it might not be proper to have the 20-year observations of forward
citations for every patent in the sample. This could be particularly critical when considering
that the expiration of patents can invite more follow-on inventions by lifting the fence
around the patented invention. To address this concern, I calculate a expiration date of each
patent by using the patent renewal history11 and counting three forward citation indicators
up to the newly calculated expiration date. These regression results are reported in Table
4.9. Overall, the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients of the key independent
variables did not change significantly from those in the main regression analysis.
11 Available in https://bulkdata.uspto.gov/data/patent/maintenancefee/.
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Table 4.9: Regression taking into account the patent expiry
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipients
PostTransfer 0.130∗∗∗ -0.0185 0.142∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -0.0205 0.143∗∗∗
(0.0423) (0.0182) (0.0381) (0.0458) (0.0198) (0.0406)
FEDxPostTransfer -0.00748 0.00961 -0.00675
(0.0554) (0.0212) (0.0538)
Constant 0.772∗∗∗ 0.0102 0.757∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.00943 0.757∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.0244) (0.139) (0.144) (0.0243) (0.137)
R2 0.111 0.024 0.100 0.111 0.024 0.100
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.021 0.098 0.108 0.021 0.098
Observations 13003 13003 13003 13003 13003 13003
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Exclusion of patents with insufficient time to observe citation data after transfer
In the main analysis, I analyzed patents that were transferred before 2014 to have at least
five observations of the forward citation count for each patent. To check whether my find-
ings were sensitive to the minimum number of observations per patent in the panel analysis,
I run another regression with the patents that were transferred before January 1, 2008, so
as to have at least 10 observational points per patent. The regression results presented in
Table 4.10 are roughly consistent with those of the main regression.
Table 4.10: Regression with patents transferred before 2008
Total Recipient NonRecipients Total Recipient NonRecipients
PostTransfer 0.120∗∗∗ -0.00635 0.133∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ -0.0143 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0359) (0.0171) (0.0350) (0.0391) (0.0187) (0.0384)
FEDxPostTransfer -0.0407 0.0338∗ -0.0627
(0.0550) (0.0193) (0.0549)
Constant -0.541∗∗∗ 0.0115 -0.553∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗ 0.00845 -0.547∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.0210) (0.108) (0.110) (0.0209) (0.107)
R2 0.141 0.018 0.133 0.141 0.019 0.133
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.014 0.130 0.138 0.016 0.130
Observations 9346 9346 9346 9346 9346 9346
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.4.3 Validity of the Assumption of Patent Transfer Timing
The key assumption that enabled the causal inference in this research design is that the
timing of patent transfer is exogenous. However, this assumption does not necessarily
hold. For example, the timing of the patent transfer may be systematically associated with
the recognized technological importance of a patented invention in the pre-transfer period.
If this is the case, patent transfer timing could associate with later forward citations not by
a causal impact of the patent transfer but by the selection of the patent of interest based on
its technical importance.
To check the empirical validity of the assumption, I conducted a survival analysis that
examines if a patent’s forward citations received before the transfer associated with the
hazard rate of the patent transfer. The dependent variable is the time to patent transfer in
year, and the independent variable is the log-transformed forward citations that the patent
received one to three years before the patent transfer, counted in the cumulative manner
(ln(FWDt−1+1), ln(FWDt−2,t−1+1), and ln(FWDt−3,t−2,t−1+1)). I used the weibull
distribution for its flexibility in the distrubtional assumption. Controlling for the patent-
level characteristics that were used in Table 4.4, the results in Table 4.11 indicates that the
hazard rate of patent transfer is not associated with the three pre-transfer forward citation
counts. This implies that there is no evidence indicating that the recognized technical
importance of a patent before the transfer determines the timing of the patent transfer.
4.4.4 Alternative indicators of the Scientific Commons
In the main regression, I used patents on the outcomes of federally funded research as the
proxy for invention characterized as a part of the scientific commons. The downside of this
operationalization is that not all inventions originating from federally funded research are
on the new scientific research outcomes.
To address this issue, I develop two alternative indicators of inventions in the scientific
commons, which capture the two features of the scientific common: (1) the invention is on
133
Table 4.11: Survival Analysis - Timing of Patent Transfer
Years to Transfer Years to Transfer Years to Transfer
ln(FWDt−1 + 1) -0.196
(0.131)
ln(FWDt−2,t−1 + 1) -0.169
(0.117)
ln(FWDt−3,t−2,t−1 + 1) -0.190
(0.123)
nClaim 0.00354 0.00348 0.00348
(0.00313) (0.00313) (0.00313)
ln(FamilySize) 0.0608 0.0613 0.0616
(0.0541) (0.0535) (0.0533)
ln(BWD+1) -0.0676 -0.0672 -0.0670
(0.0539) (0.0540) (0.0541)
Licensed -0.305 -0.304 -0.306
(0.218) (0.217) (0.218)
Chemical -0.0112 -0.0114 -0.0151
(0.302) (0.302) (0.304)
Cmp&Cmm -0.496 -0.495 -0.495
(0.331) (0.332) (0.333)
Drgs&Med -0.379 -0.378 -0.379
(0.276) (0.276) (0.277)
Elec -0.179 -0.179 -0.175
(0.340) (0.340) (0.342)
Mech 0.434 0.436 0.443
(0.348) (0.349) (0.352)
Constant -5.649∗∗∗ -5.650∗∗∗ -5.647∗∗∗
(0.487) (0.487) (0.487)
ln p 0.680∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗
(0.0670) (0.0669) (0.0667)
Observations 846 846 846
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, hazard ratio reported, weibull distribution used
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
new scientific research outcome, and (2) the scientific research is funded by federal research
program. The first alternative indicator is based on patent-paper pair (e.g., Murray, 2002;
Murray and Stern, 2007; Thompson et al., 2018). The second indicator employs a non-
patent reference (NPR) cited in the patent.
Utilizing Patent—Paper Pairs
I consider the patent that had paired scientific papers as inventions on new scientific re-
search outcome. Patents that had paired papers on the outcome of federally funded research
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are considered as inventions in the scientific commons.
To identify these patents, I use the ExPorter database provided by the US National
Institutes of Health (NIH).12 This database contains comprehensive information about US
patents and scientific papers that originated from NIH-funded research programs identified
by a unique research project award number. Using this database, the patents that had paired
papers on the same project number are identified. Because the ExPorter database provides
the list of publications that are indexed by PubMed, which is a search engine for scientific
publications in the life sciences and on biomedical topics, I initially select univ-transferred
patents that were categorized as Drugs & Medical only. From this selected sample, I could
identify 28 patents that had scientific paper pairs out of 329 Drugs & Medical patents.
Next, I add a comparison group composed of the set of patents that are not defined as
scientific commons (hereafter NoSciCommon) by the two features illustrated above. These
patents are not readily apparent because there is no information whether there are paper
pairs for a patented invention originating from a non-NIH federally funded research project.
To overcome this empirical challenge, I employ two methods for building NoSciCommon:
One is to consider patented inventions that were not funded by any federal agency (in-
cluding the NIH) as NoSciCommon patents. Another is considering all patents other than
patents in the scientific commons as the NoSciCommon patents. I run the panel regression
again for each case, using the same specifications as in the main regression, and the results
are displayed in Table 4.12.
The coefficients of NIHPub × PostTrasfer, which is the interaction term between
NIHPub (a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for patents that have scientific paper
pairs on NIH funding) and PostTransfer are statistically insignificant at the 0.1 signifi-
cance level across all six columns. There is no evidence supporting for Hypothesis 3.
12 https://exporter.nih.gov/ExPORTER_Catalog.aspx
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Table 4.12: Regression with an Alternative Operationalization of Inventions on Scientific
commons - With NIH Data
Total Recipient NonRec’ Total Recipient NonRec’
PostTransfer 0.145∗ -0.0215 0.163∗∗ 0.164∗∗ -0.0130 0.175∗∗
(0.0767) (0.0256) (0.0750) (0.0811) (0.0284) (0.0778)
NIHPubxPostTransfer 0.136 0.0487 0.123 0.122 0.0414 0.113
(0.109) (0.0618) (0.115) (0.110) (0.0628) (0.116)
Constant -0.416∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.221∗
(0.111) (0.0268) (0.114) (0.110) (0.0282) (0.113)
R2 0.200 0.023 0.193 0.212 0.025 0.206
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.017 0.187 0.206 0.017 0.200
Observations 4863 4863 4863 4278 4278 4278
Sample NIH+Rest NIH+Rest NIH+Rest NIH+NoFund NIH+NoFund NIH+NoFund
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Non-Patent Reference based indicator
Scholars in the field of bibliometrics and patent analysts have suggested that the extent to
which a patent cites non-patent literature can be a rough proxy for its science link (e.g.,
Narin et al., 1997; Narin and Noma, 1985; Verbeek et al., 2002). The patented invention
with a strong science link is likely to have drawn on new scientific knowledge. Following
this idea, I consider a patent from federally funded research project with a higher proportion
of NPRs in its references than a certain threshold as an invention in the scientific commons.
I set the threshold on a quantile-basis. For example, if a patent had an NPR share higher
than x% of the patents in the data with federal funding, that patent is classified as scientific
commons. The value of x varies, and I use 50%, 75%, and 90% to check the sensitivity
of the analysis results to the value of the threshold. For regression, I generate three binary
variables (NPRx, x ∈ {50, 75, 90}) that took the value of 1 if the patent of interest has an
NPR share higher than each quantile and contains the statement of government interest, and
0 otherwise. Interaction terms between these variables and PostTransfer were created
(NPRx × PostTransfer). The regression results are presented in the Table 4.13.
The coefficients of NPRx × PostTransfer are statistically insignificant at the 0.1




In this study, I explored how granting a firm the exclusive right to use the university’s
invention does affect development of follow-on inventions.
The prior literature on the broad discussion around the necessity for a formal institution
that enables exclusive use of university inventions derive first two hypotheses: granting a
firm the exclusive access to a university’s invention promotes the recipient working toward
follow-on inventions (H1), and also encourages non-recipients’ to work on subsequent in-
ventions (H2). The studies on the concerns about the consequence of the privatization of
scientific commons derive the third hypothesis: the size of the positive impact of giving the
exclusive right to use a university’s invention to an outside firm on the rate of follow-on
invention is marginalized when the invention is featured as a part of the scientific commons
(H3).
I empirically tested the three hypotheses by considering patent ownership transfers from
universities to firms as a way of granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s in-
ventions. I operationalized the universities’ inventions in the scientific commons in three
ways: patents on the outcomes of publicly funded research, patents that have scientific pa-
per pairs with federal sponsorship, and patents that have a strong science link measured
by NPR with federal sponsorship. My data consisted of 913 US granted patents that were
transferred from 107 intensive research universities to firms in the United States between
2000 and 2013.
My analysis utilizing variations in the timing of the patent transfer yielded several in-
teresting findings. First, there was no evidence showing that conferring exclusive access
to a university’s inventions to an outside firm through patent transfer affects the recipient’s
innovative activities around the university’s invention. However, I did find robust evidence
showing that the rate of non-recipient subsequent inventions increased after a patent trans-
fer.
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These findings imply that granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inven-
tions positively affects the rate of follow-on invention, realized through promoting inno-
vative activities of the non-recipients around the university’s inventions. The studies by
Drivas et al. (2017) and Thompson et al. (2018) drew the same conclusion by analyzing
exclusive patent license data of University of California.
The positive externality can be explained by following two. One is as an indicator of
increasingly invigorated innovative activities around the transferred university’s patented
inventions. Another possibility is as the trigger of the innovative activities around the uni-
versity’s invention. Acquisition of a university’s patent by an outside firm might encourage
other entities to dive into developing and preempting relevant inventions in the belief that
the university’s transfer of the patent may be related to future technological opportunities.
If any of these mechanisms worked, why is there no evidence showing an increase in the
rate of a recipient’s follow-on invention after the patent transfer? I suggest two hypothetical
explanations, which requires empirical tests in the future.
One is self-selection. Those who are not capable of developing inventions relative to the
university’s patent or are not willing to develop such follow-on inventions may seek to ob-
tain the university’s invention from the beginning. A study by Kelley (2011) suggested that
firms use the acquisition of external patents to equip themselves with intellectual property
assets that they were not capable of internal development.
Another is the incentive for developing alternative inventions. After acquiring exclu-
sive access to a university’s patented invention, the recipient may have become to focus
on making peripheral technologies that are necessary for commercializing the university’s
invention they obtained. This can include reconfiguration of the technical specifications
or technological performance improvements to the original inventions. It may also be the
case that a firm acquires a university’s inventions not to initiate a new R&D project but to
solve the technical issues of an ongoing project (Cohen et al., 2002). The outcomes of these
efforts are unlikely to end up with new inventions that are sufficiently novel to be patented.
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On the other hand, those who did not have the accessibility to the university’s inventions
but are interested in capturing the relevant technological opportunities must invent around
or develop substantially improved inventions than the university’s invention in question in
order not to infringe upon the existing patents. This could have driven the nonrecipients’
“patented” inventions around the university’s inventions.
Surprisingly, my analysis found no evidence showing that granting a firm the univer-
sity’s inventions in scientific commons marginalizes its positive effect on the development
of follow-on inventions. Instead, doing so appeared to promote non-recipients’ follow-on
inventions.
Based on this analysis result, one might claim that we need to promote a university’s
practice of granting a firm the exclusive access to its inventions in the scientific commons.
However, my findings should not be interpreted in this way. First, my findings could be
the result of the universities’ careful selection of patents for transfer or the existence of
an institutionalized screening process to ensure that the benefit of enabling exclusive ac-
cess to the university’s invention exceeds its probable social cost. In the United States,
such a screening process is already institutionalized. By law, universities must report the
transfer of patent ownership and obtain approval from the federal funding agencies if the
patents are based on the outcomes of federally funded research. It is essential to take into
account how such institutions work well when discussing its social welfare consequence.
Second, this finding should be interpreted restrictively as the impact of the privatization of
the university’s inventions in the scientific commons on the rate of follow-on inventions
rather than on the entire innovation or the social welfare. Encouraging follow-on inven-
tion is not necessarily socially desirable, and even doing so may drive the duplication of
R&D (e.g., Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Wright, 1983; Jones and Williams, 2000). Third,
this finding may hold only for the universities’ “patented inventions”, not necessarily for
the universities’ entire knowledge. As discussed in Section 2, once universities patent on
inventions containing the scientific research outcome, doing so immediately privatize the
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probable scientific commons. Hence, the transfer of patented inventions in scientific com-
mons to private entities may not generate or aggravate the “privatization of scientific com-
mon” effect. Empirical analysis on how the privatization of scientific commons that are not
patented affects the development of follow-on inventions is necessary for more conclusive
understanding.
4.6 Contribution and Limitations
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, the present research advances the long-
standing debate on the consequences of granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s
inventions for innovation. My study sheds the first empirical light on the impact to the rate
of follow-on invention of the transfer of patents to inventions that are featured as part of the
scientific commons on the rate of follow-on inventions. Contrary to such general concern,
conferring a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions in the scientific commons
patent transfer promoted the development by non-recipients of follow-on inventions. This
study also empirically contributes to expanding the recent scholarly efforts toward eluci-
dating how a university’s exclusive patent licensing affects the rate of follow-on innovation
(Drivas et al., 2017; Thompson et al., 2018). The contribution of the present study lies in
the fact that I directly examined the impact of privatization of universities’ inventions in the
scientific commons and investigated the impact on the rate of follow-on inventions more
comprehensively by analyzing the 107 research-intensive US universities’ patent transfer
data than using a few selected universities’ cases of exclusive patent licensing.
Second, this study contributes to the literature on the NIS by emphasizing a less-
explored role of universities in the NIS— patent supplier in the market for patents. Prior
literature on the NIS describes universities as the locus of knowledge creation and flow
(Mowery et al., 2004; Youtie and Shapira, 2008). My study points to this other role of uni-
versities, which may shape the dynamics of innovation differently from the conventional
ways. Given that a patent confers the legal right for the patent owner to exclude others from
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using the patented invention, universities as patent suppliers need to be distinctively under-
stood separate from the conventional view of the roles and positions of universities in the
innovation system. My study hints by showing that the observed effect of the university’s
patent transfer on the follow-on inventions is difficult to be explained by the technology
transfer effect alone. If the university’s patent transfer served a channel for knowledge dif-
fusion and technology transfer, the patent recipient’ innovative activities around the trans-
ferred patents should have been prompted. Yet, my analysis found no evidence. This may
indicate that it is necessary to explore further in depth how universities play in the mar-
ket for patents and the consequence of their patent trading activities for innovation, with
the distinct perspective from the conventional role of universities as the central innovative
players for technology transfer.
The present study has weaknesses that may become opportunities for future research.
The empirical findings were based on the US case because the analysis was enabled by data
on US patents that were transferred by US universities. I hope future studies to add more
evidence from the case of non-US countries.
As an empirical strategy, I used the number of patent forward citations as the proxy for
the rate of follow-on inventions of the focal patented invention. However, this empirical
strategy is imperfect because not all inventions are patented (Cohen et al., 2000; Moser,
2012), nor are all follow-on inventions patented. Hence, my use of the patent forward
citation captures only part of the entirety of follow-on inventions.
There are various reasons for universities to transfer their patents. They may transfer
ownership of patents to their spin-offs or sell the patents to firms through typical market
transactions. Although it is likely true that the different reasons for patent ownership trans-
fer may generate heterogeneous dynamics regarding its impact on the rate of follow-on
inventions, my study did not take into account this probable heterogeneity for the data
limitation.
I hope my work becomes a stepping stone for future studies to explore more about
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The present dissertation has explored how the market for patents shapes innovation. In the
first essay, I examined how a firm’s purchase of a patent affects other firms’ development
of technologies relevant to that patent. In particular, this study focused on examining the
negative externality of a firm’s patent purchase to the market competitor’s innovative activ-
ities when the patent is crucial for the rival firm’s market operations. A three-firm model
in this study predicted that when a firm purchases a patent related to crucial technological
input for their market competitor’s production, it negatively affects the rival’s production
level and the development of technologies relevant to the patent of interest. This is because
after the firm purchases the patent, it becomes capable of manipulating the rival’s market
operations by leveraging the ex-post patent holdup risk to the rival firm, and this risk deters
the rival firm from developing the relevant technology.
I empirically tested the derived prediction by analyzing the case of Nortel’s patent
auction in 2011. As part of its bankruptcy, the Canadian telecommunication equipment
company Nortel liquidated its communication technology patent portfolio through a patent
auction, where some global smartphone manufacturers and technology firms participated
in the bidding. The fact that telecommunication technology is a crucial input for mak-
ing smartphones, and that the participants at this auction were in competition with each
other in the smartphone market, made this a good case to use for my analysis. According
to the model prediction, the auction-winning firms that could acquire the Nortel patents
were expected to divert the auction-losing firms’ development of technologies relevant to
the Nortel patents. My analysis, using a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, found
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strong evidence supporting this prediction. The auction-losing firms became less active in
developing telecommunication technologies that had direct technological links to the Nor-
tel patents after other firms acquired them at the auction. Interestingly, this impact existed
for a short-term. The existing literature and my additional analysis suggested that, through
post-auction strategy, the auction-losing firms became to cope with the probable ex-post
patent holdup risk raised by the auction-winning firms’ acquisition of the Nortel patents.
Essay 2 focused on the institutional tension between patent and antitrust law. In this
study, I examined how antitrust regulation of a firm’s patent consolidation impacts the rate
of follow-on innovation. Toward this end, I built an analytical model to illustrate how a
firm’s patent consolidation and consequential formation of patent monopolies affect the
development of follow-on innovation. The model predicted that when a firm consolidates
patents around a technology that is substitute for the technology they already possess, it
discourages development of follow-on innovations by market competitors and simultane-
ously removes the incentive for the firm that purchased the patent to develop any follow-on
innovations. In this case, authority’s regulation of patent monopoly formation through pre-
vention of patent consolidation was expected to promote market competitors’ follow-on
innovation activities.
For the empirical test, I analyzed the case of the US Department of Justice’s (DoJ) par-
tial regulation of CPTN Holdings’ (a consortium of Microsoft, Oracle, EMC, and Apple)
consolidation of Novell’s software patents in 2011, considering the patented inventions as
the outcome of the innovative activities. Most of Novell’s patents had been shared with
the Linux community through the Open Invention Network (OIN), which was jointly es-
tablished by its six member companies (Novell, IBM, Red Hat, Sony, Philips, and NEC)
to protect the open-source software community from software patent infringement disputes
through pooling the patents. In 2010, Novell tried to sell its software patents to CPTN
Holdings, but the US DoJ intervened in the deal because CPTN’s member companies’ con-
solidation of the Novell patents could be detrimental to competition in the software market.
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The intervention was a partial regulation of patent transfer whereby Novell had to retain
the patents that were originally planned to be consolidated by Microsoft. However, the rest
of the patents could be successfully aggregated by the other three member companies of
CPTN. I capitalized on this partial regulation for my analysis. Using data on the Novell
patents that were the subject of this transfer deal, I compared the number of follow-on
inventions created for the regulated patents and those created for the transferred patents
after the DoJ’s intervention. Because OIN member companies were in market competition
with the patent consolidating firms in the software market, my theoretical model expected
that the OIN members would develop more follow-on inventions for the regulated patents
than for the transferred patents. My analysis using DiD and a synthetic control approach
found robust evidence supporting this prediction.
In the third essay, I moved the lens to a university’s patent transfer activity. In particular,
I focused on whether granting an outside firm exclusive access to a university’s inventions
through patent ownership transfer promotes or discourages innovative activities around the
focal university’s patents. The literature on the necessity for formal institutions that enable
exclusive access to a university’s inventions expects that granting firms the exclusive access
to a university’s inventions will promote the innovative activities around the university’s
invention by both the recipient of exclusive access and the non-recipients (H1, H2). The
scholarly discussion of the privatization of university inventions in the scientific commons
suggested that conferring a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions in scientific
commons marginalizes its probable positive impact on the rate of follow-on inventions
(H3).
I empirically tested the three derived hypotheses by analyzing the panel data of US
patents that were transferred from 107 research-intensive US universities to firms between
2000 and 2013. I operationalized inventions in the scientific commons with patents on
federally funded research or patents that had a strong science link, such as scientific paper
pairs or extensive citation to the non-patent references. My analysis found no evidence
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showing that the recipient’s follow-on invention development was encouraged after the
university transferred patent ownership to the firm. In contrast, it seemed to promote the
development of follow-on inventions by the non-recipients of the university’s patent. In-
terestingly, there was no evidence showing that a university’s transfer of patents that are
featured as the scientific commons marginalized this positive impact. From the findings,
I concluded that granting a firm the exclusive access to a university’s inventions through
patent transfer seems to encourage non-recipients’ subsequent innovative activities through
the signal mechanism. The patent transfer may indicate the emergence of technological op-
portunity, which encourages other innovators to jump into developing technologies around
the university’s transferred patents.
5.2 Conclusion and Policy Implication
5.2.1 Conclusion
The three essays jointly draw the following conclusions. First, the market for patents should
not be considered merely a part of the market for technology. As the first essay showed,
firms have economic incentives to purchase external patents if they are critical for a rival’s
market operations. Doing so gives strategic benefits in market competition to the patent
purchasing firm by allowing it to leverage a market rival’s patent holdup risk. In this case,
the firm’s purchase of a patent imposes a greater cost of innovation on the rival firm. Al-
though patent transfers can be an alternative method of transferring technology or be the
result of technology transactions, we need to recognize that the market for patents has a
distinctive nature separate from the market for technology.
The findings in the second essay reached the same conclusion but then went further
to show that when a firm consolidates substituting patents for what it already owns, an
antitrust issue can arise for the purchasing firm at the same time as the purchase brings
negative externality to market competitors’ follow-on innovative activities. However, this
consequence does not occur if the subject of the transaction is a technological idea. This
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implication could be particularly important for policymakers who seek to encourage the
trading of patent ownership in the belief that an active market for patents will encourage
innovation by promoting the transfer of technology.
Second, there is an immediate call for cross-domain policy discourse and interdisci-
plinary scholarly work regarding how the market for patents affects social welfare. As the
second essay explored, patent transfers could raise issues in the area of antitrust as well as
in the innovation policy domain. Although Essay 2 contributed to explorations of how the
market for patents could be particularly pertinent to antitrust and innovation policy, an area
requiring further comprehensive exploration is whether and how the patent market might
shape various dimensions of social welfare.
Third, when it comes to understanding the consequences of patent protection for in-
novation, an important factor to consider is who owns which patents rather than solely
emphasizing whether patent protection of technological ideas promotes or discourages in-
novation. The prior discussion was focused on the tension between the opposite effects
that patent protection has on innovation: on the one hand, the patent system incentivizes
innovation by rewarding innovators with a temporal monopoly on a technological idea, but
on the other hand, it can restrict knowledge diffusion and bar access to inputs that would
encourage further innovation. The present dissertation extends this conventional under-
standing by showing that the consequences of patent protection for innovation may depend
on the ownership of the patent—in other words, who owns which patents. The first essay
suggests that if a patent is owned by those who have a strong incentive to use the patent
strategically against rival firms, the existence of the patent may work toward distorting a
rival firm’s innovative activities.
The second essay concluded that if a patent is owned by a patent monopolist, the exis-
tence of the patent may discourage market competition and follow-on innovation by market
competitors. This conditional consequence to innovation from the existence of patents is
also supported by the third essay. Patent ownership transfer from a university to a firm
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could be a indicator of emerging technological opportunity that induces more follow-on
innovation by non-recipients of exclusive access to a university’s inventions.
5.2.2 Policy Implications
The three essays of this dissertation point to the presence of externality as the key feature
of the market for patents. The existence of externality highlights why the market for patents
needs to be subject to policy discussion about its consequences to social welfare.
In the remainder of this section, I describe the policy implications of this dissertation
while providing useful actions that policymakers can use when formulating measures for
promoting technological innovation, when the subject comes to the market for patents.
(1) Determine which patent transfers will bring externality
First of all, it is necessary to investigate which patent transfers might impose which type
of externality upon whom. I suggest that governmental authorities should first distinguish
whether the patent transfer in question is for a technology transfer or for the transfer of the
patent exclusion right. If the latter is the case, the patent transfer can generate the negative
externality issues already discussed. Answering the following two questions can be helpful
in this regard:
• Does the purchasing firm have more incentive than the seller does to use the patent to
impose a greater level of ex-post patent holdup risk to other firms?
• Does the patent purchasing firm possess any patents on technologies that are substi-
tutable for the patent in question?
Regarding the probable positive externality of a patent transfer influencing follow-on
innovative activities, the regulatory authority may need to ascertain whether the underlying
technological idea in the transferred patent is part of emerging technological opportunities.
If this question is answered positively, the authority can expect the patent transfer to
have a positive externality on follow-on innovative activities among even those who did
not acquire the patent.
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Note that both negative and positive externalities can occur with the same patent trans-
fer. For example, a firm may purchase patents that are part of emerging technological
opportunities, while at the same time, such patents could be critical for some of its market
rival’s operations. In this case, the net effect of the patent transfer becomes the subject of
empirical analysis.
(2) Investigate who the patent seller is and which entities would be affected by the
externality
Is the governmental authority’s intervention in a patent transfer always desirable if the
patent transfer is likely to impose a negative externality on others’ innovative activities?
The answer is dependent upon who the patent seller is and who might suffer from
a negative externality. The first essay showed that once a firm purchases a patent that
is crucial for rival firms’ market operations, the focal firm’s patent acquisition can deter
competitors’ innovative activities around the patent, but only for a short time. The damping
effect is short-term because rival firms may be able to equip themselves to mitigate the
patent transfer-induced holdup risk. In that case, the governmental authority’s intervention
in the patent transfer may not be necessary.
However, if rival firms are not capable of building an adequate coping strategy (e.g., as
with small businesses), the impact of negative externality could persist long enough to harm
the business. In this case, the governmental authority may need to consider a proper policy
instrument to allow for intervention in the patent transfer, either directly or indirectly.
It is also important to take into account who the patent seller is. When the patent seller
is a failing firm, restricting its patent sale because of concerns about negative externality
to other firms’ innovative activities implicitly imposes an exit cost on the patent owner.
The restricted patent liquidation effectively weakens the patent’s enforceability and erodes
patent-induced ex-ante incentive for innovation. Furthermore, the restricted patent’s en-
forceability may induce less-efficient players to enter the market, which in turn might be
harmful to consumer welfare (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1996).
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In contrast, it is also possible that proper restriction of a patent transfer and the oppor-
tunistic patent enforcement that would occur thereafter can help innovation, as hinted by
the literature on compulsory licensing (e.g., Moser and Voena, 2012; Tandon, 1982).
Such probable opposite consequences of governmental restriction on patent transfer for
the protection of innovation is not different from the conventional debate about whether the
patent system properly incentivizes or hampers innovation.
One can consider the governmental purchase of a failing firm’s patents to be an alter-
native policy instrument, which was originally discussed by Kremer (1998). For example,
as studied in Essay 2, when a failing firm tries to sell its patents, if it is expected that the
patent buyer would then have an excessive concentration of existing patents on an upstream
technology, the government could consider acquiring the patent by itself as a possible in-
tervention option. In doing so, the patent seller would still obtain the salvage value of the
patent, to some extent (i.e., the ex-ante value of the patent), while the government would be
able to ensure that the patent would not be used to discourage innovation or market compe-
tition. Later, the government can place the patent in the public domain so that anyone can
use the invention.
In Essay 3, I showed that a university’s patent ownership transfer to a firm encourages
the purchaser’s rival firms to conduct innovative activities related to the patent. I suggested
that this was because the university’s patent transfer may be indicative for an emerging
technological opportunity to the rest of the innovating firms in the field and, thus, promote
follow-on innovative activities by them. If so, should the authorities encourage patent trans-
fers at universities to prompt innovation? One cannot draw this conclusion. The positive
externality was only for “follow-on innovation” as opposed to all possible innovative activ-
ities. If the university’s patent transfer results in overinvestment in follow-on innovations,
it could lead to suboptimal resource allocations for R&D from a societal viewpoint. Ac-
cordingly, policymakers need to determine from the start whether the positive externality
for follow-on innovation of a patent transfer is socially desirable.
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Note that my study did not examine the situation where a firm acquires the patent on a
technology that is complementary to technologies the firm already owns. Given that acquir-
ing complementary technological assets enhances an innovator’s appropriability (Teece,
1986), while also becoming a crucial resource for further innovation, how the patent trans-
fer for complementary technology acquisition affects innovation will be an intriguing future
research question. The combination of my study’s findings and the existing literature leads
me to suggest that a patent purchase made by a firm for the acquisition of complementary
patented technology will bring somewhat less obvious effects on innovation. The patent
transfer may promote the patent-purchasing firm’s innovative activities while making rival
firms less active in developing technologies relevant to the transferred patent, if the patent
is crucial for rival firms’ operations.
All the suggestions I have made above are inconclusive initial sketches. Nevertheless,
I believe that this discussion could serve as a stepping stone for later research further ex-





ROBUSTNESS CHECK (CHAPTER 3)
Use of count-variable models
The nature of the dependent variable is count variable. Although the natural log-transformation
of the count variables is widely used in regression analysis, it can be problematic when
dealing with the zero-observations (i.e., adding 1s). In this case, using Poisson or Negative
binomial model is preferred (Ohara and Kotze, 2010). To check whether my findings are
robust to the count-variable regression models, I run the Poisson- and negative binomial
models1 while using the four forward-citation variables without log-transformation. Ta-
ble A.1 and A.2 report the regression results. The signs and statistical significance of the
coefficients of the regulated are largely consistent with the main regression result.
Placebo Test
Could the present study’s findings be a result of coincidence? To rule out this possibility,
I conducted a placebo-test. I posited that the Novell’s patents sale and DoJ’s intervention
into it occurred on April 20, 2008 (placebo intervention date). Then, I counted the four
forward citation variables beginning from the placebo intervention date and up until April
20, 2011 (3-year window). As a control variable, I counted the number of forward citations
accrued by the two groups of Novell patents from April 20, 2005, to April 20, 2008. If my
finding is specific to the actual timing of the DoJ’s intervention, the number of follow-on
inventions for the regulated and transferred patents after the placebo intervention date is
unlikely to be different in the given time window. Table A.3 reports the regression result of
this placebo test.
1 I used generalized linear model with family(poisson) and family(negative binomial) respectively
employing the robust standard error to avoid issue of misspecification of the distribution
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Table A.1: Poisson Regression
PostCiteOIN PostCiteCPTN PostCiteRem PostCiteAll
Regulated 0.873∗∗∗ 0.300 0.154 0.159









nClaim -0.000362 0.0107 0.0110∗ 0.00881∗
(0.00742) (0.00979) (0.00576) (0.00518)
DoJConcern 0.0357 -0.337∗ -0.108 -0.225
(0.302) (0.204) (0.164) (0.152)
CiteOINPat 0.454 -0.0501 0.00303 0.132
(0.487) (0.224) (0.204) (0.185)
CiteMSPat -0.0806 0.0129 -0.00932 0.00630
(0.319) (0.203) (0.143) (0.127)
EuroFam -0.699 -0.118 -0.760∗∗∗ -0.725∗∗∗
(0.554) (0.295) (0.292) (0.236)
Constant -29.11 -31.76∗ -0.303 -0.433
(.) (17.50) (0.976) (0.854)
AppYrFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TechFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 432 432 432 432
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients of regulated are statistically insignificant at the 0.1 significance level
across all the columns. Specifically, the statistical significance of coefficient of regulated
on ln(PostCiteOIN+1) disappears. This indicates that my original findings are specific to
the actual timing of the DoJ’s intervention.
Sub-Sample Regression
Could my findings be simply driven by the peculiar characteristics of patents that were
acquired by a certain CPTN member company? To rule out this possibility, I constructed
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Table A.2: Negative Binomial Regression
PostCiteOIN PostCiteCPTN PostCiteRem PostCiteAll
Regulated 0.476∗∗ 0.101 0.163 0.178









nClaim 0.00481 0.0102 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗
(0.00839) (0.00737) (0.00407) (0.00396)
DoJConcern 0.228 -0.614∗∗∗ -0.142 -0.237∗
(0.253) (0.188) (0.134) (0.122)
CiteOINPat 0.441 0.0583 -0.125 0.00494
(0.323) (0.207) (0.133) (0.117)
CiteMSPat -0.111 0.291 0.0542 0.0922
(0.238) (0.182) (0.118) (0.107)
EuroFam -0.560 -0.00309 -0.201 -0.368∗∗
(0.368) (0.266) (0.207) (0.175)
Constant -29.15∗∗∗ -30.10 -1.378∗∗∗ -1.291∗∗
(1.581) (.) (0.511) (0.512)
AppYrFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TechFE Yesb Yes Yes Yes
Observations 432 432 432 432
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
three sets of patent sub-samples by excluding patents that were acquired by Oracle, EMC,
and Apple respectively at a time, and ran the regression for each sub-sample. Table A.4 to
Table A.6 present the regression results. The coefficient of the regulated stays positive and
statistically significant at least the 0.1 significance level.
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Table A.3: Placebo Test
ln(PostCiteOIN+1) ln(PostCiteBuyer+1) ln(PostCiteRem+1) ln(PostCiteAll+1)
Regulated -0.0853 -0.0255 0.0330 -0.0157









nClaim 0.00528∗∗ 0.00167 0.00462 0.00399
(0.00236) (0.00330) (0.00314) (0.00334)
DoJConcern 0.0167 -0.0658 -0.170∗ -0.0976
(0.0742) (0.0870) (0.0924) (0.0919)
CiteOINPat 0.0878 -0.0733 -0.238∗∗ -0.214∗∗
(0.0668) (0.0850) (0.0928) (0.0975)
CiteMSPat 0.0108 0.0742 0.0864 0.122
(0.0623) (0.0796) (0.0871) (0.0870)
EuroFam -0.110 0.00315 0.0475 -0.0302
(0.0838) (0.102) (0.123) (0.116)
Constant 0.821∗∗∗ -0.418 0.247 0.968∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.526) (0.243) (0.236)
R2 0.275 0.345 0.655 0.631
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.294 0.628 0.602
Observations 346 346 346 346
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Regression excluding Oracle-Purchased Patents
ln(PostCiteOIN+1) ln(PostCiteCPTN+1) ln(PostCiteRem+1) ln(PostCiteAll+1)
Regulated 0.146∗∗ -0.0152 0.000339 -0.0133









nClaim -0.00145 0.00361 0.00249 0.00217
(0.00218) (0.00333) (0.00345) (0.00341)
DoJConcern 0.0228 -0.124∗ -0.0441 -0.0767
(0.0732) (0.0740) (0.105) (0.101)
CiteOINPat 0.0874 0.0269 0.0566 0.105
(0.0654) (0.0758) (0.107) (0.102)
CiteMSPat -0.0435 0.0791 0.0121 0.0147
(0.0646) (0.0700) (0.0884) (0.0862)
EuroFam -0.0906 -0.0126 -0.0934 -0.0873
(0.0939) (0.0786) (0.146) (0.135)
Constant -0.121 -0.308 0.268 0.309
(0.162) (0.246) (0.283) (0.269)
R2 0.195 0.412 0.682 0.676
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.352 0.650 0.643
AppYrFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TechFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 335 335 335 335
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Regression excluding EMC-Purchased Patents
ln(PostCiteOIN+1) ln(PostCiteCPTN+1) ln(PostCiteRem+1) ln(PostCiteAll+1)
Regulated 0.201∗∗∗ 0.0233 0.176∗ 0.211∗∗









nClaim -0.000353 0.00416 0.00192 0.00261
(0.00223) (0.00349) (0.00384) (0.00373)
DoJConcern 0.0109 -0.123 0.139 0.0442
(0.0691) (0.0767) (0.105) (0.101)
CiteOINPat 0.137∗∗ -0.0197 -0.0856 -0.0655
(0.0563) (0.0855) (0.108) (0.110)
CiteMSPat -0.0228 0.0104 0.0496 -0.0147
(0.0611) (0.0718) (0.0872) (0.0858)
EuroFam -0.0423 -0.0575 -0.0958 -0.119
(0.0799) (0.0844) (0.123) (0.127)
Constant -0.251 -0.540∗∗ 0.382 0.0734
(0.164) (0.265) (0.261) (0.269)
R2 0.257 0.454 0.668 0.670
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.396 0.633 0.634
AppYrFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TechFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 323 323 323 323
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Regression excluding Apple-Purchased Patents
ln(PostCiteOIN+1) ln(PostCiteCPTN+1) ln(PostCiteRem+1) ln(PostCiteAll+1)
Regulated 0.121∗ 0.0197 0.0901 0.0589









nClaim -0.00102 0.000921 0.00269 0.00158
(0.00231) (0.00365) (0.00359) (0.00347)
DoJConcern -0.00453 -0.109 0.0328 -0.0657
(0.0656) (0.0751) (0.105) (0.0982)
CiteOINPat 0.128∗ 0.000973 0.00817 -0.00451
(0.0694) (0.0795) (0.110) (0.101)
CiteMSPat -0.0305 -0.0164 0.0198 0.00347
(0.0642) (0.0686) (0.0916) (0.0853)
EuroFam -0.00649 0.0309 -0.0223 -0.0569
(0.0761) (0.0871) (0.126) (0.121)
Constant -0.407∗ -0.590∗ 0.213 -0.102
(0.239) (0.326) (0.283) (0.319)
R2 0.251 0.446 0.647 0.670
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.389 0.611 0.636
AppYrFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TechFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 332 332 332 332
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Placebo regulation date: April 20, 2008
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX B
OVERVIEW OF SYNTHETIC CONTROL METHOD (CHAPTER 3)
Abadie and Gardeazabal(2003) and Abadie et al.(2010) pioneered the SC method. The
key principle of the SC is creating a synthetic counter-factual of the treatment-group by
mixing individual units from the pool of control units (i.e., donor pool). The mix of control
units becomes the SC unit. In this section, I briefly explain how the SC method works by
reviewing two seminal works on the subject by Abadie et al. (2010) and Kreif et al. (2016).
Abadie et al.(2010) describes how to apply the SC method when there is one treated
unit and multiple control units.
Consider that there are J + 1 units. The first unit is the one that is exposed to the
treatment of interest (i.e., the DoJ’s intervention into the patents transfer in the present
study) at T0 + 1 whereas the rest of them (from the unit 2 to J + 1) have not been assigned
to the treatment of interest during the period of observation. The outcome of each unit is
observed from time t = 1 to t = T (where T > T0). The outcome of each unit at time t
can be modeled into:
Yjt = Y
N
jt + αjtDjt (B.1)
where Y Njt is the treatment-free outcome of the jth unit at time t, αjt is the treatment effect,
and Djt is the binary variable that takes the value of 1 if unit j is assigned to the treatment
at time t where t ∈ [T0 + 1, ..., T ].
Y Njt is a linear combination of the time fixed effect (δt), a vector of the time-invariant
unobserved factor(s) (µj), and the time-invariant observed factor(s) (Zj).
Y Njt = δt + λtµj + θtZj + εjt (B.2)
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Now, consider the treated unit. Since Y N1t is unobservable, the SC method instead uses
a weighted sum of the post-treatment outcomes of the units in the donor pool ( ˆY N1t ) as the
“synthesized counter-factual” of the treated unit.
The weights(W ) are chosen so that the weighted pre-treatment outcome as well as other
selected covariates of untreated units are as close as possible to those of the treated unit.









(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ) (B.3)
where X1 is the vector of covariates including the pre-treatment outcome of the treated
unit, X0 is the vector of the covariates of the untreated units, V is the matrix that specifies
the relative importance of the covariates and the pre-treatment outcome.
The treatment effect is estimated by α̂1t = Y1t − ˆY N1t . Abadie et al.(2010) showed
that α̂1t is an unbiased estimator of α1t if the covariates and pre-treatment outcome of the
synthetic control equal to those of the treated units.
Kreif et al.(2016) suggests an extended version of the SC method for cases where mul-
tiple treated and control units exist. The key idea is to aggregate treated units into a single
aggregated treated unit; this is accomplished by taking the weighted average of the charac-
teristics of all the treated units. Then, the SC of the aggregated treated unit is constructed
by the same procedure used by Abadie et al. (2010).
In sum, one can make the aggregated treated unit by taking the arithmetic average of
each treated unit’s pre-treatment period outcomes and the selected covariates. Then, the SC
is constructed by finding W , which minimizes the discrepancy between the characteristics
of the aggregated treated unit and the control units.
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